Judge: Randy Rhodes, Case: 22STCV38230, Date: 2023-04-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV38230    Hearing Date: April 19, 2023    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 4-19-23                                                                                  Trial Date: None

Case #22STCV38230

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Motion filed on 2/6/23.

MOVING PARTY:    Defendant The Congregational Church of Chatsworth

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Southern California Nevada Conference United Church of Christ

NOTICE: Ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Court’s order on granting Plaintiff Southern California Nevada Conference United Church of Christ’s Peremptory Challenge to Judicial Officer (CCP § 170.6).

RULING: The motion for reconsideration is denied.

Background

            On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff Southern California Nevada Conference United Church of Christ (“Plaintiff,” also referred to as “Conference” in the Complaint) filed this action against Defendants The Congregational Church of Chatsworth (the “Church”), Does 1 through 10 (i.e., all persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in the property described in the Complaint adverse or cloud upon Plaintiff's title), and Does 11 through 45, inclusive.

            Plaintiff asserts three causes of action in the Complaint: (1) quiet title and injunctive relief, (2) declaratory and injunctive relief, and (3) imposition of constructive trust and injunctive relief.

            The Complaint alleges the following.

Plaintiff is a California nonprofit, religious corporation, and successor of the Congregational Conference of Southern California and the Southwest (“CCSC”). (Compl., ¶ 1.) The United Church of Christ (“UCC”) is a nationwide religious organization, which has approximately five thousand churches or “congregations.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) The operational and governance structure of the UCC, provides that “conferences,” such as Plaintiff, are bodies which are organized on a territorial basis to perform functions in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and UCC’s bylaws. (Compl., ¶ 10.) The larger conferences are organized on a territorial basis into “associations,” which are cooperatives of local congregations. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Each Association holds the responsibility and oversight for all member churches in its area, and it can remove membership as noted in its bylaws. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff has four associations, including the Northern Association that governs and serves the congregations from approximately Paso Robles to Chatsworth and from approximately Bakersfield to Lompoc. (Compl., ¶ 11.) The Northern Association had responsibility and oversight over the Defendant at all relevant times. (Compl., ¶ 11.)

On about July 28, 2022, Plaintiff became the owner in fee title of the real property commonly known as 20440 Lassen Street, Chatsworth, CA 91311 (the “Property”). (Compl., ¶¶ 3, 9.) On April 1, 2001, a grant deed (the “Deed”) was recorded with the Official Records of the County of Los Angeles, through which Plaintiff conveyed fee title of the Property to Defendant, but reserved a revisionary interest in the Property in the event Defendant ceased to be or function as Plaintiff’s member. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

            In compliance with the bylaws of the Northern Association, a meeting was held on April 6, 2022, to discuss Defendant’s membership and standing. (Compl., ¶ 14.) At that meeting, the UCC, Plaintiff, and the Northern Association’s Committee on Ministry determined that Defendant’s standing and membership should be terminated, and voted to notify Defendant of their intention to terminate Defendant’s standing and membership at a subsequent meeting. (Compl., ¶ 14.) At a meeting held on July 27, 2022, the UCC, Plaintiff, and Northern Association’s Committee on Ministry moved that Defendant did not have standing and was not a member of the UCC, Plaintiff, or Northern Association, and majority of the members present voted to terminate Defendant’s standing and membership with immediate effect. (Compl., ¶ 14.)

            Therefore, since Defendant’s membership and standing was terminated, Plaintiff filed this action seeking (among other things) a declaration that Plaintiff has fee title to the Property from July 28, 2022 (the day after the standing and membership was terminated) pursuant to the Deed’s reversion provision. (Compl., ¶ 16.)

            On January 24, 2023, the Court determined that this case (22STCV38230) and another

Los Angeles Superior Court Case, Southern California Nevada Conference United Church of Christ, et al. v. The Congregational Church of Chatsworth, et al., Case Number 21CHCV00417 (the “First Action”) are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a), and that the First Action is the lead case.

            On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed, and the Court granted, a CCP § 170.6 preemptory challenge to Judge Melvin Sandvig. The Court reassigned the case to Judge Randy Rhodes in Department F51, at the Chatsworth Courthouse for all further proceedings.

            On January 26, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s preemptory challenge, arguing that (1) the Court erred when it failed to consider Defendant’s opposition before granting the preemptory challenge and (2) because this action is merely a continuation of the First Action, the Court should not have granted the preemptory challenge.

            On February 6, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the January 25 order granting Plaintiff’s CCP § 170.6 application.

            On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

            On April 12, 2023, Defendant filed its reply in support of the motion.

Request for Judicial Notice

            Defendant filed a request for judicial notice of court records in this action as well as court records in the First Action. (Request for Judicial Notice, filed on February 6, 2023 (“RJN”), pp. 1:9-3:2.)

            The Court grants the unopposed request as to all documents (Exhibits 1-14). (Evid. Code § 452(d) [providing that a court may take judicial notice of court records].)

