Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 23STCV29526, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV29526    Hearing Date: February 5, 2025    Dept: 49

Racheal Ball v. Essex Portfolio, L.P., et al.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFF’S SUBPOENA TO FENN TERMITE & PEST CONTROL, INC. AND REQUEST FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Essex Portfolio, L.P., Essex Property Trust, Inc., and Essex Management Corporation

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Racheal Ball

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Racheal Ball brings this action against the Essex entities, who are alleged to own or operate the rental unit at which Plaintiff lives. Plaintiff alleges her unit contains uninhabitable conditions, including waste backup and cockroach infestation, which resulted in her constructive eviction. 

Defendants now move to quash a subpoena Plaintiff issued to Fenn Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion to Quash is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The third party is ordered to turn over all documents consistent with the Subpoena from January 1, 2020 through present. 

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, unless waived.  

DISCUSSION:

Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena

A. Legal Standard

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) A motion to quash the production of documents or tangible things requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.13459(a)(5).)  “[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.”  (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)

B. Analysis

Defendants move to quash the deposition subpoena issued on third party Fenn Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Fenn is a “pest control operator” that Defendants’ allegedly hired on multiple occasions to address the cockroach infestation in Plaintiff’s unit. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 36, 40, 42.)

The subpoena seeks:

Any and all documents related to Fenn Termite & Pest Control, Inc.'s ("Fenn") services at "Avant," a property located at 1355 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, CA 90015 ("the Property"), since January 1, 2014, until the present, including, but not limited to, agreements, contracts, complaints, service reports, requests for service, inspection reports, notices, estimates, invoices, service tickets, correspondence such as letters, emails and text messages, color photographs, videos recordings, telephone records, memos, inspector's notes, and logs. Finally, any and all documents pertaining to the Property in the custody and/or control of Fenn.

(Porche Decl., Exh. A, Attach. 3.)

In short, Plaintiff seeks any documents relating to Fenn’s extermination work at the property for the last 11 years. Defendants argue that because the subpoena seeks documents about the entire multi-unit property—and not just Plaintiff’s unit—it violates the privacy rights of third parties. They suggest that the pest control documents would include “identifying information” of other tenants.  (Mtn. 5: 23.) Defendants also argue the records sought are irrelevant and overbroad. They assert there is “no likelihood that the documents for the entire complex and for 10 years will lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence…” (Id. 8: 7-11.) 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. Plaintiff contends the discovery is “relevant to the subject matter” of the action, as it will allow her “to ascertain how long the infestation issue has existed, where the infestation began and how it made its way throughout the building, what efforts Defendants have made to abate this issue and when, what pest control methods were used, and the identities of the pest control technicians and the tenants who had their units serviced.” (Opp. 5: 12-19.)

 “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552.)

First, as to the privacy concerns, it is unclear exactly what recognized privacy interests the subpoena might raise. The records could presumably indicate which units had pest issues and reveal the identities of the tenants who lived in those units. However, Defendants have not cited authority recognizing this information as particularly intrusive. The court considers the privacy interests at stake here to be fairly minor. 

Second, the court agrees with Plaintiff that the documents sought are generally relevant to this action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants repeatedly failed to effectively remediate an ongoing cockroach infestation in her unit. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-49.) Evidence is relevant if it “ha[s] any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code § 210.) Thus, when balancing the privacy interests of any third-party tenants against Plaintiff’s interest in discovering documents that are particularly relevant to her claims, this court finds the balance shifts in favor of disclosure. This conclusion is consistent with the legislature’s “very liberal and flexible standard of relevancy,” such that any “doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at 542.)

Finally, the court does agree with Defendants, however, that the subpoena’s time scope is unnecessarily broad. Plaintiff seeks documents going back to January 1, 2014. That scope is unnecessary and risks becoming unduly burdensome. The court will therefor modify the subpoena by reducing the time scope to the past 5-years (January 1, 2020 onward). Plaintiff was amenable to this limitation in the parties’ meet and confer conversations. (Yenokian Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. A.) 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Quash is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The third party is ordered to turn over all documents consistent with the Subpoena from January 1, 2020 through present. 

C. Sanctions

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

The Court declines to award expenses as the Motion was not made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   February 5, 2025 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.