Vladimir Shagramanov, et al. v. Aleksey Pak, et al.

DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE THE COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Aleksey Pak

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Vladimir Shagramanov and SP Law Group, APC

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Vladimir Shagramanov, an attorney, and his law firm, SP Law Group, bring this action against Defendants Aleksey Pak and Oxana Galay for defamation. Plaintiffs allege they helped Defendant Pak obtain compensation from an accident involving Pak’s 18-wheeler in 2018. In 2024, Defendant Pak allegedly made complaints to the state bar and in a posting on Yelp claiming that Plaintiffs had defrauded him. The complaints came just after Plaintiffs fired their former employee, Defendant Galay. Plaintiffs allege Defendant Galay and Defendant Pak are now conspiring to make false statements about Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for (1) defamation—libel, (2) defamation—libel per se, (3) false light, (4) fraud, (5) misrepresentation, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (8) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (9) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. 

Defendant Pak now moves to strike the Complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Pak’s Special Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as expressly stated herein. 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action are ordered stricken in their entirety, as to Defendant Pak. 

Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Third Causes of Action are ordered stricken, as to Defendant Pak, only to the extent they are predicated on the State Bar Complaint.  Otherwise, these causes of action remain as to the relevant Yelp! statements.

Defendant Pak may file a noticed motion for attorney’s fees if he elects to do so. The court will address any award at such a hearing.

Defendant Pak is ordered to file an Answer to the remaining causes of action as it pertains to him, within 21 days, if he hasn’t already done so.

Defendant Pak is ordered to give notice to all interested parties.

DISCUSSION:

Special Motion to Strike

I. Objections to Evidence

Defendant’s objections numbered 1 through 18 are OVERRULED. (See Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-49.)

II. Legal Standard

CCP section 425.16 permits the Court to strike causes of action arising from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of free speech or petition, unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.   

 

“The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Id. at 384.) 

 

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 384, citation omitted.) The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’” (Id. at 384-385 [citations omitted].) The anti-SLAPP motion need not address what the complaint alleges is an entire cause of action, and may seek to strike only those portions which describe protected activity. (Id. at 395-396.) 

III. Analysis 

A. Prong 1:  Defendant’s Burden

1. Background and Allegations in the Complaint

To satisfy the first prong of the two-prong test, a movant defendant must demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public as defined in the statute.  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; see City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 [“[i]n the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech”].)  Section 425.16 expressly “defines the types of claims that are subject to the anti-SLAPP procedures…as these terms are defined in subdivision (e)(1)-(4) of the statute.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 69, 75–76.) 

As background, Plaintiff Vladimir Shagramanov, an attorney, and his law firm, SP Law Group, bring this action against Defendants Aleksey Pak and Oxana Galay for defamation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Pak was involved in collision in Missouri while operating his 18-wheeler in 2017. (Compl. ¶ 1.) “Stranded in Missouri, Defendant called his friend, Ms. Oxana Galay…and requested that someone would come to his rescue.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Galay then contacted Plaintiff Vladimir Shagramanov, owner of SP Law Group, for assistance. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs then utilized contacts in Missouri who provide Defendant with assistance. (Id. ¶ 6.) Once Defendant Pak returned to Los Angeles, Plaintiffs allege they helped Defendant Pak obtain compensation from the accident. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 8, 9, 10.) 

In 2024, “after almost six and a half years of having no contact with Vladimir Shagramanov or his office,” Defendant Pak allegedly made complaints to the state bar and in a posting on Yelp claiming that Plaintiffs had defrauded him. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) Though the Yelp posting, and State Bar Complaint are not attached to the Complaint, the moving party has provided them. (See Pak Decl., Exhs. 2, 3; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [“[i]n deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ”].)

Defendant Pak’s October 2, 2023, bar complaint reads as follows:

I am a truck driver who was involved in a car accident on December 23, 2017. The truck I was operating was completely damaged in the collision. In pursuit of my personal injury case, I retained the services of attorney Vladimir Shagramanov.

Unfortunately, Mr. Shagramanov did not respond to my calls and failed to provide any updates on my case. It wasn't until June 2018 that he invited me to his office located at 1644 Wilshire Blvd., #300, Los Angeles, CA 90017. During this meeting, Mr. Shagramanov handed me a check for $1,500. He explained that due to the complexities of commercial insurance cases, it would take some time to resolve the matter.

Recently, I contacted my insurance company to inquire about the status of my case, only to learn that they had transferred all funds to attorney Shagramanov.

I respectfully request the bar to investigate Mr. Shagramanov's actions to protect other clients from falling victim to his neglect, unethical behavior, dishonesty, and malpractice. His conduct undermines public trust in the legal profession[.]

(Pak Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. 2.) 

