Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV26125, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 23STCV26125, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Maira Sosa Parada alleges she worked for Defendants CitiStaff Solutions, Inc. and Colour Republic, LLC, until Defendants terminated her because of her pregnancy. Plaintiff brings causes of action against Defendants for (1) Discrimination Based on Sex (Pregnancy) in Violation of Government Code § 12940(a); (2) Disability Discrimination in Violation of Government Code § 12940(a); (3) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of Government Code § 12940(m); (4) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code § 12940(n); (5) Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of Government Code § 12940(k); and (6) Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(h).

“[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence . . . .” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284). “In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration [citation]. The court should attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353). “Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n v. State (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205).

“[A] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284).

“If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. . . .” (CCP § 1281.4.)

The FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration provisions in any contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9 USC § 2.) The term “involving commerce” is functionally equivalent to “affecting commerce” and “signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.” (Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 US 265, 277.) “The party asserting the FAA bears the burden to show it applies by presenting evidence establishing [that] the contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce . . . .” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.)

Arguing the transaction here involved commerce, Defendant presents evidence that “CitiStaff is a temporary staffing company that provides temporary workers to companies in California, Texas, and State of Washington. CitiStaff customers are engaged in various industries that includes warehousing, logistics and manufacturing.” (Slater Decl. Exh. 2; see also Cerdas Decl. ¶ 2.) Moreover, “most” of CitiStaff’s customers “manufacture goods that are distributed and shipped to other states nationwide.” (Id.)

In addition, the Arbitration Agreement expressly calls for application of the FAA, stating that the “arbitration agreement shall be enforceable and subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).” (See Motion, Exh. A., ¶ 17; see also Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 956, 963 [finding the FAA applies “if it is so stated in the agreement.”].)

California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving disputes. “Even so, parties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so.” (Avila v. S. California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 835, 843.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Id.)

An arbitration agreement is a contractual agreement. “General contract law principles include that ‘[t]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] ... The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” [Citations.] (Garcia v. Expert Staffing W., 73 Cal. App. 5th 408, 412–13.)

Defendants have the initial burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Gamboa v. Ne. Cmty. Clinic (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158, 165.) “[I]t is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 215, 218.)

Defendant presents the declaration of Aurelio Cerdas, CitiStaff’s Director of Human Resources. (Cerdas Decl. ¶ 2.) Cerdas presents evidence that Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement during her employment onboarding on January 4, 2022. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Agreement, translated from Spanish, provides that the parties agreed to arbitrate “any and all disputes, claims or controversies (“Claims”) that they may have against each other, the Employer’s client, including its current and former agents, owners, officers, directors or current and former employees, arising out of the employment relationship between the Employee and the Employer or termination thereof.” (Motion, Exh. A, “Arbitration Agreement, ¶ 3.) Claims covered by the agreement includes, “without limitation, claims for employment discrimination and harassment under…the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

Here, Defendant has met its initial burden to establish the existence of a binding arbitration agreement that covers Plaintiff’s claims here. (See Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189 [noting that “arbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question”].) Because Plaintiff has not challenged the existence or authenticity of the agreement, nothing more is required.

Plaintiff, as the party opposing arbitration, has the burden of presenting any defenses to enforcement. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, and thus, has not done so. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164 [once a defendant proves an agreement to arbitrate exists, “[t]he opposing party then must prove any defense to enforcement of the arbitration agreement. [Citation.]”)

It is first worth noting that Colour Republic is not a moving party, and has not filed a motion for joinder. Be that as it may, the Court of Appeal has held that under the principle of equitable estoppel, “ ‘a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations.’ [Citation.]” (Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 786.)

In addition, although “[s]omeone who is not a party to a contractual arbitration provision generally lacks standing to enforce it,” there is a recognized exception “for third parties who are agents of a party to a contract.” (Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 840, 856; Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418 [“If, as the complaint alleges, the individual defendants, though not signatories, were acting as agents for the [Defendant], then they are entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provisions.”]).

Here, the causes of action against each Defendant are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations. Plaintiff alleges the Defendants were her employers, and that each Defendant was the agent of the other. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Therefore, both Defendants may invoke the Arbitration Agreement under either an agency or equitable estoppel theory. [FN 2] By failing to oppose, Plaintiff does not contend otherwise.

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Defendant’s Proof of Service reflects service on Plaintiff by mail and email on December 19, 2023. (See Proof of Service attached to 12/12/2023 moving papers.) More importantly, Plaintiff had actual notice of this pending motion. See, Stipulation, filed 1/22/24.

FN 2 - The court need not and does not determine if the other Defendant is also a “third party beneficiary” of the arbitration agreement.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.