Vipan Kant Bhola v. Gregory T. Royston, et al.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS AS PREVAILING PARTIES ON MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Gregory Royston, Yuko Royston, and YGR Living Trust

RESPONDING PARTY(S): None

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Vipan Bhola brings this action against Defendants Gregory Royston, Yuko Royston, and YGR Living Trust for an alleged violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.

On December 8, 2024, this court granted Defendants’ motion to expunge the lis pendens recorded on the subject property. Defendants now move to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on that motion. Plaintiff Bhola has not filed an opposition. 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Moving parties to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

I. Legal Standard

In California, “[a] party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly authorized by statute or contract.” (Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67 Cal. App. 5th 459, 464; See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees under the Labor Code sections 218.5, 226, and 2699.

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.)  “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’”  “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”  (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’”  (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.)  The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

The court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94.  The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.

II. Analysis

Defendants Gregory Royston, Yuko Royston, and YGR Living Trust move for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs after successfully moving to expunge the lis pendens from real property located at 6338 Sattes Drive, Rancho Palos Verdes, CA 90275. 

The court is required to direct an award of the prevailing party of attorneys’ fees and the costs of making or opposing a motion to expunge lis pendens unless it finds that either the other party acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust.  (CCP § 405.38 [The court shall…].) The prevailing party on a motion to expunge is entitled to an award only against the losing party, not against its counsel.  (Doyle v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1355, 1359.)

Here, the attorney fee award is mandatory, and neither of the exceptions apply. First, Plaintiff did not act with substantial justification in bringing this lawsuit, nor in maintaining it once he learned (or should have learned) that it lacked merit. (See Wahl Decl. ¶¶ 15-18.) Second, there is nothing to suggest imposition of sanction would be unjust, and by failing to oppose, Plaintiff has not demonstrated otherwise.

Defendants seek a total award of $32,273.12. This includes $26,603.12 in attorney’s fees and costs on the motion to expunge, $4,050 on the fee motion, and an estimated $1,620 for a reply and to attend the hearing. Counsel for Defendants is billing at a rate of $550 per hour. (Wahl Decl. ¶ 4.) 

First, the court finds that an hourly rate of $550 per hour is reasonable based on counsel’s experience and the nature of the case. 

Moving parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   January 31, 2024 ___________________________________