Judge: Randy Rhodes, Case: 21CHCV00316, Date: 2023-03-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21CHCV00316    Hearing Date: March 9, 2023    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51¿ 

Date: 3/9/23 

Case #21CHCV00316 

¿ 

DEMURRER

 

Demurrer without Motion to Strike Filed: 12/12/22

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Krupe Investments, Inc., a Delaware corporation registered in California (“Moving Defendant”) 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Lucy Holdings, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company (“Plaintiff”) 

NOTICE: OK 

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: Moving Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s entire second amended complaint (“SAC”).

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is overruled. Moving Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) is granted as to Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 15, and denied as to Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, and 14.

 

At the outset, both D’s demurrer and RJN are somewhat unintelligible – with regard to the RJN, D has not made any argument that any of the materials attached thereto should be judicially noticed. Moreover, the exhibits are not bookmarked, nor is every requested item attached as an exhibit. The exhibits themselves are missing pages, out of order, and some contain documents which are not cited to in the text of the RJN.

 

Moving Defendant is reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil.¿When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

 

BACKGROUND 

This quiet title action arises out of a dispute over certain property located at 28212 Kelly Johnson Parkway, Santa Clarita, California 91355 (the “Subject Property”). Plaintiff alleges that a 12/2/20 deed of trust was fraudulently executed and recorded between the two commonly owned and controlled entities, Moving Defendant and nonmoving defendant Roshmore Development, Inc. (“Roshmore”), and subsequently foreclosed on by Moving Defendant. (SAC ¶¶ 45, 48, 69.)

On 4/23/21, Plaintiff filed its original complaint in this action alleging a cause of action for declaratory relief/quiet title against Moving Defendant and nonmoving defendant Witkin & Associates, LLC (“Witkin”), the foreclosure trustee (collectively, “Defendants”) and a cause of action for fraud against Moving Defendant. On 8/2/21, this Court overruled Defendants’ demurrer as to the declaratory relief/quiet title cause of action and sustained the demurrer, with leave to amend, as to the fraud cause of action.

8/23/21, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting a single cause of action for declaratory relief/quiet title. On 11/5/21, the Court overruled Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC.

On 11/7/22, Plaintiff filed its SAC, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Declaratory Relief/Quiet Title; (2) Slander of Title; and (3) Conspiracy to Slander Title. On 12/12/22, Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer and request for judicial notice. On 2/24/23, Plaintiff filed its opposition. No reply has been filed to date.

 

ANALYSIS

Meet-and-Confer 

Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The demurring party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either: “(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer;” or “(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)

Here, counsel for Moving Defendant declares that he sent Plaintiff’s counsel a meet and confer email on 12/2/22 regarding the issues raised in the demurrer, and the parties discussed further on 12/5/22, but were unable to come to a resolution. (Decl. of Eric Rasmussen, ¶¶ 1–2.) Therefore, counsel has satisfied the preliminary meet and confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a). 

 

Legal Standard

As a general matter, a¿party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer on the basis of any single or combination of eight enumerated grounds, including¿that¿“the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” or is uncertain, meaning “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).)

In¿a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.¿(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc.¿v.¿Accountants, Inc. Servs.¿(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Here, Moving Defendant¿demurs to Plaintiff’s SAC pursuant Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions¿(e) and (f),¿arguing that the pleading fails¿to allege facts sufficient to¿state¿a cause of action for Declaratory Relief/Quiet Title against it, and is uncertain. Moving Defendant also realleges that Plaintiff lacks the standing to bring the instant action, another action is pending involving the same parties, issues, and property, and that the transaction sued upon is void ab initio.

 

A.    Declaratory Relief/Quiet Title Cause of Action

“A party demurring to a pleading that has been amended after a demurrer to an earlier version of the pleading was sustained shall not demur to any portion of the amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer on grounds that could have been raised by demurrer to the earlier version of the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (b).)

