Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV20894, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling

This is a breach of habitability case. Plaintiff Aaron Brown resided at 111 W. 7th Street in a unit owned or managed by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges the unit contained mold contamination, insect infestation, and lack of heat, among other defects. Plaintiff brings asserts causes of action for (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (2) Negligence, (3) Nuisance, (4) Breach of Quiet Enjoyment, (5) Violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code § 51, (6) Violations of the California Anti-Harassment Statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 1940.2); and (7) Violations of the Los Angeles Anti-Harassment Statute, LAMC § 8.52.130 et seq.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike punitive damages is GRANTED. Whether Plaintiff is given leave to amend will depend on whether a sufficient offer of proof can be made at the hearing to allege ultimate facts to demonstrate that a specific managing agent of the moving party acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, or that it was otherwise authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of that corporation.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Plaintiff filed its opposition to the motion on January 3, 2025, only five court days before the hearing. (See CCP § 1005(b) [“All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days…before the hearing”].)

Here, the court exercises its discretion to the consider the untimely opposition. Plaintiffs are admonished to comply with all filing deadlines going forward. Any and all requests for sanctions against Plaintiff or his counsel are DENIED.

Defendant demurrers to each cause of action in the Complaint. In support of the demurrer, Defendant argues the Complaint is “hopelessly ambiguous as to what factual allegations and claims are being asserted against which defendants.” (Dem. 2: 9-10.) It contends that it cannot “ascertain its involvement in the alleged controversy.” (Dem. 5: 21-22.)

Plaintiff alleges the moving Defendant has been the “administrator, owner, part owner, joint owner, agent, trustee and manager of the subject property” since April 2023. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Defendant’s request for Judicial Notice confirms that Defendant acquired the property in March of 2023. (See RJN Exh, 1.) The five other defendants, MAIN SB LLC, SBDTLA 1 LLC, SBDTLA 2 LLC, SBDTLA 3 LLC, and SBDTLA 4 LLC owned the subject property prior to 111 W 7 Owner. (Compl. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff challenges defects and actions at the property occurring before and after the moving Defendant acquired it. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that, “Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer from defendants’ neglect of the property that included defective water pipes, plumbing issues, and roaches’ and other insects’ infestation, inoperable windows and doors caused by deterioration, holes all over the unit, faulty electrical fittings, deteriorated walls, molds in living rooms, bedrooms, hallway, closet, restroom walls, deteriorated bathroom walls and floors etc. Plaintiff became sick with rashes and breathing issues owing to the dangerous conditions in the subject property.” (Compl. ¶ 7.)

Here, Plaintiff complained of these conditions from April 2022 “to present.” (Id. ¶ 24.) In other words, during the period the moving Defendant has possessed the property, the defects have persisted.

Considering the allegations and liberal pleading standards, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated each cause of action against the moving Defendant. (See Taylor, supra, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1228 [courts read allegations liberally and in context].) In addition, “[d]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored,” and are strictly construed “because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery.” (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125.)

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ references to punitive damages in the Complaint. Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to plead facts against it to support an award of punitive damages.

Civil Code § 3294 provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Additionally, “[w]hen the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that various substantial habitability defects persisted at the property. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff has also identified various individuals who were involved in managing the property, including “Lea Kim (Ms. Kim) of Greystar; Joshua Moore (Mr. Moore), Maria Del Brown Brown (Ms. Brown) and Marcelo Gigena (Mr. Gigena) of FPI Management; and Summer Smith (Ms. Smith) and Michelle Langobardo (Ms. Langobardo) of Avenue 5.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

However, Plaintiff has not identified any “officer, director, or managing agent” of the moving Defendant, 111 W. 7 Owner LLC. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite malice, oppression, or fraud perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of said Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages must fail against said Defendant.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike punitive damages is GRANTED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Whether Plaintiff is given leave to amend will depend on whether a sufficient offer of proof can be made at the hearing to allege ultimate facts to demonstrate that a specific managing agent of the moving party acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, or that it was otherwise authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of that corporation.