Judge: Richard J. Burdge, Case: 20STUD01375, Date: 2022-09-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STUD01375    Hearing Date: September 29, 2022    Dept: 3

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Plaintiffs Reginald Fourmyle, filed a notice of intention to file a new trial motion, a motion for a new trial and memorandum in support of the motion on August 17, 2022, seeking a new trial on the judgment entered on court’s grant of directed verdict.  The judgment and notice of entry of judgment were filed on August 2, 2022. The court finds the notice of intention for new trial and the motion for new trial to be timely filed.

Plaintiff moves for new trial on the following grounds:  (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of, or abuse of discretion by the Court (Code of Civil Procedure §657(1)); and (2) There was an error in law occurring at trial, which was excepted by Reginald Fourmyle (Code of Civil Procedure §657(7)).^[1]    In particular, Plaintiff claims 1.) that the court granted an oral motion for a directed verdict with no opportunity for briefing by Plaintiff deprived him of a fair trial.  (Mot. 3:11-14.)  2.) Plaintiff’s failure “to serve a valid registration or annual registration renewal statement on Defendant is not a defense in this Action, not only because rent was not in issue, but because the rules, ordinances, and case law reflect that at most, the Defendant’s sole remedy is to withhold rent, to which the landlord is otherwise entitled; this withholding of rent occurs only until the landlord complies with LAMC section 151.05(A).” (Mot. 3:15-19.)  . 

Plaintiff filed a memorandum, a Declaration of Christopher W. P. Overton in support of the motion.   Defendant Epiphania Medrano filed an opposition to the motion.  The court has reviewed all the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion. 

After having considered the parties’ briefs and the trial proceedings, the court concludes that there is no good cause for a new trial for the reasons stated below.

A.        Standards for a New Trial Motion

California permits motions for new trial in very limited circumstances. As set forth in Article VI, Section 13, of the California Constitution, “[n]o judgement shall be set aside, or new trial granted … unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Case law holds that “[a] miscarriage of justice … occurs … when it appears reasonably probable that were it not for the error a result more favorable to the appellant could have been obtained.” (Candelaria v. Avitia (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1436, 1444  (quoting Williams v. Lambert (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 115, 126).)  Prejudice is not presumed; the burden is on the movant to show its existence. (Id.) “If it clearly appears that the error could not have affected the result of the trial, the court is bound to deny the motion.” (Bristow v. Ferguson (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 823, 836.) Plaintiffs’ Motion fails to meet this burden.

B.        The failure to serve a notice of registration on the tenant is a complete defense to an unlawful detainer proceeding.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s complaint was for an unlawful detainer solely on the alleged breach of covenants in the lease between the parties and that Plaintiff made no claim for unpaid rent.   The first amended complaint admits the property was subject to the Los Angele Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO).

In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not allege the affirmative defense of failure to serve a registration in her amended answer.  There was a box in the list of affirmative defenses for the defense of the failure to serve a registration statement, and Defendant did not darken that box.  Plaintiff argues that was a waiver of the defense:

“An affirmative defense is a “new matter” when, as here, it raises defenses independent of the allegations raised in the complaint. Such grounds are not in issue under a denial, and, unless specially pleaded in the answer, evidence of such grounds is inadmissible at trial, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of such defense. (See, e.g., Hulsey v. Koehler (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1156; Mayes v. Sturdy Northern Sales, Inc. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 69, 80 [Affirmative defense of privilege was deemed waived where it was not asserted]; Woodman v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 321, 330 [in action on liability policy, insured's breach of duty to give timely notice of accident and to co-operate in its investigation and defense of action is matter of defense required to be pleaded by insurer]; Houk v. Williams Bros. (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 573, 582 [New matter constituting a special defense must be specially pleaded in answer, notwithstanding rule that a liberal construction of pleadings with object of securing substantial justice should prevail.]; Minton v. Cavaney (1961) 56 Cal.2d 576, 581 [defendant's failure to allege statute of limitations as affirmative defense in answer to complaint constituted a “waiver” of the defense]; Butchers Union v. Farmers Markets (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 905, 913 [“a defendant who wishes to assert the right to arbitration must urge it as an affirmative defense in the answer and that the failure to include such a defense in the answer amounts to a waiver of arbitration.”].)”  (Mot. 6:21-7:8.)

In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to meet its burden of proof on the defense, because evidence of a demand for payment of rent by the landlord was an essential element of the defense and non-payment of rent was not put in issue at all. (Mot. 8:13-28.)

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the failure to server a registration statement as required by LARSO section 151.05(A) is not a defense to an unlawful detainer action based solely on a failure to comply with non-rent covenants in the lease, citing Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759.  While Lyles stands for the proposition that the failure to serve a registration statement does not give rise to affirmative relief to recover rent paid, it does not address the issue of whether it is an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action.  Plaintiff submits no authority on this point other than to argue his interpretation that the defense only applies when nonpayment is an issue. (Mot. 8:1-9:24.)[2]

In opposition, Defendant argues that LARSO section 151.09(E) states: “In any action by a landlord to recover possession of a rental unit, the tenant may raise as an affirmative defense any violation of the provisions of this chapter.” And that it means what it says.  In another words a breach of the provisions of LARSO is a defense to an unlawful detainer action regardless whether the action involves the payment of rent.  (Opp. 1: 21-26.)  In support of this argument, Defendant cites Yanez v. Vasquez (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 11-12.  The case addresses the issue presented in this motion.  So long as there has been some demand for rent, even in a lease that requires the payment of rent, the registration and notice requirement of LARSO applies.  (Section 151.05(A).)  The failure to satisfy that provision of LARSO is a complete defense to an unlawful detainer action, regardless of the basis for the unlawful detainer.  (See Yanez at 12.)

The more difficult position for Defendant is the argument that the affirmative defense was waived by the failure to allege it in the answer.  In its Opposition, Defendant points out that her original answer asserted the defense specifically, even though the box was not checked in the amended answer.  Defendant did deny in that answer Plaintiff’s allegation that he had complied with all the LARSO requirements.  (See ¶ 4.)   In addition, the jury instructions for this case contained CACI 4325, which asked the jury to determine the affirmative defense of failure to serve the registration notice.  Plaintiff also testified that he did not serve Defendant with a copy of the registration notice, which could not be cured if a new trial was granted.  If a new trial were granted and Defendant moved to file an amended answer to specifically state the affirmative defense, then Defendant would be entitled to a judgment in that new trial.  Thus, granting a new trial motion would be a needless waste of court and party time. 

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is denied.

Dated:   September 29, 2022.                                       __________________________

Hon. Richard J. Burdge, Jr.