As the Court previously stated in overruling Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC: “The sole basis set forth in Defendants’ demurrer to the original complaint as to the declaratory relief/quiet title cause of action was that Witkin and Associates, LLC was not a proper party to the cause of action because it has no interest in or ownership of the Property. (See 8/2/21 Minute Order). Defendants now improperly demur to declaratory relief/quiet title cause of action on different grounds which could have been raised by the demurrer to the original complaint. See Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.41(b). Even if the demurrer on these additional grounds was proper at this point in time, it would be overruled on the merits.” (11/5/21 Minute Order, p. 2.)

Here, the same holds true. Moving Defendant essentially makes the same arguments as previously asserted in its demurrer to the FAC, thus the instant demurrer is improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (b).

As previously stated by the Court, “Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the claim for quiet title. Whether Plaintiff has good title to the Property is what is to be determined in this action. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegation that the grant deed transferring the Property from Roshmore to Plaintiff forms the basis of the quiet title claim. (First Amended Complaint ¶34). The deed is dated November 19, 2020. (First Amended Complaint, Exhibit 2). For purposes of Code of Civil Procedure Section 761.020(d), the date of which a determination is sought is the date of the filing of the complaint, or another date, if the plaintiff so alleges. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (2012) 206 CA4th 201, 213. Similarly, the declaratory relief claim seeking to quiet title is properly stated. See Code of Civil Procedure Section 1060.” (11/5/21 Minute Order, p. 3.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules the instant demurrer as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for declaratory relief/quiet title.

 

B.     Standing

Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no standing to being the instant action because it has no interest in the Subject Property. On the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged in its SAC that it was deeded a Grant Deed to the Subject Property by Roshmore on 11/19/20. (SAC 43.) This assertion is further substantiated by the Grant Deed attached as Exhibit O to Moving Defendant’s RJN.

Moving Defendant further argues that the 11/19/20 transfer of the Subject Property to Plaintiff is void ab initio for violation of Delaware General Corporations Law section 271, subdivision (a)(1) because Roshmore’s shareholders were not notified thereof, and its board of directors did not vote to approve the transfer. (Dem. 12:7–23.)

Plaintiff argues in opposition that “it is not established that Delaware law would even apply here to govern an LLC registered in California and as to real property located in the State of California.” (Pl.’s Opp., 4:14–16.) Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged in its SAC that Roshmore and Moving Defendant are alter ego companies with the same sole shareholder and director. (SAC ¶¶ 11, 13.)

The Court notes that Moving Defendant has made various additional factual allegations to argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action, but declines to reach the merits of these arguments at the demurrer stage. As previously stated, it is sufficient that Plaintiff has properly alleged its interest in the Subject Property, affording it the basis to bring the cause of action to quiet title.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant has failed to establish that the transfer of the Subject Property to Plaintiff is void as a matter of law. “Whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on its claim cannot be determined on demurrer.” (11/5/21 Minute Order, p. 3.) Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.

 

C.    Separate Pending Action

Moving Defendant further argues that the demurrer should be sustained because there exists another pending action involving the same parties, case, property, and issues. (Dem. 15:7–21.) A party may demur to a complaint if “there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (c).)

Moving Defendant cites to LASC Case No. 20CHCV00631, a Breach of Contract action brought by Mark A. Liker against nonmoving defendants Cochrane, Inc. and Roshmore. Moving Defendant also cites to LASC Case No. 22STCV13647, an action for (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Quantum Meruit; and (3) Express and Implied Indemnity brought by nonmoving defendant Eliezer Appel against Mark A. Liker, Airlux Aircraft, Inc., and LG Aviation Inc.

The Court finds that neither of the above-mentioned cases involve the same parties nor the same causes of action as in the instant action. In accordance with the Court’s previous finding, “there is no other action pending between Plaintiff and Defendants.” (11/5/21 Minute Order, p. 2.) Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.

 

  1. Uncertainty 

Generally speaking, “demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and thus are strictly construed because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery. Such demurrers are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Cal.Jur.3d § 137.) “Where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (2011) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 fn.2.)¿¿

Here, Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s entire SAC is uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f). In applying the stringent standard for demurrers filed on this ground, the Court finds that the SAC is not “so incomprehensible” that Moving Defendant cannot respond, especially given the extensive analyses it has offered in attacking the pleading. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.¿

 

CONCLUSION 

The demurrer is overruled.