Judge: Randy Rhodes, Case: 20CHCP00146, Date: 2023-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20CHCP00146 Hearing Date: January 17, 2023 Dept: F51
Dept. F-51¿
Date: 1/17/23
Case #20CHCP00146
¿
DEMURRER
Demurrer without Motion to Strike Filed: 12/7/22
MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Ron Hacker, aka Ronen
Hacker; BAG Fund, LLC; and Intellectual Capital Management & Servicer, Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Larion Krayzman, in pro per
(“Plaintiff”)
NOTICE: OK
RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s
entire second amended complaint (“SAC”).
TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled.
The parties are reminded to review the 5/3/19
First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When
e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which
are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19
First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil
(particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).)
Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers
being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so
documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents
not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.
I.
BACKGROUND
On 6/18/20, Plaintiff filed his
original complaint against nine named defendants, seeking to set aside
allegedly fraudulent transfers made to avoid satisfying a judgment in a
previous action[1]
where a jury awarded Plaintiff a total of $126,000 against defendant L&J
Assets, LLC.
On 4/27/22 and 5/3/22, the Court
sustained demurrers filed by defendants Lana Smith and Intellectual Capital
Management & Servicer, Inc., respectively, with leave to amend.
On 5/26/22, Plaintiff filed his
first amended complaint (“FAC”). On 8/9/22, the Court sustained defendant Tanya
Bogorad’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC with 20 days leave to amend.
On 9/30/22, Plaintiff filed his
second amended complaint (“SAC”) against the moving defendants. On 10/12/22,
Defendants filed a motion to strike the entire SAC, which the Court denied on
11/14/22.
On 12/7/22, Defendants filed the
instant demurrer with motion to strike. On 1/11/23, Plaintiff filed his
opposition. On 1/12/23, Defendants filed their reply.
II.
ANALYSIS
Timeliness
noticed shall be filed with the
court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply
papers at least five court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005, subd. (b).)
Here, the deadline for Plaintiff to
file and serve his opposition was 1/3/23, nine court days before the instant
hearing. Plaintiff filed and served his opposing papers on 1/11/23, six court
days late, and three court days before the hearing. Plaintiff, a
self-represented litigant, filed his papers past the filing deadline, thereby
preventing Defendant from an opportunity to file a timely reply.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, “the
law respects form less than substance.” (Civ. Code § 3528.) Additionally, the
public policy of California favors adjudicating cases on the merits. (Elston
v. City of Turlock¿(1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 235; Hernandez v. Superior
Court¿(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.) The Court thus exercises its
discretion, under Rule 3.110 of the California Rules of Court, to excuse the
untimely filed opposition. Plaintiff is advised to take note of the filing
deadlines under the statute, as future filings made past the statutory
deadlines may result in the Court declining to consider the late-filed papers
at the hearing.¿
Meet-and-Confer
Before filing its demurrer, “the
demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party
who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of
determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections
to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file
and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which
the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading
subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving
the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the
pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request
of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id.
at subd. (a)(3).)
Here, counsel for Defendants
declares that on 11/15/22, he sent a letter to Plaintiff by email detailing the
issues raised in the instant demurrer. (Decl. of Vincent Quigg, ¶ 10.) However, counsel
did not receive any response from Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
Therefore, counsel has satisfied
the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section
430.41, subdivision (a).
Demurrer
As a general matter, a¿party may
respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or
combination of eight enumerated grounds, including¿that¿“the pleading does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.10, subd. (e).)
In¿a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.¿(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts
alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc.¿v.¿Accountants, Inc. Servs.¿(2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the
complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The
only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands,
states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740,
747.)
1.
Intentional Fraudulent Transfer
Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges
intentional fraudulent transfer against all defendants.[1] A transfer is fraudulent, both as to
present and future creditors, if it is made “with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” (Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a).)
The statute “permits defrauded creditors to reach property in the hands of a
transferee.” Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 657, 663.)
Here, Defendants argue that they are not
the proper parties to whom Plaintiff has directed this cause of action, as they
are not the debtors to Plaintiff. (Dem. 5:19–28.)[2] Defendants
further argue that nonmoving defendant L & J Assets, LLC is the debtor in
the instant action, and while Plaintiff identifies Defendants as transferees,
he fails to allege any single transfer. (Id., 6:3–9.)
Plaintiff argues in opposition that he has
specifically alleged the transfers at issue in paragraphs 9–13 of his SAC, and the
role each of the moving Defendants had in those transfers. (Pl.’s Opp., 5:4–8.)[3] The Court notes
that Plaintiff quotes to the incorrect paragraph numbers in his opposition, and
that the correct paragraph numbers should be paragraphs 13–16 and 22 of the
SAC. In these paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that beginning in August 2011, L &
J Assets, LLC “started
transferring assets comprising collection lawsuits and / or judgments for money
against third parties” to Defendants without proper consideration, with intent
to defraud such creditors as Plaintiff. (SAC ¶¶ 13–16.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to support a cause of action for
fraudulent transfer under Civil Code section 3439.04. Accordingly, the demurrer
is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action.
2. Conspiracy
Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges
that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy. “Civil conspiracy is not
an independent tort. Instead, it is a legal doctrine that imposes liability on
persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the
immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 191, 211–212.) “The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the
formation of a group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant to the
agreement; and (3) resulting damages.” (Id.
at p. 212.)
Here, Defendants argue that this cause of
action necessarily fails “since Plaintiff is not successful in pleading a cause of action for
fraudulent transfers against Defendants.” (Dem. 7:5–6.) However, as set forth
above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a cause of action
for fraudulent transfers. Moreover, Plaintiff’s SAC specifically alleges that
Defendants conspired between themselves “with the sole intent and purpose to
prevent Plaintiff from satisfying his claim in the underlying action against
the collection accounts and Judgments in the name of L&J ASSETS, LLC by
changing the alleged ‘owner’ of these assets.” (SAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendants engaged in wrongful conduct by executing the fraudulent transfers,
causing Plaintiff to suffer damages in the amount of $126,000.00. (SAC ¶¶ 20–21.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to support a cause of action for
conspiracy. Accordingly,
the demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action.
CONCLUSION
The demurrer is overruled.