Deodre Cotton v. Tri-Cities Regional Occupation Program, et al.

DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTIES: Defendant County of Los Angeles

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Deodre Cotton

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Deodre Cotton was a Dental Program Director and Dental Instructor for Defendant Tri-Cities Regional Occupation Program. Plaintiff alleges she was terminated after she fell and sustained injuries in a classroom on campus. Plaintiff, who is African American, alleges the termination was based on her disability, her request for accommodations, and her race.  

Defendant County now demurrers to the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. 

Defendant’s Demurrer is OVERRULED as to all other causes of action.

Defendant is to file an Answer within 21 days.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Demurrer

I. Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Tara Kearns, Counsel for Defendant, reflects that the parties met and conferred.

II. Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)  

III. Analysis

A. Demurrer to Causes of Action Based on Lack of Employment Relationship

Defendant first argues the FAC is uncertain because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts that the County was her employer.

Plaintiff alleges she was employed as the Dental Program Director and Dental Instructor at Defendant Tri-Cities ROP. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that Tri-Cities and the County “directly and indirectly employed plaintiff, as defined under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) at Government Code section 12926(d).” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that all Defendants “acted as agents of all other defendants.” (Id. ¶ 6.) This is the extent of specific allegations against the County.

The existence of an employment relationship is necessary to support Plaintiff’s claims. (See Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 114 [“FEHA predicates potential liability on the status of the defendants as an ‘employer.’”]; Weinbaum v. Goldfarb, Whitman & Cohen (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1314-15 [“[T]he duty on which the tort [of wrongful termination in violation of public policy] is based is a creature of the employer-employee relationship….”].) Whether any entity is a plaintiff’s employer is generally a question of fact, as “the precise contours of an employment relationship can only be established by a careful factual inquiry.’ [Citation.]” (St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal. App. 5th 301, 311–12.)

Here, Defendant cites no authority that requires a Plaintiff to plead specific facts supporting an employment relationship, as opposed to conclusory terms. Moreover, “[d]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored,” and are strictly construed “because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery.”  (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125.) Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the County was her employer for purposes of withstanding a demurrer. 

B. Demurrer to Eleventh Cause of Action for IIED

Alternatively, the County argues it is immune from Plaintiff’s common law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

“Except as otherwise provided by statute,” a public entity “is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Govt. Code § 815(a).) “As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.” (Eastburn v. Reg'l Fire Prot. Auth. (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1179.) “If the Legislature has not created a statutory basis for it, there is no government tort liability.” (State ex rel. Dep't of California Highway Patrol v. Superior Ct. (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 1002, 1009.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that the County is immune from common law torts like IIED. Therefore, Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action fails. (See Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 659, 672 [finding public entities immune from liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress].)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. 

Defendant’s Demurrer is OVERRULED as to all other causes of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   June 24, 2024 ___________________________________