Discussion

As an initial matter, Defendant has not cited (and the Court has not found) any authority to support Defendant’s argument that the Court was required to consider Defendant’s opposition before granting Plaintiff’s preemptory challenge under CCP § 170.6. (See NutraGenetics, LLC v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 243, 251 (“NutraGenetics”) [“Section 170.6 permits a party to disqualify a judge for prejudice based only upon a sworn affidavit”]; see also Bravo v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493 [“If the motion is timely and filed in proper form, the trial court must accept it without further inquiry, and the disqualification is effective immediately”].) A court may consider an opposition to a preemptory challenge, but it is not required to do so. (Pickett v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 887, 891 (“Pickett”) [noting that the defendant in that case filed an opposition to the CCP § 170.6 preemptory challenge and the trial court considered that opposition before striking the challenge].)

“‘“[I]n enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 the Legislature guaranteed to litigants an extraordinary right to disqualify a judge.”’ [Citation.]” (NutraGenetics, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 251.)

“The right to disqualify a judge under section 170.6 ‘“is ‘automatic’ in the sense that a good faith belief in prejudice, is alone sufficient, proof of facts showing actual prejudice not being required.”’ [Citations.]” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 [italics removed].)

“A party is only allowed one such challenge per action.” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 892.)

“This single challenge rule is … limited by the provision in subdivision (a)(4) of section 170.6 that in an action involving more than one plaintiff or similar party, or defendant or similar party, only one such disqualifying statement may be made ‘for each side.’ [Footnote omitted.]” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 892-893.)

“That limitation applies even when a separate proceeding is merely a ‘continuation of the original action out of which it arises and it involves “substantially the same issues” as the original action.’ [Citations.]” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 893.) “Rather, there must be a subsequent proceeding, the gravamen of which is rooted in, or supplementary to, the initial proceeding.” (Ibid.) “That is, the second proceeding must involve ‘the same parties at a later stage of their litigation with each other, or ... arise out of conduct in or orders made during the earlier proceeding.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

As noted in Pickett, the appellate Court in NutraGenetics “analyzed the principles concerning the peremptory challenge.” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 893.) “In that case, a plaintiff filed an action against the defendants who induced him to invest in a company. When faced with a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation, the plaintiff filed a second action against the company itself, raising some similar and some new claims based on the same alleged misconduct and involving the same parties as in the prior action.” (Ibid.) “The two actions were found to be related and the second case was assigned to the initial trial judge. The plaintiff, in the second action, then filed a peremptory challenge. [Citation.]”

“The court in NutraGenetics held that the trial judge properly disqualified herself pursuant to the challenge because the second action was not a continuation of the first,” even though the two causes were found to be related. (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 893.) “The court acknowledged that the two cases involved the same parties and arose from common acts of alleged wrongdoing.” (Ibid.) However, “[i]n surveying case law applying the continuation rule, the court in [NutraGenetics], discerned a second necessary element: that the second action must arise from the first.” (Id. at pp. 893-894 [emphasis added]; NutraGenetics, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 257 [“In other words, the second proceeding must arise out of the first proceeding—not merely, as NutraGenetics suggests, out of the same incidents or events that gave rise to the first proceeding”].) “Examples of a continuation of a pending matter for purposes of a peremptory challenge include a petition to modify a child custody order in earlier proceedings [citation]; an indirect contempt proceeding occasioned by a husband’s violation of visitation and receivership orders in divorce proceedings [citation]; and an action seeking to remove an arbitrator before whom an already-pending matter was being arbitrated.” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 894.) “In contrast, a plaintiff whose first complaint for employment discrimination was dismissed, and who immediately thereafter filed a second complaint against the same defendant for similar claims, was not continuing the first action because the second complaint addressed discrimination on dates subsequent to those described in the first complaint.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].) “Applying that [and other] case law, the court in [NutraGenetics] held that the two cases at issue before it were not a single proceeding for purposes of section 170.6. Even though the plaintiffs were identical, and the wrongful conduct alleged was the same, some defendants and some of the relief sought were different than in the first action.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].)

In Pickett, “Plaintiff Shelley Pickett’s [“Pickett”] action that included a Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA) claim was deemed related to a prior-filed PAGA action brought by Eugina Bright [“Bright”], against the same defendant on similar allegations, although the remedies sought were not identical.” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) “Upon Pickett’s action being reassigned to the all-purpose judge in the prior-filed action, but not consolidated with that first action, Pickett timely filed a peremptory challenge to the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.” (Ibid.) “The respondent court struck the challenge as improper. It determined that Pickett’s action was identical to and a continuation of the action brought by Bright, who had already used her one peremptory challenge in the matter.” (Ibid.) “Pickett petitioned for an extraordinary writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate its order.” (Ibid.)

Like in NutraGenetics, the Court of Appeal in Pickett found “[u]nder section 170.6 and the authorities applying it, Pickett’s action [was] not a continuation of Bright’s action, nor [was] Pickett on the same ‘side’ as Bright in one action, and therefore Pickett’s peremptory challenge should have been accepted.” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) “Although the alleged wrongful conduct [was] the same, the second plaintiff, Pickett, [was] seeking additional relief that [went] beyond her representative claims for Labor Code penalties.” (Id. at p. 894.)

