Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV24190, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 23STCV24190, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

This is a breach of habitability case. Plaintiffs are 46 tenants who reside at the property at 625 S. San Pedro St., Los Angeles, CA 90014, owned by Defendant Abbey Apartments, L.P, and managed by Defendant SRHT Property Management Company. Plaintiffs asserts causes of action for (1) breach of the warranty of habitability, (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (3) negligence, (4) private nuisance, (5) violation of California Civil Code Section 1942.4, (6) violation of Unfair Business Practices, and (7) tenant harassment.

Defendants now demur to the First, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action. Defendants also move to strike allegations pertaining to punitive damages. Plaintiffs opposed both motions.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendants first demurrer to the First Cause of Action, labeled “breach of contract/covenant of quiet enjoyment/warranty of habitability.” When characterizing a complaint or cross-complaint, it is policy to “emphasiz[e] substance over form” (Ameron Internat. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1370, 1386.) The court construes this cause of action as three separate claims: (1) one for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) one for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (3) one for breach of contract.

Defendants argue these claims fail because Plaintiffs have failed to plead the terms of their lease agreements with sufficient particularity. The rule in California is that “[a] written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. [Citation.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy, (2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 972, 993.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ lease agreements are not set out verbatim in the Complaint, nor are they attached to the Complaint as exhibits. Therefore, Plaintiffs must plead the “legal effect” of their lease agreements.

The 46 Plaintiffs each allege the date of their written lease, the unit they live in, and the amount each paid monthly under the lease. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-54.) Beyond that, they have not alleged the legal effect of the leases or any material terms therein. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of contract is subject to demurrer, as it cannot be ascertained which portion of the leases were allegedly breached.

Like breach of contract, both the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and the implied covenant of the warranty of habitability require the existence of lease contract. However, these do not rely on any terms of the lease, and instead are implied in every lease. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Ests. (2005) 125 Cal. App. 4th 578, 588; Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 919, 925.) Be that as it may, this court is unaware of any authority holding that a Plaintiff is relieved of his obligation to plead the existence of a contract either verbatim or by its legal effect as a threshold issue to the claims. Therefore, these causes of action are also subject to demurrer.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the First Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)

Plaintiffs are given leave to amend to plead the legal effect of their lease agreement(s), including which portion of the agreements that were allegedly breached, particularly for the breach of contract cause of action. In addition, Plaintiffs should amend to allege these claims as three standalone causes of action.

Defendants also demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action for Private Nuisance, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege actual injury, and that the cause of action is duplicative.

The elements of an action for private nuisance are: (1) plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; (2) invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, that is, it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 248.)

Courts broadly construe private nuisance. “So long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege the existence of water leaks, mold, heating issues, vermin infestation, and electrical issues, among other defects or safety hazards. (Compl. ¶¶ 64-71.) This is sufficient to allege a substantial and unreasonable interference with their use and enjoyment of the property.

There is likewise no merit to Defendants’ argument that the cause of action is duplicative. A plaintiff is free to plead alternative theories of recovery, even those that are inconsistent with each other. (Dubin v. Robert Newhall Chesebrough Trust (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 465, 476-477.)

Next, Defendants demurrer to the sixth cause of action for unfair business practices, arguing Plaintiffs have not alleged an “injury-in-fact” caused by an unfair business practice.

Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice....” “The scope of section 17200 is broad, encompassing ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’ ... It governs ‘anti-competitive business practices’ as well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose ‘the preservation of fair business competition.’” [Citations.] (Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 115, 133). Whether a practice violates the section “is generally a question of fact which requires ‘consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides’ and which usually cannot be made on demurrer.” [Citation]. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants left open walls exposed in both individual units and common areas of the Subject Property, allowed severe safety hazards to exist unabated (such as a building wide gas leak, blocked exits, and a dysfunctional fire alarm control panel), allowed the elevator to be constantly broken even though several Plaintiffs are elderly or disabled, did not allow SANCHEZ to use the underground parking area even though she was disabled and her accommodation was a reasonable request, provided defective amenities and did not replace broken amenities in Plaintiffs’ units, removed or taped over several Plaintiffs’ doorbells rather than fix the units’ wiring problem, allowed individuals to freely enter the premises and commit crimes, did not effectively replace Plaintiffs’ keys if Plaintiffs’ keys were defective or broken.” (Compl. ¶ 121.)

On a demurrer, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the SAC as true. (See Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1078.) It also must read the complaint liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) Accepting the Complaint as true, and construing it liberally, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged injuries resulting from Defendants’ failure to remedy or maintain the premises.

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ references to punitive damages in the Complaint at paragraphs 95, 109, 119, and the Prayer for Relief. Defendants argue Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts to support an award of punitive damages.

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Here, Plaintiffs allege the existence of various health and safety defects at the property. (See Compl. ¶¶ 64-71.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants have been on notice of these issues “for years” yet have failed to abate them. (Id. ¶ 76.)

However, beyond the general allegations that Defendants were on notice of the defects and failed to remedy them, Plaintiffs have failed to allege the required specific facts necessary to show the requisite malice, oppression, or fraud necessary to seek punitive damages.

Additionally, these general allegations for punitive damages as contained in Paragraphs 95, 109 and 119 are legally inadequate to hold a corporate defendant to be responsible for punitive damages under Civil Code § 3294 (b).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED, with leave to amend. When amending, Plaintiffs must allege adequate specific facts to demonstrate that these corporate Defendants acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, as provided in Civil Code § 3294 (b).

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.