Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 24STCV33621, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 24STCV33621, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Elizabeth Luque brings this action against FCA US, LLC and Los Angeles Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram for violations of the Song-Beverly Act, fraudulent concealment, and negligent repair. Plaintiff alleges that her 2022 Jeep Wrangler exhibits engine and steering defects, among other things, and that FCA concealed the existence of these defects before Plaintiff purchased the vehicle.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendant demurrers to the Sixth Cause of Action for fraudulent inducement by concealment. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege the claim with the requisite specificity, “relying instead on conclusory and vague statements…” (Dem. 5: 12.) Defendant relatedly argues the “Complaint is devoid of the names of the persons for FCA who made any representations to Plaintiff, their authority to speak on behalf of FCA, what specifically they said or wrote to Plaintiff, or when the representation was made.” (Id. 6: 1-3.)

“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal. 5th at 40.) “Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship. (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1185–1186.) Fraud, including concealment, must be pleaded with specificity. (Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 132.)

Plaintiff alleges “[o]n or about June 5, 2022, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2022 Jeep Wrangler…which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant FCA.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) The vehicle displays defects “including but not limited to, engine defects, steering defects, transmission defects, electrical defects; among other defects and non-conformities,” that “substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the Vehicle.” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.)

“Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that FCA knew since prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2022 Jeep Wrangler vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine have one or more defects that can result loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the “Engine Defect”).” (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendant “failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter.” (Id. ¶ 18.) “Defendant knew or should have known, based on FCA’s routine monitoring of complaints, that the 2022 Jeep Wrangler vehicles have a dangerous defect that adversely affects their drivability. Additionally, FCA knew or should have known about the Engine Defect through sources not available to consumers, including FCA’s own aggregate pre-market data and other aggregate post-market data from FCA authorized dealers.” (Id. ¶ 23.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “was under a duty to disclose the defective nature of the vehicle and its Engine” because (a) “FCA acquired its knowledge of the Engine Defect and its potential consequences prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff,” (b) “FCA was in a superior position from various internal sources to know (or should have known) the true state of facts about the material defects contained in vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine;” and (c) “Plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to learn of or discover the Vehicle’s Engine Defect and its potential consequences until well after Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 66.)

As raised by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal has held that similar allegations satisfied the pleading standard for fraudulent concealment. (See Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 828, 840.) In Dhital, the Court held that the following allegations were sufficient at the pleading state to state the claim: “[P]laintiffs alleged the CVT transmissions installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car.” (Id. at 844.)

Here, considering the allegations, Plaintiff has alleged all elements of fraudulent inducement by concealment, and has done so with the specificity required at the pleading stage in a lemon law case. (See Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255 [under the LiMandri factors, a duty to disclose arises when a Defendant “actively conceals a material fact” or “makes partial representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not been disclosed.”].) It is also worth noting that the facts of the alleged defects are likely within the knowledge of the moving parties. (Comm. On Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 217 [“Less specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.’”].)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.