Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV24335, Date: 2025-01-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV24335, Date: 2025-01-29 Tentative Ruling

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at pp. 1441-1442.) When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.) “A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process.” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.)

Specially-appearing Defendant James Almonte moves to quash service of the summons and complaint on the basis that he was never served in this action. Personal service is service “by personal delivery” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10), and “ ‘usually contemplates actual delivery.’ ” (Crescendo Corp. v. Shelted, Inc. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 209, 212; Sternbeck v. Buck (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 832 [“ ‘Personal service’ means the actual delivery of the papers ... in person.”].) A registered process server's declaration of service creates a rebuttable presumption of proper service. (Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal. App. 4th 383, 390.)

Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service reflecting personal service on James Almonte on November 11, 2024. (See 11/14/2024 Proof of Service.) Service occurred at 10 Ridge View Ct, Smithfield, RI 02917-2508. (Id.) The person served is described as being 60 years old, 6-foot-4, 190 lbs, with gray hair, and Caucasian. (Id.)

Specially-Appearing Defendant confirms he was involved in the subject collision. (Almonte Jr. Decl. ¶ 4.) However, he argues he was not the person served with the summons. Defendant attests in his declaration that he has never lived at 10 Ridge View Ct. Smithfield, RI, and has “no connection with” that address. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) Defendant provides a copy of his New York driver’s license which reflects that his name includes the suffix “Jr.” and that he was born in 1996. (Lee Decl., Exh. B.)

Defendant also provides a declaration from “James T. Almonte,” who attests he was the person actually served with the summons and complaint. (J. T. Almonte Decl. ¶ 2.) Almonte attests he was not present in California at the time of subject accident. (Id. ¶ 3.) Almonte provides a copy of his Rhode Island driver’s license, which reflects he resides at the address of service. (Lee Decl., Exh. C.) Almonte’s age, height, and weight are also a close match to the description of the individual served. (Id.)

Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. (See Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868 [plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service”].)

On the evidence presented—and without any opposition—this appears to be a clear case of mistaken identity. It easily preponderates that specially-appearing Defendant was not the person served at the Rhode Island address. Rather, the process server mistakenly served James T. Almonte instead of the correct Defendant, James Almonte Jr. Therefore, service was ineffective on Defendant.