Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case BC722477 2023-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jane A.M. Doe brings this action against Defendants the City of Los Angeles and Officer Brian Kelly, a City of Los Angeles police officer. Plaintiff alleges that she was exiting the Los Angeles/Highland Park Metro Station when Officer Kelly unjustifiably detained her and used excessive force. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1) Unreasonable Search and Seizure-Detention and Arrest, (2) Unreasonable Search and Seizure – Excessive Force, (3) Assault, (4) Battery, (5) Sexual Battery, (6) Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (7) Negligence, (8) Negligent Use of Force, and (9) Violation of Bane Act.

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order . . . that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.) “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues . . . .” (Id., § 1048, subd. (b).) “It is within the discretion of the court to bifurcate issues or order separate trials of actions . . . and to determine the order in which those issues are to be decided.” (Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 205.)

Defendant first argues bifurcation is warranted because Plaintiff intends on offering the testimony of William Bennett during the damages portion, a psychologist who took six psychological tests of Plaintiff Jane Doe. Defendant contends these tests “take a lot of explanation and a lot of time to discuss so that the jury will understand what he is testifying about.” (Mtn. 3: 3-7.) Including cross-examination, Defendant predicts the expert’s “testimony will take at least one day, but more likely two days.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff’s mother—who “was not a percipient witness and would not have any testimony to offer for the liability phase”—will apparently testify as to damages. (Mtn. 3: 8-9.) Defendant contends the liability portion should be “relatively brief,” whereas the damages phase “will take days to present.”

Another, perhaps overarching motivation for bifurcation is Defendant’s apparent fear that Plaintiff’s “sympathetic evidence” revealed in the damages phase will sway the jury to find liability for the alleged sexual assault. (Mtn. 3: 12-16.) Defendant argues by “bifurcating liability, the court will save jurors considerable time, but importantly will ensure that the Defendants are not prejudicially impacted by testimony that has no bearing on whether there is any liability.” (Mtn. 3: 9-11.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion. She contends this is a “straight forward liability and damage case,” and that bifurcation “would cause unnecessary delay in the presentation of evidence when it is not needed or warranted.” (Opp. 2: 26-28.) In particular, Plaintiff argues bifurcation would result in overlapping evidence and duplication, since damages are an essential element of her causes of action, and Plaintiff, her sister, and her mother would need to testify in two separate trials. She also contends there is “minimal damage evidence,” including only a single expert to testify on damages. (Opp. 5: 24-28.) Moreover, Plaintiff says her expert witness’s testimony is also necessary in both the liability and damages phase.

Considering the above, this court finds bifurcation unwarranted here. Importantly, there is no evidence that bifurcation will promote “the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation” in any significant way. (CCP § 598.)

In fact, bifurcation may do the opposite, requiring multiple witnesses to testify in two separate trials. Of course, if the jury finds Defendants not liable, under a bifurcated trial, then there is nothing for a jury to consider on damages. But that is true of every case that goes to trial—it does not mean, standing alone, that such a factor warrants bifurcation. After all, the damages portion is expected to last no more than a few days maximum as is.

Further, Defendants have not shown they will be unduly prejudiced absent bifurcation. At most, Defendant shows the potential that the jury may hear evidence of damages not favorable for the City. But such is the nature and purpose of a contested trial. Again, this fact does not warrant bifurcation. Indeed, Defendant itself claims “[t]here are so many reasons that [Plaintiff’s] testimony is not credible.” (Mtn. 3: 14-15.) If that is the case, a jury is surely capable of coming to that conclusion and will not be swayed by “favorable” or “sympathetic” damages evidence when assessing Defendant’s liability.

Finally, Defendant asks that if this court is not inclined to bifurcate damages from liability, that it still grant the motion as to the punitive damages portion of the trial. Defendant’s counsel represents that she met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel and the parties “agreed to bifurcate punitive damages.” (Cohen Decl. ¶ 3.) However, they “could not reach an agreement as to whether all damages should be bifurcated.” (Id.) Plaintiff apparently does not oppose bifurcating the punitive damages portion only in her opposition.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email atSmcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.