Judge: Randy Rhodes, Case: 20CHCP00146, Date: 2023-01-17 Tentative Ruling




Case Number: 20CHCP00146    Hearing Date: January 17, 2023    Dept: F51

 

Dept. F-51¿ 

Date: 1/17/23 

Case #20CHCP00146 

¿ 

DEMURRER

 

Demurrer without Motion to Strike Filed: 12/7/22

 

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Ron Hacker, aka Ronen Hacker; BAG Fund, LLC; and Intellectual Capital Management & Servicer, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Larion Krayzman, in pro per (“Plaintiff”) 

NOTICE: OK 

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s entire second amended complaint (“SAC”).

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled.

 

The parties are reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

 

 I.      BACKGROUND 

On 6/18/20, Plaintiff filed his original complaint against nine named defendants, seeking to set aside allegedly fraudulent transfers made to avoid satisfying a judgment in a previous action[1] where a jury awarded Plaintiff a total of $126,000 against defendant L&J Assets, LLC.

On 4/27/22 and 5/3/22, the Court sustained demurrers filed by defendants Lana Smith and Intellectual Capital Management & Servicer, Inc., respectively, with leave to amend.

On 5/26/22, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”). On 8/9/22, the Court sustained defendant Tanya Bogorad’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC with 20 days leave to amend.

On 9/30/22, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint (“SAC”) against the moving defendants. On 10/12/22, Defendants filed a motion to strike the entire SAC, which the Court denied on 11/14/22.

On 12/7/22, Defendants filed the instant demurrer with motion to strike. On 1/11/23, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 1/12/23, Defendants filed their reply.

 

 II.         ANALYSIS

Timeliness

The Court observes that Plaintiff’s opposition was filed late under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b). Under the statute, “All papers opposing a motion so


noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005, subd. (b).)

Here, the deadline for Plaintiff to file and serve his opposition was 1/3/23, nine court days before the instant hearing. Plaintiff filed and served his opposing papers on 1/11/23, six court days late, and three court days before the hearing. Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, filed his papers past the filing deadline, thereby preventing Defendant from an opportunity to file a timely reply.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, “the law respects form less than substance.” (Civ. Code § 3528.) Additionally, the public policy of California favors adjudicating cases on the merits. (Elston v. City of Turlock¿(1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 235; Hernandez v. Superior Court¿(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.) The Court thus exercises its discretion, under Rule 3.110 of the California Rules of Court, to excuse the untimely filed opposition. Plaintiff is advised to take note of the filing deadlines under the statute, as future filings made past the statutory deadlines may result in the Court declining to consider the late-filed papers at the hearing.¿

Meet-and-Confer 

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, counsel for Defendants declares that on 11/15/22, he sent a letter to Plaintiff by email detailing the issues raised in the instant demurrer. (Decl. of Vincent Quigg, ¶ 10.) However, counsel did not receive any response from Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

Therefore, counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a). 

Demurrer

As a general matter, a¿party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including¿that¿“the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

In¿a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.¿(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc.¿v.¿Accountants, Inc. Servs.¿(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

Here, Defendants¿demur to both of Plaintiff’s causes of action in the SAC pursuant Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision¿(e),¿arguing that each cause of action fails because¿it fails¿to allege facts sufficient to¿state¿a cause of action against Defendants.

1.      Intentional Fraudulent Transfer

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges intentional fraudulent transfer against all defendants.[1] A transfer is fraudulent, both as to present and future creditors, if it is made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” (Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a).) The statute “permits defrauded creditors to reach property in the hands of a transferee.” Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 657, 663.)

Here, Defendants argue that they are not the proper parties to whom Plaintiff has directed this cause of action, as they are not the debtors to Plaintiff. (Dem. 5:19–28.)[2] Defendants further argue that nonmoving defendant L & J Assets, LLC is the debtor in the instant action, and while Plaintiff identifies Defendants as transferees, he fails to allege any single transfer. (Id., 6:3–9.)

Plaintiff argues in opposition that he has specifically alleged the transfers at issue in paragraphs 9–13 of his SAC, and the role each of the moving Defendants had in those transfers. (Pl.’s Opp., 5:4–8.)[3] The Court notes that Plaintiff quotes to the incorrect paragraph numbers in his opposition, and that the correct paragraph numbers should be paragraphs 13–16 and 22 of the SAC. In these paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that beginning in August 2011, L & J Assets, LLC “started transferring assets comprising collection lawsuits and / or judgments for money against third parties” to Defendants without proper consideration, with intent to defraud such creditors as Plaintiff. (SAC ¶¶ 13–16.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to support a cause of action for fraudulent transfer under Civil Code section 3439.04. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action.

 

2.      Conspiracy

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy. “Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort. Instead, it is a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211–212.) “The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation of a group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant to the agreement; and (3) resulting damages.” (Id. at p. 212.)

Here, Defendants argue that this cause of action necessarily fails “since Plaintiff is not successful in pleading a cause of action for fraudulent transfers against Defendants.” (Dem. 7:5–6.) However, as set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a cause of action for fraudulent transfers. Moreover, Plaintiff’s SAC specifically alleges that Defendants conspired between themselves “with the sole intent and purpose to prevent Plaintiff from satisfying his claim in the underlying action against the collection accounts and Judgments in the name of L&J ASSETS, LLC by changing the alleged ‘owner’ of these assets.” (SAC 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants engaged in wrongful conduct by executing the fraudulent transfers, causing Plaintiff to suffer damages in the amount of $126,000.00. (SAC ¶¶ 20–21.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to support a cause of action for conspiracy. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action.


CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled.