Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case BC695842 2022-12-05 Tentative Ruling

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Emmanuel and Lara Trousse (“The Trousses”) claim that in 2002, their mother Martine Palmaro-Trousse (“Martine”) entrusted to Defendants some $14.8 million (the “Inheritance Money”) that the Trousses had inherited from their late father, to be invested on the Trousses’ behalf because they were minors. Defendants were family-friends of the Trousses. To hold the Inheritance Money, Defendants established Delago Enterprises, LLC, Corelson, LLC, and Estate Investments, LLC (the “LLCs”). The Trousses allege that Defendants mishandled the Inheritance Money, misrepresented the state of affairs to the Trousses, and misappropriated millions of dollars from the LLCs.

On April 5, 2018, Defendants filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs and their mother, and on December 31, 2019, filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (the “FACC”). Defendants filed requests for dismissal of various cross-claims on January 20, 2021 and February 4, 2021, the result of which was that only cross-claims against cross-defendant Martine Palmaro-Trousse for declaratory relief, breach of contract, fraud, and contractual interference remain.

Pursuant to Cross-Complainants’ request, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 8. Cross-Defendant objects to exhibit 6, which was filed in this matter and reflects Proof of Service on Cross-Defendant Palmaro-Trousse in Monaco. Because the court takes judicial notice without assuming the truth of the assertions contained therein (see Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp. (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 808), Cross-Defendant’s objection is overruled.

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at pp. 1441-1442.) When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.) “A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process.” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.)

Palmaro-Trousse states that she “was born and raised in the Principality of Monaco,” has “primarily resided in Monaco for over forty years,” and resides there currently. (Decl. ¶ 2.) She met Cross-Complainants Ruben Gomez and Lynne Delaney while the three studied at UCLA in the 1970s, and they became “very close friends.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Gomez is the godfather to Palmaro-Trousse’s daughter, Lara, and Delaney was Palmaro-Trousse’s maid of honor. (Id. ¶ 6.) The group spent holidays together and Palmaro-Trousse “considered cross-complainants as family”; They referred to each other as “Sis” and “Bro.” (Id.)

After the sudden death of her ex-husband and minor-children’s father in 2001, Palmaro-Trousse became the legal trustee of the children’s estate. She accepted the children’s inheritance on their behalf. (Id. ¶ 8.) Around this time, Palmaro-Trousse “spoke with cross-complainants about [her] children's inheritance and expressed [her] desire to preserve and enhance [the] children’ s inheritance and secure properties for them in the United States.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Gomez and Delaney “were insistent on taking care of the investments themselves,” and claimed they were “experienced real estate investors and had managed successfully their own investment properties.” (Id.)

Between 2002 and 2006, Palmaro-Trousse transferred “approximately $14,490,000 to cross-complainants from [the] children's estate to be directed to investments on [the] children's behalf.” (Id. ¶ 10.) All of this money belonged to the children. Palmaro-Trousse, Gomez, and Delaney “agreed not to inform the children of this arrangement, because they were going through a very difficult and traumatic period in life.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

Palmaro-Trousse had only a “general understanding that [Cross-Complainants] would invest the funds in real estate in the United States,” but “did not know where specifically in the United States the real estate investments would be located.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Gomez and Delaney made their own decision to invest in California real estate. (Id.) Palmaro-Trousse eventually learned the investment properties were in California, but “was not personally familiar with where the investment properties were located in California.” (Id.) She states she is not a member, has never been a member, and had no role in forming the LLCs created by Gomez and Delaney. (Id. ¶ 13.) She further states that after 2001, she does “not recall visiting cross-complainants in California.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Her only visit to California since then was to attend a funeral. She attests that she “own[s] no property or assets in California and [has] no bank accounts or other holdings in California.” (Id.)

First, Cross-Defendant challenges the procedural validity of service. Cross-Defendant argues there is no certificate of service issued by the appropriate authority pursuant to the requirements of the Hague Convention, to which the United States and Monaco are both signatories. More specifically, Cross-defendant contends that her “counsel in Monaco received the cross-complaint on July 13, 2022,” but “[b]ecause no certificate of service has been issued, cross-defendant does not know whether cross-complainants have complied with the requirements of the Convention, and therefore contests that service of the summons was proper.” (Mtn. 10: 17-22.)

In opposition, Cross-Complainants argue that Cross-Defendant was properly served in Monaco on July 13, 2022, and that the service package “included the operative Summons, operative Cross-Complaint, and the Request for Service Abroad of Judicial or Extrajudicial Documents pursuant to the Hague Convention.” The Service Packet is attached as Cross-Defendants’ Exhibit 6. (See RJN, Exh. 6.) Indeed, the packet includes a “CERTIFICATE” apparently issued by the Monegasque agency confirming service of the documents in compliance with the Convention. (Id., Bates #0000091.)