Defendant Pak’s February 16, 2024 post on Yelp reads:

I got in car accident in 2018. I was referred to SP Lawgroup, attorney Vladimir Shagramanov by my friend. Attorney V. Shagramanov constantly lied to me, such as insurance doesn't want to pay ... V. Shagramanov didn't respond to my calls, he avoided me. So did his assistant Liana A. Recently I found out the my commercial insurance paid the settlement to V. Shagramanov long time ago. V. Shagramanov robbed me! V. Shagramanov and his SP Lawgroup are terrible crooks! I submitted complaint to the State Bar, investigation is ongoing. Clients! Don't trust attorney V. Shagramanov! State Bar provides assistance in 200 languages. I don't recommend this law office. [FN 1]

(Id. ¶ 9, Exh. 3.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Pak’s statements came right after Plaintiffs fired Defendant Oxana Galay, a former employee, from the law firm in January 2024. (Id. ¶ 13.) After Defendant Galay’s termination, Plaintiffs allege that “several individuals,” including Defendant Pak, “whom Defendant Galay was in close relationship and who at one point or another used services of SP Law Group simultaneously filed identical claims against” Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 14.) Thus, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Galay and Pak “are working together and conspiring to make false statement[s] about” Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.) 

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for (1) defamation—libel, (2) defamation—libel per se, (3) false light, (4) fraud, (5) misrepresentation, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (8) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (9) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Each and every cause of action is based on both the Yelp posting and the State Bar Complaint. 

2. The State Bar Complaint is Protected Under Prong One

Defendant argues his State Bar Complaint was protected under Prong One of the anti-SLAPP statutes as a “written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (CCP § 425.16(e)(1).)

In opposition, Plaintiffs concede that the State Bar Complaint “was a protected activity,” but argues the “privilege was lost” once the State Bar dismissed the Complaint. (See Shagramanov Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. 6 [concluding that Pak’s complaint “does not warrant further action”].) In other words, it is Plaintiffs’ position that a complaint that ultimately proves to lack merit is not protected. However, Plaintiffs cite no authority for that position, and for good reason – there is no such authority. 

Courts have adopted an “expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1268 (2008). The term “official proceeding” “has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings,” and thus, a “communication to an official administrative agency designed to prompt action by that agency is as much a part of the ‘official proceeding’ as a communication made after the proceedings had commenced.” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1009 [cleaned up].) Therefore, the Court in ComputerXpress had “little difficulty concluding that the filing of the complaint [with the SEC] qualified at least as a statement before an official proceeding,” and was thus protected under prong-1. (Id.) 

Similarly, here, this court concludes Defendant’s filing of the complaint with the State Bar was a writing made before an official proceeding authorized by law and is therefore a protected act in furtherance of Defendant’s right of petition or free speech. (CCP § 425.16(e)(1).) It is irrelevant to the analysis that the State Bar ultimately dropped the Complaint. Therefore, Defendant has met his burden under Prong One concerning the State Bar Complaint.

3. The Yelp Post is Also Protected Under Prong One

Turning to the Yelp post, Defendant argues this too was protected under Prong One as a “written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (CCP § 425.16, subd. (e)(3).)

Online forums like Yelp “hardly could be more public.” (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 895.) Thus, the question is whether the post was made “in connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) Defendant contends that his post “was a warning to the public—specifically, other potential clients—about the quality of the legal services provided by Plaintiffs.” (Mtn. 7: 4-5.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Yelp posting is not protected because Defendants made it purely in retaliation for firing Defendant Galay. Thus, it was “created specifically to target Plaintiff and not to warn the public.” (Opp. 10: 5-6.) 

The court is aware that the anti-SLAPP protection “does not extend to communication or conduct that is, as a matter of law, illegal.” (Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal. App. 5th 1005, 1023; Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 299, 305 [“conclud[ing] that, consistent with the legislative intent underlying the anti-SLAPP statute as revealed by the statutory language, and consistent with our existing anti-SLAPP jurisprudence, a defendant whose assertedly protected speech or petitioning activity was illegal as a matter of law, and therefore unprotected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition, cannot use the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff's complaint.”].)

Be that as it may, Plaintiffs cite no authority nor presents any argument suggesting that the conduct here was illegal as a matter of law. And Plaintiffs have not presented any authority demonstrating that the retaliatory motivations of the Defendants might make an otherwise protected communication unprotected. 

“[C]onsumer information that goes beyond a particular interaction between the parties and implicates matters of public concern that can affect many people is generally deemed to involve an issue of public interest for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1366.) Thus, in Wong, the Court of Appeal held that a complaint made about a dentist in a Yelp review was protected under Prong One. (Id.)

Here, Defendant’s Yelp post is also protected. It accused Plaintiff Shagramanov of being a liar, a crook, and failing to communicate.  (Pak Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. 3.) Defendant states in his declaration that he made the Yelp post to “warn the public about Mr. Shagramanov.” (Pak Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant “believe[d] that [his] statements on Yelp! addressed an important concern for people who might be checking Yelp! when considering whether to hire Mr. Shagramanov as their attorney.” (Id.)

