Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV28282, Date: 2025-03-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV28282 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: 49
June Rodriguez v. Glen Park at Glendale Mariposa St., et al.
DEMURRER TO ANSWER
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff June Rodriguez
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Glen Park at Glendale Mariposa St.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiff June Rodriguez, a Hispanic woman, alleges she suffered discrimination and harassment while working for Defendant based on her race or national origin. Plaintiff further alleges she was retaliated against after complaining of the discrimination and harassment, resulting in her termination.
Plaintiff now demurrers to each and every of the twenty-three (23) affirmative defenses in Defendant’s Answer. Defendant opposed.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff’s Demurrer to the Answer is SUSTAINED IN FULL. Defendant is given 21-days leave to amend, consistent with this Ruling.
Moving party to give notice, unless waived.
DISCUSSION:
Demurrer
I. Meet and Confer
The Declaration of attorney Bardia Aaron Akhavan reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel reached out to Defendant’s counsel to meet and confer, but Defendant’s counsel did not respond. (CCP § 430.41.) While this demonstrates the absence of any substantive meet and confer, in the interest of judicial economy, the court exercises its discretion to address the demurrer on its merits. The parties are admonished to comply with all meet and confer obligations going forward.
II. Legal Standard
Within ten (10) days of service of an answer, a party against whom an answer has been filed may object by demurrer.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40.)¿ Unlike a demurrer to a complaint or cross-complaint, a demurrer to an answer is limited to three grounds:¿¿(a) The answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense;¿¿(b) The answer is uncertain; or¿¿(c) Where the answer pleads a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the answer whether the contract is written or oral.¿¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20.)¿
The demurrer may be to the whole answer or to any one or more of the several affirmative defenses within the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.50(b).) The plaintiff may not, however, demur to part of a defense and, in order to determine the sufficiency of a defense, it must be considered as a whole. Each defense must be considered separately without regard to any other defense, and one defense does not become insufficient because it is inconsistent with other parts of the answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733.)¿
The critical inquiry when a plaintiff demurs to an answer is whether the answer raises a defense to plaintiff’s stated cause of action. (Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879-80.) The same pleading of “ultimate facts” rather than evidentiary matter or legal conclusions is required as in pleading the complaint. The answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384 [a general denial puts in issue the material allegations of the complaint; court was considering whether general denial put at issue new matter for a motion for summary judgment].) Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30, subdivision (g) provides, the various affirmative defenses must be separately stated and must refer to the causes of action to which they relate “in a manner by which they may be intelligently distinguished.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (g).)
“Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.”¿ (South Shore Land Co., supra, 226 Cal. App. 2d at 732.)¿ “[T]he demurrer to the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.”¿ (Id. at 733.)¿ Unlike a demurrer to complaint, “the defect in question need not appear on the face of the answer” as “[t]he determination of the sufficiency of the answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (Id.)¿
III. Analysis
Plaintiff demurrers to each of the twenty-three (23)(!) affirmative defense raised in Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint. Plaintiff argues these “boilerplate” affirmative defenses fail to state any sufficient facts to support the defense.
In opposition, Defendant contends its Answer is “more than sufficient” to survive the demurrer. Defendant is wrong.
Here, Defendant’s affirmative defenses are non-specific and boilerplate, as they fail to state any facts in support of the defenses. Many appear inapplicable to the causes of action asserted in the Complaint. Therefore, Defendant’s Answer fails to state facts sufficient, and the demurrer must be sustained in full on this ground.
Plaintiff also contends that “numerous” affirmative defenses are not affirmative defenses at all. In particular, Plaintiff points to the First Affirmative Defense (failure to state a claim), Fifth (Failure to Exhaust), Sixth (Business Necessity/Legitimate Reason), and Twentieth (Meal Periods Provided and Waived). Indeed, Plaintiff has understated this argument.
Defendant counters that each of the challenged affirmative defenses are, in fact, affirmative defenses—or at least, appropriate to raise in an answer. Once again, Defendant is wrong.
Here, the court agrees with Plaintiff that “failure to state a claim” is not an affirmative defense. Failure to state a claim “is not a proper affirmative defense but, rather, asserts a defect in [the plaintiff's] prima facie case. [Citations]…[It] is, in essence, an argument that the plaintiff has not met its burden of alleging the elements of its claims.” (LL B Sheet 1, LLC v. Loskutoff, (N.D. Cal. 2019) 362 F. Supp. 3d 804, 818.) Therefore, this affirmative defense should not be included in the First Amended Answer.
As to Fifth, Sixth, and Twentieth Affirmative defenses, Defendant has demonstrated that they are appropriate for an Answer. Thus, they may remain in the First Amended Answer.
Finally, Plaintiff argues the affirmative defenses do not state which claim or claims they are intended to respond to. Plaintiff, once again, is correct. When amending the Answer, Defendant is reminded that each defense “shall be separately stated, and the several defenses shall refer to the causes of action which they are intended to answer, in a manner by which they may be intelligibly distinguished.” (CCP § 431.30(g).)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Demurrer to the Answer is SUSTAINED IN FULL. Defendant is given 21-days leave to amend, consistent with this ruling.
Concluding Observations
This pending demurrer presents a classic example of the rather sad and unfortunate state of current affairs in civil litigation.
Does the Plaintiff have a right to demurrer to an Answer? Of course; it is in the CCP. Be that as it may, what does the Plaintiff actually accomplish, from a practicable standpoint, when he or she does so, such as in this case? Not much.
As such, one is left to wonder whether this is this merely a case of over-litigation in an attorneys-fees generated case? Perhaps. Fortunately, that particular issue need not be answered at this time. Attorneys are certainly allowed and encouraged to “zealously” represent their clients. However, does that mean that it was, in fact, reasonable and necessary to file this instant demurrer, even though Plaintiff was, in fact correct, and had a statutory right to do so? Maybe.
On the other hand, why do Defendants constantly assert dozens and dozens of “affirmative defenses” that are not, in fact, actual affirmative defenses, or moreover, they don’t actually apply in their pending case? All this does is increase litigation and discovery obligations, such as when you must respond to the standard Form Interrogatory No. 15, governing affirmative defenses.
“My words fly up, my thoughts remain below.
Words without thoughts never to heaven go.”
(W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 3, lines 94-98)
It is respectfully suggested that more “thoughts” should be given by counsel to the actions and words we choose to engage in civil litigation.
Just food for thought.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2025 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.