In reply, Cross-Defendant submits a Declaration from her Monaco counsel, Richard Mullot. Mullot states that the summons package he received on Trousse’s behalf “included a blank Hague Convention certificate.” (Mullot Decl., ¶ 2.) The Declaration attaches a blank certificate form. (Id., Exh. A.)

Here, Cross-Complainants have provided a completed Certificate showing compliance with the Hague Convention. Even accepting that the completed version was not actually served on Cross-Defendant, there is nothing in Cross-Defendant’s authority suggesting that it had to be. Rather, as explained in Rockefeller, the service agency “must serve the documents by a method prescribed by the internal law of” Monaco, and “then provide a certificate of service that conforms to a specified model.” (Rockefeller Tech. Invs. (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Tech. Co. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 135.) That is all that Cross-Defendant’s authority requires, and that was done here. Moreover, because the Certificate is apparently the document confirming that service occurred, it is logical that the form was blank at the time of service on Cross-Defendant. Accordingly, the court finds service was proper.

Under a “general” jurisdiction analysis, nonresident defendants may be sued on causes of action unrelated to their activities within the state. (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147.) “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 924.)

Here, it is undisputed that Cross-Defendant is a resident of Monaco. However, Cross-Complaints argue general jurisdiction exists because of the following: “Martine made: (i) annual visits to California for decades to maintain her personal and business relationship with Defendants and to oversee the sale of her deceased ex-husband’s California real estate (RJN, Ex. 7, ¶¶ 3-4, 10, 16): (ii) investments of tens of millions of dollars in California real estate (id., ¶¶ 25-41); (iii) regular communications with Defendants in California about her real estate investments in California (id., ¶ 3); (iv) holding joint California bank accounts with Defendants (Wallenstein Decl., Ex. A); and (v) petitioning a California Superior Court, County of Marin, to appoint one of the Defendants as the administrator of her deceased ex-husband’s assets (RJN, Ex. 5).” (Opp. 12: 21-28.)

However, the court agrees that Cross-Defendant’s limited time spent in California does not resemble a domicile or otherwise arise to the continuous contacts necessary to invoke general jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s visits and concrete connections to California—which have become quite limited since 2001—do not show that she is at home in the state. Neither do her investments within the state, nor communications with parties who live here.

Accordingly, this court does not have general jurisdiction over Cross-Defendant, based upon the above-stated stated grounds.

Cross-Complainants also argue the argue has specific jurisdiction over Cross-Defendant. “A nonresident defendant may be subject to the court’s specific jurisdiction if three requirements are met: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits with respect to the matter in controversy; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contact with the forum; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable and comports with fair play and substantial justice.” (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 216 (citing Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269).) “‘The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” (Id. (citing Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 282-85).) “For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” (Id.)

As explained in Walden, “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State. (Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 [citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475)(Emphasis in original.) The Court further noted that it has “consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State” and that the analysis “looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.” (Walden, 571 U.S at 285.)

Here, Cross-Complainants have shown that Cross-Defendant purposely availed herself to California. By sending millions of dollars to the United States—to be looked after by those who she knew resided in California and would likely invest there—Cross-Defendant “should [have] reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” in California. (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra, 444 US at 297.) The court notes that “even a single act may support specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident” provided there is a “substantial connection” with the forum state. (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (1957) 355 US 220, 223.) Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a single act with a greater connection to California than the one here. Cross-Defendant knowingly sent millions to the state and at minimum, could reasonably foresee that the money would be used to purchase property in the state.

The court appreciates that the “’minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 285.) Here, the court is not concerned with Cross-Defendant’s contacts with Cross-Complainants and rejects the argument that the “parties’ relationship was the only purported ‘connection’ between cross-defendant and California.” (Mtn. 17: 2-3.) Rather, it is her own actions that “connect[] [her] to the forum in a meaningful way.” (Id. at 290.)

Finally, the court concludes that exercising personal jurisdiction here will “comport with fair play and substantial justice.” (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 476.) In fact, granting the motion would arguably cause a greater injustice. It’s been said before that Cross-Defendant was, and still remains, a central figure in this case. Cross-Defendant cannot invoke California and its court’s only when it is to her benefit to do so—fairness requires her participation in this litigation.

Because Cross-Complainants have met burden to show that Cross-Defendant has “purposefully availed” herself of benefits and protections of forum law, the burden shifts to Cross-Defendant to prove it would be unreasonable for local courts to exercise jurisdiction. (Burger King Corp., supra, 471 US at 476.) Cross-Defendant’s main contention is that traveling to California from Monaco for a trial is prohibitive. Absent more, the court rejects that argument. (See Integral Develop. Corp. v. Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.4th 576, 592 [“In this era of fax machines and discount air travel,” requiring a foreign citizen to defend an action in California does not violate due process].)

This court finds that it may validly exercise personal jurisdiction over Cross-Defendant Palmaro-Trousse. Cross-Complainants have shown that specific jurisdiction applies here because Cross-Defendant purposefully availed herself to California, the cross-claims arise out of Cross-Defendant’s contacts with California, and that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, Specially-Appearing Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons is DENIED.