Timothy Galindo v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, et al.

DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Amazon.com Services, LLC and Mackarious Garass

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Timothy Galindo

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Timothy Galindo, a former Warehouse Associate for Amazon, suffered an injury out of the workplace. Plaintiff alleges he informed Defendants of the injury, but rather than reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s workplace restrictions, Defendants greatly reduced his hours and then terminated his employment. 

Defendants now demurrer to the Third and Ninth Causes of Action in the Complaint. Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Demurrer to the Third and Ninth Causes of Action is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff is given 30 days leave to amend the Third Cause of Action only. Leave to Amend is DENIED as to the Ninth Cause of Action.

Moving parties are ordered to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Demurrer

I. Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Ryan H. Wessels, Counsel for Defendants, reflects that the parties met and conferred.

II. Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)  

III. Analysis

A. Ninth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

First, Defendants demurrer to the Ninth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue Plaintiff has not alleged “extreme and outrageous conduct” to support this cause of action.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.  A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) (internal citations omitted). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”  (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 215, 233.)  Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’”  (Id.)

Although a claim for IIED will generally present multiple questions of fact, a court may sustain a demurrer to the claim when “the facts alleged do not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.)  The process has been described as “more intuitive than analytical.”  (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671–672.)

 Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a Warehouse Associate starting in November 2023. (Compl. ¶ 17.) “On or about December 8, 2023, Plaintiff suffered a nonwork-related injury to his groin area when he slipped and fell.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff’s Primary Treating Physician instructed Plaintiff “to refrain from crouching and pulling carts, and to work a reduced schedule of two days per week via 3 intermittent absences per week.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff provided Defendants a doctor’s note detailing these restrictions. (Id. ¶ 22.) 

On January 2, 2024, Defendant offered Plaintiff an “accommodation” by reducing his schedule “to only 4 hours per week.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges this reduction in hours was “in an attempt to force him to resign.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to offer any other reasonable accommodations despite notice of the need for same. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.) 

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n February 2, 2024, Plaintiff received an email from Amazon Human Resources Department informing him of his termination. Subsequently, Plaintiff called the Human Resources Call Center to inquire why he was terminated. However, Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff with a reason for the termination. Plaintiff protested the termination but was repeatedly told that the decision was made and there was nothing that could be done to reinstate him.” (Id. ¶ 28.) 

Here, as a matter of law, these allegations fail to amount to severe or outrageous conduct. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendants failed to offer reasonable accommodations for his injuries. Instead, Defendants reduced his work hours to 4 hours per week in an attempt to get Plaintiff to quit. When he did not, Defendants fired him without explanation. But “[a] simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs. (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 [emphasis added].)

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Plaintiff asks for leave to amend, stating he “can provide clarification as to Garass’ knowledge that Plaintiff was susceptible to injuries through mental distress and that the conduct at issue would likely result in illness through mental distress.” (Opp. 14: 10-12.) But even assuming Plaintiff amends to plead these additional facts, the conduct would still not amount to severe or outrageous conduct. Therefore, the Demurrer is sustained WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Third Cause of Action for Whistleblower Retaliation

Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the disclosure of illegal activity. 

Labor Code section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities. It prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for sharing information the employee “has reasonable cause to believe ... discloses a violation of state or federal statute” or of “a local, state, or federal rule or regulation” with a government agency, with a person with authority over the employee, or with another employee who has authority to investigate or correct the violation. (§ 1102.5, subd. (b).) “This provision,” the Supreme Court of California has explained, “reflects the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 77.) A claim for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 requires “(1) the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of retaliation, (2) the defendant provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its acts, and (3) the plaintiff show this explanation is merely a pretext for the retaliation. [Citations.] To establish the first element, the plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the defendant subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the two.” (Ross v. Cnty. of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 580, 591–92.)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he shared information with anyone that he believed violated any law. Rather, he alleges only that he “disclosed to his supervisor(s) that he had a disability which required reasonable accommodations.” (Compl. ¶ 65.) Under these facts, Plaintiff is simply not a “whistleblower.” 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED.

In support of leave to amend, Plaintiff states he “can add facts to clarify that Plaintiff was complaining about Amazon’s façade of an accommodation in violation of his work restrictions and, thus, Amazon’s unlawful activity.” (Opp. 14: 6-8.) This court understands Plaintiff to mean that he can plead facts showing Defendants terminated him not only because he “disclosed to his supervisor(s) that he had a disability which required reasonable accommodations” (Compl. ¶ 65), but because he subsequently complained that Defendants were failing to offer reasonable accommodations. Because Plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable possibility of an successful amendment, he is given leave to amend the Third Cause of Action only. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   May 19, 2025 ___________________________________