Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV01531, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV01531, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Marlene Arellanes brings this action against Defendants Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., and Walter Timmons Enterprises, Inc., dba Timmons of Long Beach for breach of implied warranty and breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act, and for violations of the CLRA and UCL. Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff purchased a 2021 Volkswagen Atlas that exhibits various defects, including a shaking steering wheel and faulty brakes. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant refused to repair the vehicle.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendant demurrers to the Third Cause of Action for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and Fourth Cause of Action for violation of the Business and Professions Code. Each is addressed in turn.

Defendant argues the Third Cause of Action fails because “(1) Plaintiff does not allege a requisite transaction that would warrant a cause of action under CLRA; and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege an affirmative misrepresentation made by Defendant or that Defendant had a duty to disclose a material safety concern.” (Dem. 6: 25-27.)

On July 3, 2021, Plaintiff leased a new 2021 Volkswagen Atlas. (Supp. Compl. ¶ 6.) The purchase included an express warranty stating “that Defendant VW and its authorized agents would repair any defect in workmanship and materials for 4 years or 50,000 miles.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has presented the vehicle for repairs on “at least nine (9) separate occasions” for a shaking steering wheel, faulty brake system, and a leaking transmission, among other things. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[o]n or about August 16, 2024, Plaintiff attempted a repair presentation of the Subject Vehicle to Defendants at Walter Timmons of Long Beach, and was expressly refused service on the Subject Vehicle in violation of Defendant VW’s warranty, and in violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b) because Defendants refused to commence service or repairs at all, let alone to conform the Vehicle to the applicable warranties within 30 days.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

Defendant argues there was no qualifying “transaction” between it and Plaintiff because Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from the dealer, not the manufacturer. The CLRA makes it unlawful for a person to engage in unfair or deceptive practices in a “transaction” for the sale or lease of goods and services. (Civ. Code § 1770.) The CLRA defines “transaction” as “an agreement between a consumer and another person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement.” (Civ. Code § 1761(e).)

Plaintiff counters that a transaction is evidenced by the allegation that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle accompanied with Volkswagen’s express written warranties. (See Supp. Compl. ¶ 8 [alleging the purchase included an express warranty stating “that Defendant VW and its authorized agents would repair any defect in workmanship and materials for 4 years or 50,000 miles”].) In Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 828, 844, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs had alleged a “buyer-seller relationship” between the purchaser and manufacturer where they alleged “they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers.”

Here, like in Dhital, Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from a Volkswagen dealership, that Volkswagen backed the car with an express warranty, and that Volkswagen’s authorized dealers are its agents for purposes of sales and repairs. (Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 8.) Notably, Defendant has not addressed Dhital in its demurrer or reply. Therefore, this court concludes Plaintiff has alleged a qualifying transaction under the CLRA.

Next, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not alleged an affirmative misrepresentation. Plaintiff alleges, again however, that the vehicle came with an express warranty “stat[ing] that Defendant VW and its authorized agents would repair any defect in workmanship and materials for 4 years or 50,000 miles.” (Supp. Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff further alleges that the authorized agent failed to repair the vehicle on numerous occasions, and on August 16, 2024, the agent “expressly refused service on the Subject Vehicle in violation of Defendant VW’s warranty…” (Id. ¶ 11.) Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged an affirmative misrepresentation by Defendant’s alleged failure or refusal to honor its express warranty.

Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice....” “The scope of section 17200 is broad, encompassing ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’ ... It governs ‘anti-competitive business practices’ as well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose ‘the preservation of fair business competition.’” [Citations.] (Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 115, 133). Whether a practice violates the section “is generally a question of fact which requires ‘consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides’ and which usually cannot be made on demurrer.” [Citation]. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges the vehicle came with an express warranty and this was “[o]ne of the reasons Plaintiff chose to purchase the Vehicle…” (Supp. Compl. ¶ 8.) The warranty stated that Defendant Volkswagen and its authorized agents would “repair any defect in workmanship and materials for 4 years or 50,000 miles,” and “Plaintiff’s only obligation would be to present the Vehicle for repair to any Defendant VW’s authorized agents, i.e. dealerships, should a defect arise.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges this representation was false, however, because Defendant(s) refused to repair the vehicle when Plaintiff presented it to the dealer. (Id. ¶ 11.) Therefore, for pleading purposes, Plaintiff has alleged conduct that was unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent.

Finally, Defendant argues the UCL claim fails because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law under the Song-Beverly Act. Despite its broad applicability, “[i]njunctive relief and restitution are the only remedies available under the UCL.” (Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 53.) Thus, “[a] UCL claim must be based on the existence of harm supporting injunctive relief or restitution.” (Id.) As a general rule, “equitable relief will not be granted if there is a plain, complete, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.” (Andal v. City of Stockton (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 86, 91.)

Defendant has cited no binding California authorities precluding the UCL cause of action when claims are also asserted under Song-Beverly—and certainly not at the pleading stage. Therefore, Plaintiff can technically, if so desired, bring this cause of action in the alternative to his Song-Beverly claims.

Of course, perhaps Plaintiff (and his attorneys) should be careful for what they ask. This Court has the authority at this time to bifurcate this cause of action (including any request for injunctive relief) and hear this matter in a few weeks and/or months. The adjudication of this cause of action could arguably moot many of the other causes of action in this case. If Plaintiff still want to pursue this UCL cause of action, this Court intends to have this discussion at the upcoming hearing. Plaintiff should frankly ask himself the following question: What additional remedies and/or damages can he receive under the UCL cause of action, to which are not available by means of the other causs of action? The answer is rather simple: None.

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s punitive damages demand should be stricken “because Plaintiff has failed to allege any specific facts supporting ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of ‘oppression, fraud or malice.’” (MTS 12: 1-2.)

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages under the First and Second causes of action brought under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218 [holding punitive damages award was improper where the judgment also included a § 1794 civil penalty]; see also Gomez v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 921, 928 [“There is nothing before the court to indicate that the remedy afforded by Civil Code section 1794 is inadequate either in the amount of damages that a meritorious plaintiff may recover or as a deterrent to the proscribed conduct.”]). Nor are punitive damages available for the Fourth Cause of Action under the UCL. (Clark v. Superior Ct. (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 605, 610.)

However, Violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act permits the recovery of punitive damages. (See Civil Code § 1780(a)(4).) As discussed in the demurrer, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim, for pleading purposes, under the CLRA. And these allegations, if true and proven at trial, could amount to the requisite malice, oppression, or fraud necessary to support a punitive damage award.

Next, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief should be stricken because Plaintiff has not alleged fact supporting entitlement to same. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff has not alleged that Plaintiff suffered any injury. Defendant also contends Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.

Plaintiff seeks an order under the CLRA “enjoining Defendants from a) misrepresenting that the vehicles it manufacturers and distributes into the stream of commerce will be free from defects and b) representing that any defect that did occur during the warranty period would be repaired.” (Supp. Compl. ¶ 47.) As discussed in the demurrer, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant issues express warranties to the effect that Defendant VW and its authorized agents would repair defects, but in fact, fails or even refuses to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.) Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged wrongful conduct by Defendant and an injury arising therefrom. Finally, this court need not conclude at this stage that Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.

Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action under section 17200 et seq., should be stricken because Plaintiff has not alleged any misrepresentation. But again, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant failed to comply with the representation(s) it made in its express warranty. (Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 8-11.) Thus, Plaintiff has alleged an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.