Judge Richard L. Fruin, Case Number: 21STCV05583, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE OF DEFENDANTS STEVEN HAROLD HANEY AND STEVEN H. HANEY, A LAW CORPORATION

MEET AND CONFER: OK (Parties met and conferred telephonically in compliance with CCP §§ 430.41 & 435.5. (Mikel Decl., ¶ 7.))

W. Cohen (“Cohen”), files an action (Case No. SC121758) (the “2013 Action”), in which Plaintiff alleges that his former attorney, nonparty Diamond, engaged in malpractice while representing Plaintiff in a 2011 employment discrimination lawsuit.

Law Corporation d/b/a Haney & Young, LLP and Haney Law Group (collectively “Haney” or “Defendants”) for representation in a lawsuit against Cohen. The parties enter into a written retainer agreement.

5/1/2018: Haney files a malpractice action again Cohen (Case No. BC704662) (the “2018 Action”) on behalf of Plaintiff, based on Cohen’s allegedly deficient legal services in connection with the 2013 Action.

2/11/2021: Plaintiff files this Complaint, arising out of Haney’s alleged legal malpractice in connection with the 2018 Action. On 8/27/2021, this Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the Complaint with leave to amend. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed 10/6/2021, alleges causes of action for:

1/23/2025: Defendants files this Demurrer with a Motion to Strike, followed by Plaintiff’s Opposition (2/10/2025) and Defendants’ Reply (2/19/2025).

TENTATIVE RULING: DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS STEVEN HAROLD HANEY AND STEVEN H. HANEY, A LAW CORPORATION is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

MOTION TO STRIKE OF DEFENDANTS STEVEN HAROLD HANEY AND STEVEN H. HANEY, A LAW CORPORATION is DENIED as MOOT.

Defendants demur to each cause of action in the FAC on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute each cause of action. Each cause of action alleged by Plaintiff arises from the same underlying allegations of Defendants’ deficient legal services in connection with the 2018 Action. “In California a viable legal malpractice claim requires proof of ‘(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney's negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238, 247–248.) Regarding causation of damages, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that it is more likely than not the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result but for the malpractice. (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 572.) Like legal malpractice, the additional claims for breach of contract[1], breach of fiduciary duty[2], and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing[3] also require Plaintiff to establish that he suffered damages caused by Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing.

Here, Plaintiff’s alleged harm is twofold. First, and primarily, Plaintiff alleges that but-for Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiff “would have obtained faster progress and better results” in the 2018 Action. (FAC, ¶¶ 23-24, 78.) Second, Plaintiff alleges he spent “close to $50,000.00” on fees and costs in the 2018 Action. (FAC, ¶¶ 34, 76.) The Court considers each of these allegations separately, as outlined below.

First, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he would have obtained a more favorable result in the 2018 Action but for Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing. The 2018 Action was dismissed due to Plaintiff’s own misuse of the discovery process, unrelated to Defendants’ conduct. In the 2018 Action, the Court ordered Plaintiff to appear at a deposition on 10/26/2022. (Mikel Decl., Exh. 1.) Thereafter, on 1/17/2023, the Court issued an order finding Plaintiff had failed to appear for the court-ordered deposition and imposed terminating sanctions against Plaintiff. (Id., Exh. 2.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the order for terminating sanctions, and the California Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s Petition for Review. (Id., Exhs. 3-4.) The FAC alleges Defendants withdrew as Plaintiff’s counsel in the 2018 Action on 2/13/2020, well before the above events ensued. (FAC, ¶ 21.) As a result, it is not clear whether or how Plaintiff was prejudiced by Defendants’ acts or omissions in the 2018 Action. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not— and cannot— sufficiently allege a causal relationship between Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing and the unfavorable result in the 2018 Action.

Second, with respect to Plaintiff’s alleged monetary damages, even if Plaintiff incurred $50,000 in legal fees and costs owed to Defendant, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts indicating that these fees constitute a legally cognizable harm to Plaintiff. In legal malpractice suits, attorney’s fees may constitute actual damages to the extent that the fees exceed the value of the services rendered. (Herrington v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1060 (“an overpayment for services is contract damages”.) Here, the FAC does not allege sufficient facts to suggest that Plaintiff’s fees exceeded the value of the services performed by Defendants, or that Defendants’ conduct otherwise fell below the standard of care. For example, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants billed Plaintiff for work that was not done or performed haphazardly.” (FAC, ¶ 41.) However, Plaintiff later alleges that the work which was purportedly “not done” was the preparation, noticing, and research for depositions that never occurred, and that Plaintiff never benefitted from. (Id., ¶ 42.) Time spent on legal work preparing for depositions that did not come to fruition does not constitute work that was never done. Further, even to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants engaged in substandard discovery practices, such allegations are not supported by clear factual allegations demonstrating that Plaintiff was either prejudiced from such conduct or that Defendants’ discovery practices fell below the standard of care. (Id., ¶¶ 43-48.) As the FAC lacks factual support for the assertion that Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ litigation strategy and decision-making, Plaintiff’s allegations of monetary “harm” are merely conclusory.

As Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that he was prejudiced due to Defendants’ conduct— either legally or financially— the FAC does not sufficiently allege Plaintiff suffered damages that are causally related to Defendants’ conduct while representing Plaintiff in the 2018 Action. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not stated sufficient facts to support any of the causes of action alleged in the FAC. Even further, Plaintiff has not shown that he will be able to sufficiently allege the causation or damages elements of his claims if given another opportunity. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument in opposing this Demurrer challenges the dismissal of the 2018 Action as well as the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the dismissal. It is not the role of this Court to reevaluate the merits of the 2018 Action, and thus, Plaintiff’s factual arguments relating to the decision in the 2018 Action are irrelevant. Moreover, this Court has previously sustained Defendants’ Demurrer to the original Complaint based on similar arguments, and thus, Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to cure the pleading defects but has not done so. Therefore, Defendants’ Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. In light of the above ruling, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT.

Defendants request judicial notice of orders from the Los Angeles Superior Court, Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court in the 2018 Action, the existence of and court records filed within the 2018 Action, and the Notice of Related Case relating the 2018 Action (Case No. BC704662) (Mikel Decl., Exhs, 1-4, 8-9.) Defendants also request judicial notice of the Court’s Tentative Ruling on Defendant’s Demurrer to the original Complaint in the instant lawsuit. (Id., Exh. 6.) Judicial notice of court records is proper pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d). Accordingly, Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED.

Defendants Steven H. Haney and Steven H. Haney, A Law Corporation to serve notice of ruling. This tentative ruling (“TR”) shall be the order of the Court unless changed at the hearing and shall by this reference be incorporated into the Minute Order.

[1] The elements of a breach of contract action are: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, (4) harm to Plaintiff, and (5) Defendant’s breach of contract was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (CACI, No. 303; See also Oasis West Realty, LLC v. 5 Goldman¿(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “In order to establish liability the plaintiff must show that the defendant's breach was ‘a substantial factor’ in causing the injury.” (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1063, emphasis in original.)

[2] The elements for breach of fiduciary against an attorney are: (1) Defendant breached the fiduciary duty of an attorney, (2) Plaintiff was harmed, and (3) Defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (CACI, No. 4106.)

[3] To plead a claim a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between contracting parties, Plaintiff must allege he was harmed by Defendant’s failure to act fairly and in good faith. (CACI 325.) “In essence, the covenant is implied as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.” (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031-1032.)