Maryetta Watkins, et al. v. Batteries Included L.P., et al.

(1) DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

(2) MOTION TO STRIKE

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant FPI Management, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Maryetta Watkins, et al.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a breach of habitability case. Plaintiffs are tenants at the property owned and operated by Defendants Batteries Included L.P. and FPI Management, Inc. Plaintiffs allege their unit exhibits insect infestations, visible mold and mildew, leaking walls, and defective plumbing. Despite requests, Defendants have allegedly failed to remedy these defects. Plaintiffs bring causes of action against Defendants for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (3) nuisance, (4) IIED, and (5) negligence.

Defendant now demurrers to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action. Defendant also moves to strike allegations pertaining to punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and statutory damages. Plaintiffs opposed both motions.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Here, it appears unlikely that Plaintiffs can amend to demonstrate that Defendant FPI was a party to the lease. Be that as it may, Plaintiffs will be afforded the opportunity at the hearing to make an offer of proof as to how they can successfully amend. If they cannot, no leave to amend will be given as to these causes of action.

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, with leave to amend.

Plaintiff has thirty (30) days leave to amend, consistent with this ruling.

Moving party to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

Demurrer to Complaint

I. Meet and Confer

The Declaration of attorney Melissa M. Eaton confirms that the meet and confer requirement was satisfied. 

II. Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)  

III. Analysis

Defendant demurrers to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action in the Complaint. Each is addressed in turn.

A. Demurrer to First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

First, Defendant argues the First and Second Causes of Action fail because no contract exists between Plaintiff and the moving Defendant FPI.

To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege “the existence of the contract.” (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97–98.) Like breach of contract, the implied covenant of the warranty of habitability requires the existence of a lease contract. (See Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 919, 925.) The rule in California is that “[a] written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. [Citation.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]”  (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy, (2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 972, 993.)

Here, Plaintiffs have attached their lease agreement to the Complaint as Exhibit A. On a demurrer, written instruments “which are the foundations of the causes of action and attached to the complaint as exhibits may also be examined by the court.” (SCEcorp v. Superior Ct. (1992) 3 Cal. App. 4th 673, 677.) On the face of that lease agreement, it would appear that only Plaintiff and Defendant Batteries Included, L.P. are parties to the agreement. (Id.)  [FN 1]

As a general rule, one who is not a party to a contract is not liable for a breach of that contract. (See Software Design & Application v. Price Waterhouse (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 464, 471.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs wholly fail to address the point made in the demurrer, namely, that Defendant FPI is not a party to the lease. Their “failure to offer reasoned analysis of [an] issue constitutes a waiver.”  (Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1009; see also In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“[t]he absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived.”]) Therefore, because Defendant FPI is not a party to the lease, the contract-based claims against it must fail.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Here, it appears unlikely that Plaintiffs can amend to demonstrate that Defendant FPI was a party to the lease. Be that as it may, Plaintiffs will be afforded the opportunity at the hearing to make an offer of proof as to how they can successfully amend. If they cannot, no leave to amend will be given.

B. Demurrer to Third Cause of Action for Nuisance

Next, Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ cause of action for nuisance is duplicative of their nuisance claim.

The elements of an action for private nuisance are: (1) plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; (2) invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, that is, it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 248.)

Courts broadly construe private nuisance. “So long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege the existence of defects to the property that cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with their use and enjoyment of the property. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18, 19, 20.) They have therefore stated a nuisance claim.

There is likewise no merit to Defendant’s argument that the cause of action is duplicative. A plaintiff is free to plead alternative theories of recovery, even those that are inconsistent with each other. (Dubin v. Robert Newhall Chesebrough Trust (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 465, 476-477.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

C. Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action

Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiffs have not stated facts sufficient to give rise to intentional infliction of emotional distress.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.  A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) (internal citations omitted). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”  (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 215, 233.)  Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’”  (Id.)

Although a claim for IIED will generally present multiple questions of fact, a court may sustain a demurrer to the claim when “the facts alleged do not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.)  The process has been described as “more intuitive than analytical.”  (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671–672.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges the property contains insect infestation, visible mold and mildew, leaking walls, and defective plumbing. (Compl. ¶ 15.) A mold test has confirmed “elevated levels of mold.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs informed Defendants that there was mold, that Plaintiffs were experiencing respiratory issues, and that the problem was causing them “extreme anxiety and discomfort. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19, 20.) Despite this knowledge, Defendants “have simply ignored [Plaintiffs’] pleas or tried to avoid fixing them properly.” (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) 

Here, considering these allegations, and accepting them same as true, Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim for IIED for pleadings purposes. At minimum, Plaintiffs have alleged extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants, done with a reckless disregard of the probability of causing them emotional distress. Thus, if true and proven at trial, the alleged conduct could give rise to a claim for IIED. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

Motion to Strike

I. Legal Standard

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

II. Analysis

A. Punitive Damages

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ references to punitive damages in the Complaint at paragraphs 38, 48, 54, and the Prayer for relief. Defendants argue Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts to support an award of punitive damages.

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” 

As defined in § 3294(c):

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. 

(3) “Fraud” means that a defendant intentionally misrepresented or concealed a material fact and did so intended to harm a plaintiff.

Additionally, “[w]hen the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)

Here, beyond the general allegations that Defendants were on notice of the defects and failed to remedy them, Plaintiffs have failed to allege the ultimate facts necessary to show the requisite malice, oppression, or fraud necessary to seek punitive damages. Moreover, although an individual named Donesha Clark is alleged to be the property manager of the property, there are no specific facts alleging that Clark acted with malice. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike punitive damages is GRANTED, with 30 days leave to amend. When amending, Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that a managing agent acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, per Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).

B. Attorney’s Fees and Statutory Damages

Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and request for “statutory damages,” arguing that they are not recoverable here. Courts are given “broad discretion” when ruling on a motion to strike.  (Camenisch v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1699).  Courts need not strike a prayer for attorney’s fees before a party “has had a full opportunity to determine, through discovery, whether a basis for recovery exists.”  (Id.)  

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike the request for attorney’s fees and statutory damages is DENIED

Moving party to give notice.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   March 13, 2024 ___________________________________