Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 25STCV00064, Date: 2024-09-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 25STCV00064, Date: 2024-09-11 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Frank Elias Mancia worked for Defendants as a forklift operator. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated his employment after he suffered an injury at work. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1) FEHA discrimination, (2) FEHA retaliation, (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (5) failure to engage in the interactive process, (6) declaratory relief, and (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

“Under the FAA, there is a strong policy favoring arbitration. [Citations.] ‘The overarching purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms ....’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘[a]rbitration is a matter of consent ....’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘ “Although the FAA preempts any state law that stands as an obstacle to its objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, ... we apply general California contract law to determine whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate their dispute.” ’ [Citations.]” (Barrera v. Apple Am. Grp. LLC (2023) 95 Cal. App. 5th 63, 76.) It is settled that “[u]nder both California and federal law, arbitration is strongly favored and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Balandran v. Labor Ready, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1527.)

California also has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving disputes. “Even so, parties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so.” (Avila v. S. California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 835, 843.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Id.) An arbitration agreement is a contractual agreement. “General contract law principles include that ‘[t]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] ... The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” [Citations.] (Garcia v. Expert Staffing W., 73 Cal. App. 5th 408, 412–13.)

“[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence . . . .” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284). “In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration [citation]. The court should attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353). “Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n v. State (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205).

“[A] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284). “If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. . . .” (CCP § 1281.4.)

The FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration provisions in any contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9 USC § 2.) The term “involving commerce” is functionally equivalent to “affecting commerce” and “signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.” (Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 US 265, 277.) “The party asserting the FAA bears the burden to show it applies by presenting evidence establishing [that] the contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce . . . .” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.)

Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff twice signed agreements to arbitrate. (Bredehoft Decl. ¶ 7.) The agreements are mostly, if not completely identical, and provide that they are “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.” (Id., Exhs. 1, 2, p. 2.)

Because the agreements expressly call for application of the FAA, this court will consider and apply the FAA, where necessary. (See Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 956, 963 [finding the FAA applies “if it is so stated in the agreement.”].)

Defendants have the initial burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Gamboa v. Ne. Cmty. Clinic (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158, 165.) “[I]t is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 215, 218.)

In the event there is any dispute between you and the Company relating to or arising out of the employment or the termination of your employment, whether such claims arise before or after the signing of this Agreement, which you and the Company are unable to resolve informally through direct discussion, regardless of the kind or type of dispute, you and the Company agree to submit all such claims or disputes to be resolved by final and binding arbitration, instead of going to court, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Federal Arbitration Act.

The “Company” is defined to include “EmployBridge, StaffingSolutions, ProLogistix, ProDrivers, ResourceMFG, Resource Accounting, Personnel One, MedicalSolutions, Select Staffing, RemX, Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Westaff, Vaughn Consulting Group, Decca Consulting, Resdin and all related entities…” (Id.) Additionally, the Agreements are “intended to also apply to the Company’s clients where employees may be sent to work as explicit third-party beneficiaries of this agreement.” (Id.)

Considering this evidence, Defendants have met their initial burden to produce a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy. Because the agreement is broad, covering “any dispute” between the parties, the agreement covers Plaintiff’s claims here. (See Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189 [noting that “arbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question”].)

Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the agreement to arbitrate, and in fact, does not provide any evidence in opposition to the motion. Instead, he states that he “agrees to arbitration provided that all Defendants agree to be jointly and severally liable for arbitration fees.” (Opp. 2: 3-4.) By making this demand, Plaintiff “hopes to avoid a situation where on the eve of the arbitration hearing, one Defendant decides to not pay for their share of the arbitration fees, causing prejudicial delay to Plaintiff, and forcing Plaintiff to go back to state court after having gone through the majority of the arbitration process.” (Id. 2: 9-11.)

Plaintiff cites no authority for his position that the Defendants must be jointly and severally liable for arbitration fees. Nor does he cite any case authority stating that the risk that a party might not pay its share of arbitration fees works as a defense to enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Be that as it may, the record is clear that the moving parties are the Defendants, not the Plaintiff.

In short, each party reserves whatever rights that party may have under the laws governing binding arbitrations, including CCP §§1280 et seq., which includes 1291.98. Nothing more needs to be ordered at this time.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.