The court concludes that the public Yelp posting, which goes directly to Plaintiff Shagramanov’s professional fitness as an attorney, was a written statement made “in connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) Indeed, the post went beyond just a private dispute, as Defendant implored readers that they shouldn’t trust Plaintiff Shagramanov as an attorney. (See Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal. App. 5th 882, 888 [online review of law firm was protected activity].)

Accordingly, Defendant has met his burden under Prong One as to both the State Bar Compliant and the Yelp review. This shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to establish a probability of prevailing on their claims.

B. Prong Two: Plaintiffs’ Burden

1. Claims Based on State Bar Complaint

“To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.  For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant; though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.  In making this assessment it is the court’s responsibility…to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff […].  The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.”  (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)  

As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim “may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.”  (Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co. (2019) 6 Cal. 5th 931, 940.) 

Defendant argues that the litigation privilege bars all causes of action based on his Complaint to the State Bar.  As explained below, this Court agrees.

“Charges of unethical conduct against an attorney may constitute actionable defamation.” However, this may be tempered by the litigation privilege. (Katz v. Rosen (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 1036.) “The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged. This privilege is absolute in nature, applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.’ [Citation.] ‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’”  (Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal. App. 4th 953, 964.)  “[T]he privilege is ‘an “absolute” privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.’ (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 926–927 [plaintiff must overcome litigation privilege to demonstrate a probability of prevailing under anti-SLAPP prong two].)  “[T]he principal purpose of [Civil Code] section 47 [, subdivision (b) ] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.”  (Id.) “The breadth of the litigation privilege cannot be understated.”  (Finton Constr., Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 200, 212.)  “Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. [Citation.]”  (Id.) Thus, “[i]nformal complaints received by a bar association which is empowered by law to initiate disciplinary procedures are as privileged as statements made during the course of formal disciplinary proceedings.” (Katz, supra, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 1032.)

While the litigation privilege and anti-SLAPP statute “are not necessarily coextensive,” the privilege is a “defense that may be considered at prong two.” (See RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co. (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 413, 444-45 [“Because this tort claim was barred by the litigation privilege, RGC could not establish the minimal merit of its action at prong two of the anti-SLAPP inquiry”].)

Here, Defendant Pak’s complaint to the State Bar is protected under the litigation privilege. This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the litigation privilege, which is to ‘ “assure utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.” (Chabak, supra, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 1514.) Moroever, “[a]ny doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. [Citation.]” (Finton Constr., Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 200, 212.)  

Accordingly, all allegations pertaining to Defendant Pak’s State Bar Complaint are ordered STRICKEN.

2. Claims Based on Yelp! Post

a. Defamation-Based Claims (First, Second, Third Causes of Action)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his defamation causes of action because Defendant’s Yelp review was factually true. The gist of the Yelp review is that Plaintiffs “robbed” Defendant by not paying Plaintiff the insurance settlement. (See Pak Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. 3.) The issue therefore is whether Plaintiffs have presented evidence establishing the falsity of the review. 

The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (J-M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th 87, 97.) “A statement is defamatory when it tends ‘directly to injure [a person] in respect to [that person's] office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to [the person] general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to [the person's] office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits.’ (Civ. Code, § 46, subd. 3.)” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.) 

“Though mere opinions are generally not actionable [citation] a statement of opinion that implies a false assertion of fact is actionable.” (Issa v. Applegate (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 689, 702; Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1471 [“An opinion ... is actionable only ‘ “if it could reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual facts capable of being proved true or false” ’ ”].) Further, “it is not the literal truth or falsity of each word or detail used in a statement which determines whether or not it is defamatory; rather, the determinative question is whether the ‘gist or sting’ of the statement is true or false, benign or defamatory, in substance.” (Issa, supra, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 702; Summit Bank, supra, 206 Cal. App. 4th at 696 [“where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute actionable defamation”].)

In determining whether a statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact, courts apply the totality of the circumstances test. (Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (2010) 190 Cal. App. 4th 1248, 1261.) “Under the totality of the circumstances test, ‘[f]irst, the language of the statement is examined. For words to be defamatory, they must be understood in a defamatory sense.... [¶] Next, the context in which the statement was made must be considered.’ ” (Id. [citing (Franklin, 116 Cal.App.4th at 385.) “The ‘pertinent question’ is whether a ‘reasonable fact finder’ could conclude that the statements ‘as a whole, or any of its parts, directly made or sufficiently implied a false assertion of defamatory fact that tended to injure’ plaintiff's reputation.” (James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1, 13.) “Whether challenged statements convey the requisite factual imputation is ordinarily a question of law for the court.” (Issa, supra, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 703.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff Shagramanov states in declaration that Defendant Pak “received both medical treatment and financial compensation” from his services. (Shagramanov Decl. 5.) Plaintiffs have provided copies of three checks purportedly paid out to Defendant and his medical provider, attached to the Opposition as Exhibit 2. These include check payments of $1,600.00 and $2,370.08 paid directly to Defendant, and of $3,345.52 paid directly to Plaintiff’s medical provider, Dr. Sohan Singh. (See Shagramanov Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs also contend that under the “Policy Limit Declaration,” Defendant Pak’s compensation was limited to $7,500 of total recovery.  [FN 2]

