Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV27978, Date: 2025-05-28 Tentative Ruling

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF PITCHESS DOCUMENTS AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,040.00 AGAINST DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD BDG LAW GROUP

Plaintiff Julio Garcia, a Hispanic American male, worked as a Supervising Deputy Probation Officer for the County. Plaintiff alleges Defendant County discriminated against him based on his ethnicity by transferring him to a new work location and giving him increased work compared to non-Hispanic employees. Plaintiff brings causes of action for (1) FEHA discrimination, (2) FEHA harassment, (3) FEHA retaliation, (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, and (5) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5.

Plaintiff now moves to compel the production of Pitchess documents that were ordered to be produced by November 21, 2024. Defendant opposed.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production is MOOT. The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the requested amount, awarded only against the Defendant’s law firm, BDG Law Group. This award is stayed at this time, pending further court order.

Plaintiff moves to compel the production of Pitchess documents. Following the Pitchess procedure, this court ordered the County of Los Angeles and their counsel to produce all Pitchess documents within 30 days of October 22, 2024. (See 10/23/2024 Order.) Plaintiff now represents that Defendant failed to produce any Pitchess documents by the required date. Plaintiff’s counsel made multiple meet and confer attempts over the coming months to facilitate the production of the documents, but those requests were ignored. (Haney Decl. ¶¶ 3-7.)

In opposition, Defendant claims the motion is moot because Defendant produced the documents on May 13, 2025—after Plaintiff filed this motion. Plaintiff apparently does not dispute that it received the documents on or about this date.

Thus, because this court no longer needs to compel the production of the documents, the only question remaining is that of sanctions. Defendant argues the sanctions request should be denied procedurally because Plaintiff has not identified the statutory basis for sanctions. CCP section 2023.040 provides: “A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought…”

Here, the Notice of Motion states that Plaintiff seeks sanctions against both Defendant and its law firm a “in the amount of $3,040.00,” but does not identify any statutory basis for an award of same. (Notice of Motion.) This notice is technically sufficient. The “type” of sanctions is inherent in the notice, to wit, monetary. There is no requirement in section 2023.040 to state the statutory basis for the sanctions request in the notice.

Defendant was ordered to produce the documents in late-November 2024. It did not do so until May 2025 once this motion was filed. No matter the busy trial calendar of Defendant’s lead counsel, this delay is simply unreasonable, and there would be nothing unjust about awarding a reasonable monetary sanction. (See Goldsmith Decl., generally.) The amount of the sanction sought ($3,400) is also reasonable based on the multiple meet and confer attempts made by Plaintiff’s counsel to resolve the issue informally.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.