Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV07729, Date: 2024-06-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV07729, Date: 2024-06-26 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Saul Olmos worked for Defendant Home Express Delivery Service as a technician. Plaintiff alleges he injured his chest and shoulder while lifting a refrigerator at work, which required a leave of absence. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant terminated his employment during medical leave.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Whether or not leave to amend is granted shall depend on whether Plaintiff can make a sufficient offer of proof that there is a reasonable possibility that a successful amendment could be made consistent with this ruling.

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages at various portions of the First Amended Complaint. (See Notice of Motion.) Defendant argues the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to support an award of punitive damages.

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

“When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)

Plaintiff alleges he worked for Defendant as a technician. (FAC ¶ 17) While lifting a refrigerator at work, Plaintiff “injured his shoulder which resulted in a swollen chest and torn shoulder muscles.” (Id. ¶ 22.) After consulting the company’s workers’ compensation doctor, Plaintiff was put on a leave of absence. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff remained on leave and was “regularly visiting the workers’ compensation doctor and providing Defendants with doctor notes mandating his leave until September 26, 2023, when Defendants terminated his employment without explanation.” (Id.) On these facts, Plaintiff alleges:

[Defendant] exhibited a clear discriminatory animus and intent to cause harm to Plaintiff, who it knew was disabled and/or required a medical leave of absence. By terminating Plaintiff’s employment while Defendant Home Express Delivery Service, LLC knew Plaintiff was disabled and on an approved medical leave, Defendant Home Express Delivery Service, LLC’s conduct cannot be construed as anything other than intending to cause injury to Plaintiff or amounting to despicable conduct carried out with a willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. Moreover, this despicable conduct subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights. Being disabled is bad enough, but to be fired without any explanation when Plaintiff was at his most vulnerable is nothing less than despicable conduct. Plaintiff did not choose to be disabled, but Defendant Home Express Delivery Service, LLC deliberately chose to terminate his employment knowing full well the status of his medical condition. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Here, beyond the general allegations that Defendant terminated Plaintiff in violation of the FEHA, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient and specific facts necessary to show the requisite malice, oppression, or fraud necessary to seek punitive damages. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient or specific facts of fraud, oppression, or malice “perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent” of Defendant. (CCP § 3294(b).) Indeed, no officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant is even named in the FAC.

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Whether or not leave to amend is granted shall depend on whether Plaintiff can make a sufficient offer of proof that there is a reasonable possibility that a successful amendment could be made consistent with this ruling.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.