Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV23450, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV23450, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Albert Masjedian brings this action for “proper prospective injunctive declaratory relief” against Defendant Judge Sergio C. Tapia II and Judge Samantha Jessner, the current and former Presiding Judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court, respectively. Plaintiff seeks an order directing the Presiding Judge to declare certain orders made by Judge Gregory Alarcon in case number BC593351 to be null and void, including Judge Alarcon’s order declaring the plaintiff Martin Reiner a vexatious litigant.

Plaintiff asks the court to take judicial notice of the August 6, 2024 opposition filed by Martin Reiner in San Francisco County Superior Court case number CGC-22-603692A and exhibits thereto. Plaintiff also asks for judicial notice of “the indisputable fact that the subject 2016 vexatious litigant order which was wrongfully, and illegally, imposed upon Martin Reiner.” (See P’s RJN, p. 2.)

This court declines to take judicial notice of the August 6, 2024 opposition and exhibits because they are irrelevant to the disposition of this demurrer. (See Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal. App. 4th 471, 482 [declining to take judicial notice of irrelevant matters].)

The court likewise declines to take judicial notice of the assertion that the 2016 vexatious litigant order which “was wrongfully, and illegally, imposed upon Martin Reiner” because such an assertion is simply not the proper subject of judicial notice.

The Declaration of attorney Sarah L. Overton reflects numerous efforts to meet and confer with Plaintiff. It appears these attempts were unsuccessful. Despite the absence of a substantive meet and confer, the court considers Defendants to have satisfied their obligations.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendants Judge Tapia and Judge Jessner demurrer to the Complaint. They argue Plaintiff’s Complaint fails as a matter of law because (1) this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, (2) Plaintiff lacks standing, and (3) the Complaint otherwise fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the Defendants. [FN 1]

Plaintiff Albert Masjedian asserts a single cause of action for “proper prospective injunctive declaratory relief” against Defendant Judge Sergio C. Tapia II and Judge Samantha Jessner, the current and former Presiding Judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court, respectively. (Compl. p. 4.) [FN 2] Plaintiff seeks an order directing the Presiding Judge to declare certain orders made by Judge Gregory Alarcon in case number BC593351 to be null and void. In particular, Plaintiff alleges Judge Alarcon’s May 26, 2016 order declaring the plaintiff in that case, Martin Reiner, a vexatious litigant is null and void because Judge Alarcon “failed to timely respond to the March 24, 2016 disqualification statement…” (Id.) Plaintiff Masjedian alleges he has standing to bring this action because he “wish[es] to utilize Reiner as an attorney, and [his] right to counsel of [his] choosing is being obstructed by the constitutionally invalid and legally null and void ‘orders’…” (Id.) Plaintiff expressly alleges this cause of action “is not being presented pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 391.7, nor Section 391.8…” (Id.) [FN 3]

In support of the demurrer, Defendants argue “this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the [vexatious litigant] order to determine whether it was erroneously issued and to determine whether the order should be vacated.” (Dem. 3: 16-18.) Instead, “[i]t is only the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal that can affirm, reverse, or modify the VL order.” (Id. 3:18-19.) This Court agrees.

“The principle of ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ [Citation.] Thus, in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power ‘to hear or determine [the] case.’ ” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 318, 324.)

Plaintiff contends this court does have subject matter jurisdiction to vacate Judge Alarcon’s orders, and that it is “duty-bound to do so” here under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. (1944) 322 U.S. 238, 244.) There, the Supreme Court held that principles of equity permitted the Circuit Court of Appeals itself to alter a judgment where it was procured by after-discovered fraud.

But here, Hazel-Atlas has little application to the facts alleged in the FAC, or the procedural rules and practices of California state courts. In substance, this action is an appeal of Judge Alarcon’s orders with a few extra steps. It is well-settled that “[o]ne department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court.” (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1450.) Rather, the first court to hear the matter “acquires exclusive jurisdiction,” and a judgment or ruling rendered in that department “is binding on that matter upon all other departments until such time as the judgment is overturned.” (Id.) The power to “review, revise, or reverse decisions of the superior courts is vested by our Constitution only in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.” (Ford v. Superior Ct. (1986) 188 Cal. App. 3d 737, 742.)

Therefore, whether it be a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or the absence of something equally as fundamental, this court does not possess authority to grant Plaintiff the relief he seeks. For this reason, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against the Defendants.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) There is no such possibility in this case. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

This court is aware that on May 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed three doe amendments to the Complaint seeking to add three additional judges as Defendants: Judge Gregory Alarcon, Judge Mitchell Beckloff, and Judge Mark Kim. Even assuming these amendments were timely and/or proper, the action against these Defendant will undoubtedly fail for the same reason it does against Judges Tapia and Jessner: This court lacks jurisdiction to modify the orders of other trial judges. [FN 4]

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Because Defendants’ first argument is easily dispositive of the entire case, this court need not (and will not) address the remaining arguments of the Defendants. However, assuming for the sake of argument that this Court did so, it is abundantly clear that even upon a cursory review, those other arguments are also separate and distinct reasons for the sustaining of the demurrer without leave. Simply put: This case is frivolous, both procedurally and substantively.

FN 2 - Plaintiff initially named only Defendant Judge Jessner as a Defendant when he filed this action on September 11, 2024. (See Compl.) On January 8, 2025, Plaintiff added Judge Tapia as a Doe Defendant. (See 01/08/2025 Amendment to Complaint.)

FN 3 - CCP section 391.8 provides a means for a vexatious litigant to file an application to remove his or her name from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious litigants.

FN 4 - Technically speaking, though, those named DOE Defendants are not currently before this Court at this time. As such, this ruling does not apply as to them.