Plaintiff Shagramanov also states that Defendant Galay worked in his office “for about a year before she was terminated for various ethical and criminal violations…” (Shagramanov Decl. ¶ 7.) Then, just “2 to 4 weeks after Defendant Galay was terminated, [Plaintiff] received 8 State Bar complaints that were filed against [him] by [his] former/current clients, who were related to Defendant Galay.” (Id. ¶ 8.) In addition, Plaintiff received “several Yelp reviews” he believes were “created by Defendant Pak, Defendant Galay and Defendant Galay's husband Joseph Mbella.” (Id. ¶ 10.)

In his declaration supporting the anti-SLAPP motion, Defendant Pak admits that Defendant Galay is “an acquaintance” who informed him that she “suspected that her boss (Mr. Shagramanov) was not properly handling his clients’ funds.” (Pak Decl. ¶ 6.) Sometime after Defendant Pak’s attempts to communicate with Plaintiffs failed, Pak “learned that Mr. Shagramanov failed to keep [him] updated about [his] case and that he had apparently withheld funds that belonged to [him].” (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.) In other words, there is no dispute that Defendant Galay—a former employee of Plaintiffs—spurred Defendant Pak’s belief that Plaintiffs had defrauded him.

It is settled that “the plaintiff's burden of establishing a probability of prevailing is not high: We do not weigh credibility, nor do we evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant's evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's submission as a matter of law.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 688, 699–700.) 

Based on the record, there exists a dispute on whether Plaintiffs provided the full insurance payout to Defendant. Thus, whether Defendant’s Yelp review—which accused Plaintiffs of being “crooks”—contained any actual falsity is necessarily also a question in dispute. Plaintiffs have therefore carried their burden to establish the minimal merit of their defamation-based claims.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have demonstrated the requisite “minimal merit,” as to their First, Second, and Third Causes of Action remain to the extent they are based on the Yelp review.

b. Fraud Claims (Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action)

Defendant argues the fraud claims fail because Plaintiffs did not suffer harm by relying on any statement by Pak. 

“To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove: ‘(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff.’ ” (Graham v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 594, 605–06.)

Here, Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence whatsoever that anyone has reasonably relied on any representation in the Yelp review. Plaintiffs have likewise not presented any evidence that they suffered any harm from the review.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action are ordered STRICKEN in their entirety.

c. Emotional Distress (Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action)

Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot establish the emotional distress claims because the conduct was not outrageous, and because Plaintiffs did not suffer severe emotional distress.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.  A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) (internal citations omitted). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”  (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 215, 233.)  Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’” (Id.)

For his burden, Plaintiff Shagramanov states only that he “suffered serious emotional damage as a result of the stress associated these claims.” (Shagramanov Decl. ¶ 16.) 

The court would agree with Defendant that posting a negative Yelp review of an attorney, even one that might falsely accuse the attorney of misappropriating client money, is not sufficiently “severe or outrageous” as a matter of law to support the claims. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action are ordered STRICKEN in their entirety. 

d. Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action)

“Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage has five elements: (1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant's action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. Am. Asphalt S., Inc. (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 505, 512.) The elements of negligent interference are essentially the same: “The difference between intentional interference and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage relates to the defendant's intent.” (Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404, fn. 10.)

To state either claim, a plaintiff must allege the existence of an economic relationship with a specific third party that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff. (See Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 429-430 [intentional interference elements]; Venhaus v. Shultz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1078 [negligent interference elements].) 

Here, Plaintiff has not identified any economic relationship purportedly damaged by the Yelp post. As the party with the burden under Prong Two, “it was incumbent on plaintiff to produce evidence to show a specific economic relationship with the prospect of future economic advantage. The failure to produce any evidence in support of this threshold element of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage compels the conclusion that plaintiff has not shown a probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Ct. (2021) 62 Cal. App. 5th 905, 927.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action are STRICKEN in their entirety. 

IV. Attorney’s Fees

A prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike “shall” be entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs.  (CCP 425.16(c)(1).) 

Defendant may file a motion for attorney’s fees if it elects to do so.  The court will address any potential award at such a hearing.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   September 10, 2024 ___________________________________