Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 25STCV05375, Date: 2025-06-16 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Jane MCB Doe and John MMJ Doe bring this action against Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District and its former employee, Mark Berndt. Plaintiffs allege they suffered childhood sexual abuse at the hands of Berndt while attending Miramonte Elementary School.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Plaintiffs allege they suffered childhood sexual abuse at the hands of their teacher, Defendant Mark Berndt, who was employed by Defendant LAUSD. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiffs allege LAUSD knew that Berndt “previously engaged in dangerous and inappropriate conduct with children,” yet “knowingly fail[ed] to take reasonable steps, and failed to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct…” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs further allege that LAUSD hid or concealed Berndt’s misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.)

As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that public entities like LAUSD are generally immune from common law torts like IIED. “Except as otherwise provided by statute,” a public entity “is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Govt. Code § 815(a).) But section 815.2(a) provides a caveat to the rule: “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Govt. Code § 815.2(a).) In other words, “section 815 establishes ‘the basic rule[ ] that public entities are immune from liability except as provided by statute.’ [Citation.] Thus, when it comes to common law tort injuries, [a public entity’s] liability can only be predicated on its vicarious liability, if any, for the wrongful acts of its employees, as authorized by section 815.2, subdivision (a).” (Ross v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 1507, 1514.)

Because LAUSD cannot be directly liable for IIED, its liability, if any in this case, must be based on vicarious liability. “Vicarious liability ‘means that the act or omission of one person ... is imputed by operation of law to another,’ ” without regard to fault. [Citation]. For example, vicarious liability for torts is imposed by operation of law upon employers for acts of their employees within the course and scope of employment, or upon principals for the acts of their agents.” (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Prop. Mgmt. (2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 1360, 1375.) “The very fact that a public entity can only act through its employees makes it critical to analyze the nature of the alleged conduct in determining whether acts of public employees in the scope of their employment provide a basis for vicarious liability.” (Yee v. Superior Ct. (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 26, 40.)

As raised by Defendant, in John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist. (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 438, the California Supreme Court held that the school district that employed a teacher who sexually molested a student could not be held vicariously liable for the teacher's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court looked to the “underlying rationale for the respondeat superior doctrine,” and concluded the justifications for imposing liability did not apply in the teacher-student context. (Id. at 450-52.)

Plaintiffs fail to address this case in their opposition entirely. Therefore, this court concludes that the District is not vicariously liable, and Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Because there appears to be no reasonable possibility of successful amendment, no leave to amend is given.

Both fiduciary and confidential relationships give rise to a fiduciary duty, that is, a duty “to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party.” (Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 1160.) “The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and (3) damage proximately caused by that breach.” (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.) Whether a fiduciary duty exists is generally a question of law. (Hodges v. Cnty. of Placer (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 537, 546.) “A fiduciary relationship is ‘ “any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. Such a relation ordinarily arises where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his acts relating to the interest of the other party without the latter’s knowledge or consent ....” (Id. at 546-47.)

Constructive fraud “is a unique species of fraud applicable only to a fiduciary or confidential relationship.” [Citation.] Constructive fraud ‘arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship to another which induces justifiable reliance by the latter to his prejudice.’ [Citation.]” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1131.)

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants, as school teachers, staff, faculty, administrators and/or LAUSD officials were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs, owing them a special duty of due care.” (Compl. ¶ 92; see also ¶ 103 [alleging Defendants “entered into a fiduciary, special and confidential relationship with Plaintiffs”].)

Here, this court is unaware of any binding California authority holding that a fiduciary relationship or confidential relationship exist between a school district and its students. And while, as alleged, there may exist a “special relationship” between the district and its students, there is no indication that this “special relationship” gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 869).

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.