Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV01402, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV01402, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Candace Carson and Michael Tedford were residential tenants at a property managed by Defendants Nichols Canyon Properties, LLC, Michael Simmons, and Steve Ellington. Plaintiffs allege that throughout their tenancy, their unit contained defects including lack of heat, rat infestation, and water issues, among other things. Defendants allegedly failed to remedy these issues, resulting in Plaintiffs’ constructive eviction.

Defendants’ Demurrers to the Eleventh Cause of Action are SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Alternatively to amending the Eleventh Cause of Action, by the filing of a FAC, the parties can simply stipulate that the Eleventh Cause of Action applies only to Defendants who are “landlords,” as opposed to Defendants Nicols Canyon Properties, LLC, Ellington and Simmons, who are not “landlords,” but merely “managers” or agents of the landlord(s).

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendants Ellington and Simmons each demurrer separately to the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action in the Complaint. Because the arguments raised in the demurrers are largely if not completely identical, the court addresses the demurrers together. Where necessary, the court notes distinctions between the allegations against each Defendant. Each cause of action is addressed in turn.

Plaintiffs allege the property had various habitability defects. These included a lack of heat, rat infestation, raccoons in the attic, and plumbing leaks. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-19.) On November 19, 2022, Plaintiffs’ unit sustained severe water damage when an upstairs bathroom flooded. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.) Instead of hiring a professional, Defendants attempted to repair the damage themselves. (Id. ¶ 26.) Defendant Ellington “made rushed repairs, covering the soaking wet framing with new plaster, and then insisting the repairs were complete.” (Id.) As a result, “water began seeping through the new plaster, causing visible staining, bubbling, and cracking on the walls and ceilings.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs also complained of a “foul smell permeating” the unit which made the bedroom and kitchen “unusable.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendant Ellington was allegedly dismissive of Plaintiffs’ complaints, telling them “you don’t know what you are talking about.” (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.) This forced Plaintiffs to leave the apartment and stay with family out-of-state. (Id. ¶ 32.) Defendants refused to help with relocation. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25.)

On November 29, 2022, Plaintiffs hired a professional water abatement company to take moisture readings in the Subject Unit, which showed “excessively high moisture content in the walls and ceilings.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Over the following months, Defendants failed to remedy the water issues, despite complaints to both Defendants Ellington and Simmons. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.)

“On December 7, 2022, the Department of Building Inspection inspected the Subject Unit and directed Defendants to stop cutting holes in the walls until they tested for lead and asbestos. Even so, Defendants continued to cut holes and perform shoddy attempted repairs in the Subject Unit.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Defendants never tested for lead or asbestos. (Id. ¶ 36.) “On December 19, 2022, City issued a Notice of Violation for the unpermitted repairs without lead and asbestos safety protocols.” (Id. ¶ 37.) The City issued another Notice of Violation on January 31, 2022, “regarding the water-damaged walls and ceilings.” (Id. ¶ 42.)

Throughout their tenancy, Plaintiffs allege Defendant Ellington “berated Plaintiffs for making complaints, demeaned them by dismissing their concerns and complaints, and made sexist comments and actions towards Plaintiff Cason.” (Id. ¶ 46.) Defendant Ellington’s conduct and statements are detailed in the Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 46-57.) Plaintiffs also allege they complained to Defendant Simmons “to advise him of” Defendant Ellington’s “aggressive and harassing conduct,” but Simmons ignored them. (Id. ¶ 58.)

Thus, Plaintiffs allege “[o]n March 14, 2023, as a result of Defendants’ failure to promptly and properly repair habitability defects, comply with the City’s safety requirements, creation of and failure to abate nuisances, trespasses, commencing primary renovation work without following the provisions of the Tenant Habitability Program, gender discrimination, and harassment, Plaintiffs felt they had no choice but to permanently vacate their rent-controlled home of thirteen years.” (Id. ¶ 59.)

As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs suffered “physical bodily injuries,” emotional distress, a leasehold worth substantially less than rent paid, property damage, property loss, out-of-pocket expenses, moving expenses, loss of use and enjoyment of their rental unit, and loss of a rent-controlled unit. (Id. ¶¶ 61-63.)

These allegations are more than sufficient to allege a constructive eviction. Plaintiffs allege, in great detail, that Defendants made shoddy and unsafe repairs, downplayed Plaintiffs’ complaints, and failed to comply with City notices. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228 [on demurrer, a complaint must be read liberally and in context].) Thus, Plaintiffs have stated a claim for constructive eviction.

It follows that the demurrer is not remotely uncertain. Even if it were, “[d]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored,” and are strictly construed “because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery.” (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125.) Thus, the uncertainty argument fails here and through the remainder of the demurrer.

Next, Defendants argue the fourth cause of action for tenant harassment is uncertain, fails to state facts sufficient, and seeks improper relief. Defendants content that “Plaintiffs fail to point to any conduct by Defendant that amounts to a violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code §45.33, and instead rely on the language of the Code itself in an attempt to establish a cause of action.”

The Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance is codified in Chapter IV, Article 5.3 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The legislature enacted the Ordinance on the finding that “landlords have been constructively evicting long-term tenants by engaging in harassing conduct in order to coerce vacancies.” (LAMC Ch. IV, Art. 5.3, § 45.30.) The Ordinance “augments existing protections provided to residential tenants under state, federal, and local laws to prohibit and deter tenant harassment by landlords in all rental units” and “provides an aggrieved tenant with a private right of action.” (Id., §§ 45.31, 45.35.) It goes on to enumerate sixteen nonexclusive categories of conduct that constitute “tenant harassment,” including but not limited to “[r]educing or eliminating housing services required by a lease, contract or law,” “[f]ailing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws;” and “[o]ther repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of a tenant(s) and that cause, are likely to cause, or are committed with the objective to cause a tenant(s) to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such tenancy.” (§ 45.33(1)-(16).)

Thus, the Complaint states facts sufficient and is not uncertain. Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged damages, in the form of “physical bodily injuries,” emotional distress, a leasehold worth substantially less than rent paid, property damage, property loss, out-of-pocket expenses, moving expenses, loss of use and enjoyment of their rental unit, and loss of a rent-controlled unit. (Id. ¶¶ 61-63.)

First, Defendants argue the Fifth Cause of Action is unintelligible because it fails to specify public or private nuisance. When characterizing a pleading, it is policy to “emphasiz[e] substance over form.” (Ameron Internat. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1370, 1386.) Consideration of the differences between public and private nuisance, in context with the allegations in the Complaint, makes clear that this cause of action is one for private nuisance. (See, e.g. Koll-Irvine Ctr. Prop. Owners Assn. v. Cnty. of Orange (1994) 24 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1041 [“Unlike public nuisance, which is an interference with the rights of the community at large, private nuisance is a civil wrong based on disturbance of rights in land.”].) The court therefore construes the cause of action in that manner.

The elements of an action for private nuisance are: (1) plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; (2) invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, that is, it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 248.)

Courts broadly construe private nuisance. “So long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance.” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262.)

As discussed already, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege substantial defects and safety issues at the premises that went unremedied. (Taylor, supra, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1228 [on demurrer, a complaint must be read liberally and in context].) The allegations are therefore sufficient to allege private nuisance.

There is likewise no merit to Defendants’ arguments that the cause of action is duplicative. A plaintiff is free to plead alternative theories of recovery, even those that are inconsistent with each other. (Dubin v. Robert Newhall Chesebrough Trust (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 465, 476-477.)

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) (internal citations omitted). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 215, 233.) Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’” (Id.)

Although a claim for IIED will generally present multiple questions of fact, a court may sustain a demurrer to the claim when “the facts alleged do not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.) The process has been described as “more intuitive than analytical.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671–672.)

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants failed to adequately remedy the known plumbing issues at the property. Instead, Defendants undertook cheap and ineffective repairs in an unsafe manner and in violation of city notices. (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37, 42.)
When Plaintiffs pleaded that the repairs be completed correctly, Defendant Ellington was vocal and dismissive. (Id. ¶ 48.) He threatened to evict Plaintiffs and told them that asbestos and lead paint poisoning was “not real.” (Id. ¶¶ 48, 49.) When Plaintiff Cason raised issues with Defendant Ellington, he allegedly called her a “bitch,” “crazy,” and insisted on talking to her husband instead. (Id. ¶ 54.)

As to Defendant Simmons, Plaintiffs allege he “directed Defendant Ellington” to make the shoddy repairs, despite the fact Simmons is “not a professional water abatement contractor.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs also allege they complained to Defendant Simmons about Defendant Ellington’s “dismissive and aggressive conduct, improper repair efforts, and the continuing foul smell in the Subject Unit.” (Id. ¶¶ 34, 58.) Defendant Simmons “ignored Plaintiffs’ complaint.” (Id. ¶ 58.)

On these allegations and others, Plaintiffs allege they “suffered from severe emotional distress, including mental anguish, exacerbated anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, annoyance, sleeplessness, worry, fear, discomfort, indignity, embarrassment, and humiliation.” (Id. ¶ 62.)

Defendants each move to strike Plaintiffs’ references to punitive damages in the Complaint at ¶¶ 79, 92, 102, 130, 143, and the Prayer for Relief at ¶ 13. (See Notice of Motion.) Defendants argue Plaintiffs have “not plead any specific facts that rise to the level of intentionally malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct and instead vaguely allege[] mere negligence and delay, at most.”

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Here, considering the allegations discussed more fully in the demurrers—and accepting them as true—Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient or specific facts of fraud, oppression, or malice by the individual Defendants. Plaintiffs allege a concerted effort by Defendants to ignore, downplay, and permit serious habitability issues to persist at the property. If true and proven at trial, these facts could support an award of punitive damages.

Courts are given “broad discretion” when ruling on a motion to strike. (Camenisch v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1699). Courts need not strike a prayer for attorney’s fees before a party “has had a full opportunity to determine, through discovery, whether a basis for recovery exists.” (Id.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.