Here, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s peremptory challenge, found it was timely, in proper format, and accepted. (Minute Order, dated January 25, 2023, p. 1, the first paragraph.)

Defendant now argues that the Court incorrectly sustained the peremptory challenge because this action is a continuation of the First Action. According to the Defendant, the following facts show that this action is a continuation of the First Action. Both actions involve the same plaintiff. (Motion, p. 11:15-16.) They involve the same primary defendant (the Defendant). (Motion, p. 11:18.) In both actions, Plaintiff attempts to seize title to the same Property. (Motion, p. 11:20-21.) Both actions invoke the same reversion provision in the same Deed. (Motion, p. 11:23-25.) Plaintiff brings precisely the same three causes of action in the complaints for both actions (i.e., quiet title, declaratory/injunctive relief, and constructive trust). (Motion, p. 11:27-28.) Both actions also seek attorney’s fees arising from the same 2001 Settlement Agreement, which this Court recently awarded prevailing Defendant’s attorney’s fees in the First Action. (Motion, p. 12:1-3.)

Defendant further adds that (1) the gravamen of both actions is that Plaintiff seeks to quiet title over the Property, however, (2) the court in the First Action found that Defendant remained the record title holder of the fee simple interest in the Property, (3) judgment in the First Action was entered reflecting that ruling, and (4) the award of prevailing attorney’s fees to Defendant is final, as both were undisturbed on appeal. (Motion, pp. 12:7-18; RJN, Exhibit 3 – Judgment for Defendants, ¶ 3 [“The purported dissolution of the [Defendant] alleged by Plaintiffs violated the Corporations Code. Therefore, no dissolution occurred. The Defendant Church continues to exist as a corporate entity. The Plaintiff Church does not exist as a corporate entity, and lacks standing to bring any claims”]; ¶ 4 [“Defendant Church remains the record title holder of the fee simple interest in the subject real property, pursuant to the April 1, 2001 Grant Deed, recorded as Los Angeles County Instrument No. 01-0574604”]; ¶ 5 [“The Defendants are awarded costs in the amount of $1,956.45, as established pursuant to the March 15, 2022 Memorandum of costs herein”]; ¶ 6 [“The Defendants are awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $83,060, pursuant to this Court’s ruling of September 15, 2022”].)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that this action is not a continuation of the First Action because this action is chronologically distinct from the latter; while this action is based on occurrences in January and February of 2021, this matter is based on occurrences in April and July of 2022. (Opposition, pp. 11:27-12:2.) Specifically, the First Action was brought by the Defendant and Plaintiff (as successor in interest to the Defendant), against three individual defendants and an amorphous shadow entity that was holding itself out as the “Congressional Church of Chatsworth.” (Opposition, p. 5:19-21.) The First Action arose out of the meetings, actions, and votes in January and February of 2021 by Defendant’s members under its bylaws and other governing documents. (Opposition, p. 5:21-22.) On the other hand, this action is brought by Plaintiff against Defendant, and arises out of meetings, actions, and votes in April and July 2022 by the Plaintiff’s members under its bylaws and other governing documents. (Opposition, p. 6:1-3.)

In reply, Defendant does not dispute that this action arises from allegations that Plaintiff and its related entities decision to vote to terminate Defendant’s standing and membership.

Nevertheless, Defendant argues, this action arises directly from the First Action because (1) Plaintiff refiled the same three causes on which it had lost in the First Action, (2) it sues on the same clause of the same Grant Deed and seeks forfeiture thereunder of the same Property, and (3) is still attempting to eject Defendant out of its denomination under the same Deed underlying the First Action. (Reply, p. 6:7-16.)

            However, the cases discussed above emphasize the fact that two cases are related, or even arise out of the same incidents or events that gave rise to the first proceeding, does not necessarily indicate that the second action arises out of the first.

            While it is true that Plaintiff sought to quiet title of the Property in the First Action, the reason for doing so in the First Action was based on the allegation that Defendant dissolved itself and, therefore, did not have the title of the Property under the reversion provision of the Deed.  In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s membership and standing was terminated and, therefore, does not have title of the Property under the reversion provision of the Deed. Therefore, the second action does not “involve ‘the same parties at a later stage of their litigation with each other, or ... arise out of conduct in or orders made during the earlier proceeding.” (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 893.) As for Defendant’s argument that both actions seek attorney’s fees arising from the same 2001 Settlement Agreement, that agreement was part of the Deed and not entered into during or because of the First Action. (See Complaint, p. 12:6-7 [praying “[f]or attorney’s fees as set forth in Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release which is referred to in Section 5 of attached Exhibit ‘2’,” and Exhibit 2 of the Complaint is a copy of the Deed].) Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff is also seeking attorney’s fees under the Deed, that does not mean that this action is a continuation of the First Action.

            For those reasons, the Court denies the request to reconsider its ruling granting Plaintiff’s preemptory challenge under CCP § 170.6).

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