Judge: Raul A. Sahagun, Case: VC065792, Date: 2022-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: VC065792 Hearing Date: August 23, 2022 Dept: SED
KOHANBASH v. SPECIALTY BAKING, INC.CASE NO.: VC065792HEARING: 08/23/22
TENTATIVE ORDER
I. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant FARZAD KOHANBASH’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment is GRANTED. The Court is inclined to enter a JNOV as indicated below.
II. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant FARZAD KOHANBASH’s Motion for New Trial is MOOT in part and DENIED in part.
Opposing Party to give Notice.
Motion to Vacate Judgment
Kohanbash moves to vacate the Judgment entered on June 22, 2022 on the basis that the Judgment is incorrect based on this Court’s procedurally improper consideration of Specialty Baking, Inc.’s JNOV Motion while trial was still (then) pending on a number of cross-claims.
The Court notes that Kohanbash did not argue that Specialty Baking’s JNOV Motion was premature in Opposition to the JNOV Motion or at the hearing on the JNOV Motion. This argument is being raised for the first time in Kohanbash’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment.
“A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion by the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: (1) Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected. (2) A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.” (CCP §663.)
“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be made within the period specified by Section 659… in respect of the filing and serving of notice of intention to move for a new trial. (CCP §629.) A motion for new trial may be brought before a judgment is entered, but only “[a]fter the decision is rendered….” (CCP §659(a)(1).) “Case law has long held that, where some issues are to be tried by a jury and others by the court, new trial proceedings are premature when instituted after a verdict has been rendered but before a determination of all issues in a case.” (Cobb v. Univ. of So. California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143-1144.) “The reason for the rule is that there is no completed ‘trial and decision’ (CCP §656) and there is no ‘aggrieved party’ (CCP §657) until such time as there has been a completed trial and decision, at which time nothing remains to be done except to enter judgment in favor of the prevailing party. (City of Los Angeles (1946) 28 Cal.2d 509, 512.) “The statutory scheme on new trials makes it quite evident that [motion for] new trial is not proper until the action has been prosecuted to a point where it can be said to be complete.” (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 458.) “For purposes of section 659 a ‘trial’ is complete when all the issues have been determined… as to the ‘party aggrieved’ in question.” Id. at 460.) The California Rules of Court are the same; “Any motion for a new trial following a bifurcated trial must be made after all the of the issues are tried….” (CRC Rule 3.1591(c).)
On October 1, 2021, a four-day jury trial commenced with respect to causes of action for fraud and misrepresentation. The jury rendered its verdict on October 5, 2021. On November 30, 2021, Specialty Baking moved for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the alternative, for New Trial. On January 11, 2022, this Court granted in part Specialty Baking’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and denied the alternative Motion for New Trial. Judgment was entered on June 22, 2022. At the time Specialty Baking’s JNOV/New Trial Motion was filed, the action was not yet complete—Dan Samarin and Specialty Baking had outstanding cross-claims for declaratory relief that had yet to be determined. Although Samarin and Specialty Baking’s cross-claims were ultimately later dismissed, it is undisputed that they were still pending at the time the Court heard and adjudicated Specialty Baking’s JNOV/New Trial Motion.
Therefore, the Motion to Vacate the Judgment is GRANTED because the Court made an error of law by reaching the merits of Specialty Baking’s JNOV/New Trial Motion before all of the issues in this action were tried.
However, on its own Motion, the Court is inclined to enter a different judgment notwithstanding the verdict as follows:
· Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs owe Specialty $1,850.00 in unpaid holdover damages. The lease rent was $1,850.00 per month. The total holdover damages owed from June 2017 to February 2019 was $38,850.00, and Plaintiffs only paid $37,000.00.
· The jury’s award of $0 in holdover damages was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, the Court is inclined to grant the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of holdover damages.
· The jury’s finding that Specialty failed to return any of the security deposit was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The security deposit was refunded to Wholesome. Therefore, the Court is inclined to grant the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of the return of the security deposit.
(See CCP §629(a).)
Motion for New Trial
Kohanbash moves for new trial on the following grounds: (1) Specialty Baking’s JNOV Motion was improperly granted and must be reversed; (2) The ruling on Specialty’s JNOV Motion as to holdover damages was contrary to the law and facts; (3) The Court committed prejudicial error in ruling that the security deposit was returned; (4) The Court improperly took away the issue of the purchase option from the jury; (5) The 2019 bench trial violated Plaintiff’s fundamental right to a jury trial; (6) The Court unfairly surprised the Kohanbash with its impromptu bench trial; and (7) The granting of nonsuit in Kohanbash’s case was an abuse of discretion.
In Opposition, Specialty Baking argues that the Motion must be denied as untimely, and because it fails to identify the statutory grounds for a new trial which its arguments support.
Given the Court’s ruling on the Motion to Vacate the Judgment above, the Motion for New Trial is timely.
The Motion is MOOT with respect to Kohanbash’s arguments concerning whether Specialty Baking’s JNOV Motion was improperly granted and must be reversed given the Court’s ruling on the Motion to Vacate the Judgment above.
As with any Motion for a new trial, the moving party must establish the existence of one of the statutory grounds for granting the new trial motion. (See CCP §657.)
Here, it appears that Kohanbash simply appears to reargue his positions previously taken throughout this case. Kohanbash has failed to establish his asserted grounds for the new trial motion, as neither an irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, nor an error in law has been demonstrated.
The Court notes that the record does not reflect that Kohanbash ever objected to the occurrence of the 2019 bench trial. Moreover, it does not appear that any party was foreclosed from arguing their position with respect to the issue of the purchase option during the bench trial and/or at the time nonsuit was granted.
In fact, the record reflects that substantial argument on the merits of the issues identified by Kohanbash were heard and considered by the Court at all relevant times. The Court does not find that any party was prevented from having a fair trial.