Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV27269, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Young Hee Lim alleges she made an $85,000 loan to Defendant Sue Min Choi. Defendant has not repaid the loan. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for breach of contract and common counts.

If a plaintiff wishes to amend a complaint after the answer has been filed or after the demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the complaint “of course,” permission of the court must be obtained before the amendment will be allowed. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].)

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.

Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature. The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 (overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390).)

Plaintiff moves for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. The operative Complaint asserts causes of action for breach of contract and common counts, seeking repayment on a loan made by Plaintiff to Defendant in the amount of $85,000. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10.) By the amendment, Plaintiff will add causes of action for fraud and elder abuse.

Plaintiff represents she took Defendant’s deposition on March 14, 2025, at which point Defendant “denied any such loan and denied ever agreeing to repay the loan…” (Mtn. 3: 21-23; Mahrouyan Decl. ¶ 6.) Thus, Plaintiff contends “it is clear that she never intended to repay the monies.” (Id.) The amendment, therefore, is based on facts that occurred before the filing of the Complaint but were only learned some time later.

On April 18, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred with Defense counsel, and on April 24, 2025, Defense counsel indicated it would not stipulate to the amendment. (Mahrouyan Decl. ¶ 6.) On May 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to amend.

Here, the moving party has satisfactorily demonstrated (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324.)

The new allegations are based on the same underlying facts. Courts have explained that “it is irrelevant that new legal theories are introduced as long as the proposed amendments ‘relate to the same general set of facts.’ [Citation.]” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 761.) The amendment does not represent a significant expansion of the case. By failing to oppose, Defendant has not identified any prejudice if the amendment is allowed at this time.

Therefore, leave to amend is appropriate. This is consistent with the “policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits.” (Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Ct. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1163.) The court makes no conclusion on the merits at this time. Rather, the “better course of action” is to permit the amendment, “and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.)

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Plaintiff served the motion on Defendant’s counsel electronically on May 6, 2025. (See Proof of Service.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.