Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 23STCV23308, Date: 2024-04-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV23308 Hearing Date: April 9, 2024 Dept: 49
MOVING PARTY: Defendants 727 Westbourne Vila B, LP and Moss Management Services, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff James Weitzman
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a breach of habitability case. Plaintiff James Weitzman alleges he resided at a rental property in West Hollywood presently owned by Defendant 727 Westbourne Vila B, LP, and managed by Defendant Moss Management Services. Before April 2022, Defendant Westbourne Venture owned the property, and Defendant Shapiro Property Management managed it.
During Plaintiff’s tenancy beginning in 2014, Plaintiff alleges his unit has exhibited habitability issues and substandard conditions, including insect infestation and intermittent disruptions to water supply and electricity, among other things. Defendants have failed to properly remedy the defects, causing damage to Plaintiff’s health and property. This case is related to two other breach of habitability cases against these Defendants, those being 23STCV23304 Annika Leichtweiss v. Shapiro Property Mangement, et al. and 23STCV23322 Vincent James Cordi v. Shapiro Property Management, et al.
Defendants 727 Westbourne Vila B, LP, and Moss Management Services, Inc., now move to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff opposed.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Defendants are ordered to file an Answer to the FAC within 21-days of this Ruling.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.
DISCUSSION:
Motion to Strike
A. Meet and Confer
The declaration of attorney Justin M. Marvisi reflects that the meet and confer requirement was satisfied.
B. Legal Standard
A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)
C. Analysis
Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages at various portions of the First Amended Complaint. (See Notice of Motion.) Defendants argue the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to support an award of punitive damages.
Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”
As defined in § 3294(c):
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
(3) “Fraud” means that a defendant intentionally misrepresented or concealed a material fact and did so intended to harm a plaintiff.
“When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)
Plaintiff alleges the subject property had insect infestation, intermittent interruptions to water supply, and inadequate building security, among other defects. (FAC ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges he “would regularly complain and document the complaints to the original manager of the building, Blake Alexander. (Id. ¶ 16.) Then, once the property was sold, “Defendants new management company Moss and Company, and its employees, including Tiffany Workman, Derek Asante and Joseph Miller picked up right where the previous owners and their agents and managers had left off.” (Id. ¶ 18.) “Rather than acknowledge the issues that were brought up by Plaintiff, Defendants by and through their agents managers, and attorneys, denied the existence of the issues, minimized them, and gaslit Plaintiff by trying to make him believe that he was imagining them.” (Id. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff also alleges:
When Derek Asante, Joseph Miller and Tiffany Workman would relay the Plaintiff’s complaints and maintenance requests, they were told by the officers and owners of Moss and Co to ignore the requests, not to contact the vendors, and to inform the tenants that her concerns were baseless. The names of these officers and owners are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, as Plaintiff only interacted with the lower-level employees identified herein. Plaintiff will seek out and identify in discovery the higher-ranking members of Defendants who directed and ratified the conduct of those she interacted with.
(Id. ¶ 23.)
Here, considering the allegations—and accepting them as true—Plaintiff has alleged sufficient or specific facts of fraud, oppression, or malice “perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent” of Defendants. (CCP § 3294(b).) Plaintiff alleges a concerted effort by Defendants to ignore, downplay, and permit habitability issues to persist at the property. If true and proven at trial, these facts could support an award of punitive damages.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 9, 2024 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.