Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCP02047, Date: 2025-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Eric J. Perrodin, City Attorney of the City of Compton, brought this action “in his official capacity” against Compton City Council seeking a writ of mandate and declaratory relief for the Council allegedly improperly reassigning City Attorney staff and delegating City Attorney authority to non-City Attorney personnel.

Following motion proceedings before Judge Chalfant in writs and receivers, the Second Amended Petition now asserts a single cause of action against Respondents Compton City Council and City Manager Willie A. Hopkins, Jr., for waste of City funds or resources.

Respondent Compton City Council moves for leave to file a Cross-Complaint. By the proposed Cross-Complaint, City Council and current non-party City of Compton will assert claims against Petitioner for breaches of fiduciary duty and fraud to recover damages from Perrodin and his associates for his alleged misuse and waste of City resources.

Cross-claims against complainants arising from the same transaction or series thereof, existing at the time of filing an answer, are compulsory. (See, e.g., CCP §426.30(a); Al Holding Co. v. O’Brien & Hicks, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313-14.) Leave to file compulsory cross-complaints must be granted where moving parties acted in good faith. (CCP § 426.50; Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.) The “principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section.” (Foot's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Ct. (1980) 114 Cal. App. 3d 897, 902 [emphasis added].) “The legislative mandate is clear. A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial court. A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result.” (Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.)

Here, the proposed cross-complaint is effectively a response to the underlying petition in that it accuses Perrodin of wasting city funds and resources—just as he has alleged the City Council has done. Because the pleadings are generally based on the same transaction or facts and circumstances, the cross-complaint is compulsory. Therefore, Petitioner must make a strong showing of bad faith.

Even assuming the Cross-Complaint is merely permissive, and not compulsory, leave to file the Cross-Complaint is still appropriate. Leave to file a permissive cross-complaint may be granted “in the interest of justice” at any time¿during the course of¿the action. (See CCP §428.50(c).) Here, justice requires that the parties litigate all related claims they have against each other at this time.

In opposition, Petitioner first argues that the City, who is not a current party, cannot join in the Cross-Complaint. “When a person files a cross-complaint as authorized by Section 428.10, he may join any person as a cross-complainant or cross-defendant, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if, had the cross-complaint been filed as an independent action, the joinder of that party would have been permitted by the statutes governing joinder of parties.” (CCP 428.20.) Section 378(a), which governs permissive joinder of plaintiffs, provides:

(1) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or

Here, the City Council is authorized to file a cross-complaint. In doing so, it can join the City of Compton as a cross-complainant, because each of them have a claim adverse to the petitioner in the controversy which is subject of the action. Therefore, the joinder of the City is appropriate.

Second, Petitioner argues that the Cross-Complainant’s claims will “unduly delay” the underlying action. But while allowing the cross-complaint will certainly expand the scope of this matter, this is not a sufficient ground to deny the motion. Given the related nature of the claims and conflicting accusations of wrong-doing, justice is best-served where the issues are litigated concurrently.

Next, Petitioner argues that the Cross-Complaint duplicates a pending writ proceeding. On March 12, 2025, the City of Compton filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate against Perrodin (case number 25STCP00911) “to cure the failure and continuing refusal of the City Attorney of the City of Compton, Respondent Eric J. Perrodin (“Perrodin”), to perform the duties of the City Attorney.” (McAleer Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. C, ¶ 1.) Given the pending writ, Petitioner suggests a cross-complaint “would unnecessarily multiply the City’s claims, risk contradictory and incompatible rulings, and waste judicial and party resources.” (Opp. 6: 6-9.)

It would appear, however, that the writ proceeding and the proposed cross-complaint seek different forms of relief. The writ seeks a mandate compelling Perrodin to comply with certain duties. The cross-complaint, on the other hand, seeks compensatory damages for Perrodin’s alleged malfeasance. Therefore, the actions are not duplicative. [FN 1]

This court need not address the merits of the Cross-Complaint at this time. Rather, the “better course of action” is to permit the filing “and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings,” such as by demurrer or motion to strike. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.)

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Be that as it may, this court likely has discretion to stay the cross-complaint pending resolution of the mandamus proceeding under the “judge-made rule” of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, and may entertain doing so on its own motion or the motion of a party. The rule “is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits. [Citation.]” (Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lara (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 1119.) “Unlike the statutory plea of abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 788.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.