Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 23STCV23304, Date: 2024-01-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23304    Hearing Date: January 4, 2024    Dept: 49

Annika Leichtweiss v. Shapiro Property Management, et al.


MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants 727 Westbourne Vila B, LP and Moss Management Services, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Annika Leichtweiss

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a breach of habitability case. Plaintiff Annika Leichtweiss alleges she resided at a rental property in West Hollywood presently owned by Defendant 727 Westbourne Vila B, LP, and managed by Defendant Moss Management Services. Before April 2022, Defendant Westbourne Venture owned the property, and Defendant Shapiro Property Management managed it.

During Plaintiff’s tenancy beginning in 2014, Plaintiff alleges her unit has exhibited habitability issues and substandard conditions, including water leaks and mold. Defendants have failed to properly remedy the defects, causing damage to Plaintiff’s health and property. In July 2023, Plaintiff vacated the unit due to the hazardous condition.

Defendants 727 Westbourne Vila B, LP, and Moss Management Services, Inc., now move to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the Complaint. Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED. 

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) To be given leave to amend, Plaintiff must make a sufficient offer of proof at the hearing demonstrating she can plead specific facts against an officer, director, or “managing agent” of the entity Defendants, or under some other theory allowed under Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b). If she does not, no leave to amend will be given.

If leave to amend is not given, then the Defendant must file an Answer within 14 days if it hasn’t already done so.  Plaintiff to give notice, unless waived.

If leave to amend is granted, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint within 30 days. Defendant is to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Strike

A. Meet and Confer

The declaration of attorney Justin M. Marvisi reflects that the meet and confer requirement was satisfied.

B. Legal Standard

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

C. Analysis

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages at Page 11, paragraph 46 in its entirety; Page 20, paragraph 121 in its entirety; Page 20, paragraph 122 in its entirety; and Page 21, paragraph D in its entirety. (Notice 2: 2-5.) Defendants argue the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support an award of punitive damages.

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” 

As defined in § 3294(c):

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. 

(3) “Fraud” means that a defendant intentionally misrepresented or concealed a material fact and did so intended to harm a plaintiff.

“When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)

Plaintiff alleges she entered into a written residential lease for the property in 2014. (Compl. ¶ 12.) “Throughout Plaintiff’s tenancy, the Subject Property has been plagued with frequent and relentless habitability issues and substandard conditions, including but not limited to water leaks, water damage, water intrusion, moisture intrusion, toxic mold growth, mold exposure, intermittent interruptions to water and electricity supply, security concerns, ongoing nuisance, sanitation concerns, general building dilapidation, and more.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff began experiencing moisture intrusion in 2015. (Id. ¶ 18.) In 2019, Defendants took “inadequate measures” to repair the leaks. (Id. ¶ 19.) In May 2020, Plaintiff discovered that the water intrusion had reoccurred in the same previously affected location and reported her finding to Defendants. (Id. ¶ 20.) Leaks continued to spread in Plaintiff’s unit and into the building’s common areas. (Id. ¶ 20, 21.) 

In December 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic sinusitis and a nasal polyp attributed to the moisture intrusion. (Id. ¶ 22.) Removal of the polyp required surgery in April 2021. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff requested that Defendants conduct a mold evaluation of the unit, and also that she be present for the evaluation. (Id. ¶ 24.) Defendants preceded with the evaluation without Plaintiff’s presence. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

When the property was sold to Defendant Vila, Plaintiff informed Defendant of the ongoing water issues. (Id. ¶ 26.) On November 8, 2022, Plaintiff experienced a “bout of active water intrusion and notified Defendant” of the issue. (Id. ¶ 27.) Shortly after, Plaintiff traveled to Germany to care for her ailing father. (Id.) Plaintiff remained abroad for the next “several months,” where she continually communicated with Defendants about her unit. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Despite Plaintiff’s requests for updates and remedies, Defendants “ke[pt] her completely in the dark regarding the condition of her home, her belongings, and the status of any remediation efforts.” (Id. ¶ 28.) As a result, Plaintiff was forced to reschedule her return flight from Germany to Los Angeles twice. (Id. ¶ 29.) 

Based on Defendants’ failure to take action, Plaintiff commissioned a certified testing company to verify the presence of mold in the unit in April 2023. (Id. ¶ 33.) The tests confirmed elevated levels of toxic black mold. (Id. ¶ 34.) The inspector informed Plaintiff it was not safe to return to the unit. (Id.) Plaintiff vacated the property in July 2023 due to the hazardous conditions and remains without permanent housing. (Id. ¶ 14.) “Many of her personal belongings” were contaminated and unsalvageable. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “were engaged in an intentional scheme to gaslight Plaintiff regarding the condition of the Subject Property and the repairs needed to return it to a habitable condition,” and “were actively working to create a false record that would be used in the event of litigation.” (Id. ¶ 30.) 

Here, considering the allegations, Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts of fraud, oppression, or malice “perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent” of any Defendant. (CCP § 3294(b).)

Plaintiff’s contention that section 3294(b) only applies in the employee-employer context is without merit. There are numerous examples of courts applying the punitive damages analysis of that section in cases outside of the employment context. (See, e.g., CRST, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 1255 [negligence action by car occupants against truck driver and driver’s employers]; Powerhouse Motorsports Grp., Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. (2013) 221 Cal. App. 4th 867 [shareholder action against corporate defendant].) 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) To be given leave to amend, Plaintiff must make an offer of proof at the hearing demonstrating she can plead specific facts against an officer, director, or “managing agent” of the entity Defendants, or under some other theory allowed under Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).  If she does not, no leave to amend will be given.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   January 4, 2024 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court


Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.