Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV04844, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

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If the interested parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling, they should call the judicial assistant together prior to the date of the scheduled hearing. 



Case Number: 24STCV04844    Hearing Date: January 13, 2025    Dept: 49

Christina Bell v. Kia Motors America, Inc.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Christina Bell

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Christina Bell brings this action against Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc., for alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff alleges her vehicle exhbited engine and electrical defects. 

Plaintiff now moves for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. Defendant opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:
  
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

A stand-alone FAC must be filed and served to all current parties within 10 days.  Any new parties must be served in a timely manner as provided by law.  Defendant is then free to attack the FAC by demurrer, motion to strike, etc. as may be warranted under the law.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

I. Legal Standard

If a plaintiff wishes to amend a complaint after the answer has been filed or after the demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the complaint “of course,” permission of the court must be obtained before the amendment will be allowed. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)  
 
Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) 
 
Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.  

Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature.  The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment.  (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 (overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390).) 

II. Analysis

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend to file a First Amended Complaint. By the proposed amendments, Plaintiff will add a cause of action for fraudulent inducement (concealment) and request for punitive damages. 

Plaintiff contends it “recently discovered evidence that Defendant knew its vehicles equipped with the 1.6L Gamma engine, including [Plaintiff’s] Vehicle, contained one or more defects in their engines causing the engines to utilize engine oil improperly, and to burn off and/or consume abnormally high amounts of oil.” (Mtn. 2:11-14.) Additionally, “Plaintiff determined that Defendant knew of the engine defect in the Vehicle prior to the sale of the Vehicle to Plaintiff.” (Id. 15-16.) Plaintiff contends Defendant “intentionally concealed and suppressed that information from Plaintiff to induce her to purchase the Vehicle, which she did, to her detriment, suffering ongoing damages.” (Id. 16-19.) 

Defendant opposes the motion. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has “not identif[ied] when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered,” and has “not state[d] why the request for amendment was not made earlier.” (Opp. 2: 19-21.) Defendant also contends the amendment would be “unduly prejudicial” because it “will undoubtedly lead to additional discovery burdens on Defendant in this case which is just one of the many hundreds of Song-Beverly case it is defending itself against in California.” (Id. 8-10.) Finally, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the fraud allegations in the proposed pleading.

Here, it is unclear when Plaintiff found this “recently discovered evidence” or what precisely that evidence was. (See Tirmizi Decl. ¶ 10.) The declaration in support of the motion is arguably insufficient in this regard and does not wholly comply with Rule 3.1324. Indeed, Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for fraudulent concealment in May 2022 involving the same make, model, and engine here. This certainly suggests Plaintiff was aware of the potential concealment long before filing this lawsuit, and calls Plaintiff’s counsel’s representations into question. 

Be that as it may, it is settled that leave to amend should generally only be denied when the amendment is both dilatory and unduly prejudicial. And here, there is little evidence the amendments would cause undue prejudice to Defendant. While the court appreciates that the amendments may expand the scope of the case, trial is not set until April 27, 2026, leaving all parties ample time to conduct discovery and prepare for trial on any new facts or theories.

The court makes no conclusion on the merits of the new claims, nor the sufficiency of the allegations as they pertain to alleging fraudulent conduct, nor whether the “relation back” doctrine can be utuilzed.. (See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc.¿(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 [“fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”].) Rather, the “better course of action” is to permit the amendment, “and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.”  (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.) 

Therefore, leave to amend is appropriate. This conclusion is consistent with the “policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits.”  (Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Ct. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1163.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   January 13, 2025 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at  Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.