Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV23779, Date: 2025-05-07 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Paravaneh Zadeh purchased a 2023 Tesla Model Y from Defendant Tesla, Inc. Plaintiff alleges the vehicle displays unspecified defects or nonconformities to warranty. Plaintiff asserts causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act for (1) violation of express warranty, (2) violation of implied warranty, (3) violation of section 1793.2, and (4) violation of section 1793.22.

“Under the FAA, there is a strong policy favoring arbitration. [Citations.] ‘The overarching purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms ....’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘[a]rbitration is a matter of consent ....’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘ “Although the FAA preempts any state law that stands as an obstacle to its objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, ... we apply general California contract law to determine whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate their dispute.” ’ [Citations.]” (Barrera v. Apple Am. Grp. LLC (2023) 95 Cal. App. 5th 63, 76.) It is settled that “[u]nder both California and federal law, arbitration is strongly favored and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Balandran v. Labor Ready, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1527.)

California also has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving disputes. “Even so, parties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so.” (Avila v. S. California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 835, 843.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Id.) An arbitration agreement is a contractual agreement. “General contract law principles include that ‘[t]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] ... The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” [Citations.] (Garcia v. Expert Staffing W., 73 Cal. App. 5th 408, 412–13.)

“[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence . . . .” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284). “In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration [citation]. The court should attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353). “Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n v. State (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205).

“[A] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284). “If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. . . .” (CCP § 1281.4.)

The FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration provisions in any contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9 USC § 2.) The term “involving commerce” is functionally equivalent to “affecting commerce” and “signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.” (Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 US 265, 277.) “The party asserting the FAA bears the burden to show it applies by presenting evidence establishing [that] the contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce . . . .” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.)

Courts will apply the FAA “if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 956, 963.) Here, the arbitration provision in the RISC provides that “[a]ny arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” (Kim Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 1, p. 5.)

Defendants have the initial burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Gamboa v. Ne. Cmty. Clinic (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158, 165.) “[I]t is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 215, 218.) Defendant presents the existence of two documents presented to Plaintiff in the buying process that it contends require arbitration: (a) the Motor Vehicle Order Agreement and (b) the Retail Installment Sale Contract.

Motor Vehicle Order Agreement: When Plaintiff initially placed the order for the vehicle, “Plaintiff electronically accepted the terms and conditions of the Motor Vehicle Order Agreement (“MVOA”) online…” (Kim Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 1.) The Order Agreement contained an arbitration provision, which provides in relevant part: “you agree that any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.” (Kim Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 1, p. 3.)

Retail Installment Sale Contract: Upon delivery of the vehicle, “Plaintiff executed a Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”).” (Kim Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 1.) The RISC contains an arbitration agreement, which in relevant part provides:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, any allegation of waiver of rights under this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

Here, both the RISC and MVOA call for the arbitration of “any” dispute or claim arising between Plaintiff and Tesla. This covers Plaintiff’s causes of action asserted in the Complaint. Thus, under either the RISC or MVOA, Defendant has met its initial burden to produce a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy here.

This switches the burden to Plaintiff, who “bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 165.) Plaintiff can do this in “several ways,” including by “declar[ing] under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Plaintiff, as the party opposing arbitration, has the burden of presenting any defenses to enforcement. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, and thus, has not done so. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164 [once a defendant proves an agreement to arbitrate exists, “[t]he opposing party then must prove any defense to enforcement of the arbitration agreement. [Citation.]”)

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Defendant served the motion on Plaintiff electronically on January 7, 2025, at yasharesquire@gmail.com. (See Proof of Service.) This matches the email address this court has on file for Plaintiff’s counsel.

FN 2 - It should be noted that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle directly from Tesla’s website. This case does not involve an intermediary dealer/seller. Tesla is both the manufacturer and seller of the vehicle.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.