Judge Richard L. Fruin, Case Number: 23STCV00260, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULINGS:
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J. GUADALUPE REYES-CUEVAS, et al. v. ALPHA TILE & STONE, INC., et al. [23STCV00260]

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF DEFENDANT RIO STONES, INC.

2001 to Mid-2021: Plaintiff J. Guadalupe Reyes-Cuevas (“Plaintiff”) works as a fabricator of stone countertops at various locations.[1] During his work, Plaintiff is exposed to respirable crystalline silica (“RCS”) dust from various artificial and natural stone products, which are manufactured and/or distributed by the various Defendants. (FAC, ¶¶ 62-64.)

Circa 2013 or 2014: Plaintiff and nonparty Gerardo Reyes form Reycost Granite, a stone fabricating business.[2]

Mid-2021 to Present: Plaintiff continues to work in the stone industry but no longer works in fabrication. (Ibid.)

1/5/2023: Plaintiff and his wife, Blanca Estela Acosta-Martinez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) file the Complaint. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed 3/20/2023, alleges causes of action for:

12/19/2024: Defendant Rio Stones, Inc. (“Rio Stones”) files this Motion, followed by Plaintiff’s Opposition (3/28/2025) and Rio Stones’ Reply (4/4/2025).

TENTATIVE RULING: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OF DEFENDANT RIO STONES, INC. is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Rio Stones moves for summary judgment of the entire FAC on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish causation. Causation is a necessary element of both negligence and strict products liability claims. (Setliff v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1534.) “If there has been no exposure, there is no causation.” (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103.) The mere fact that a hazardous product was potentially present at a plaintiff’s work site is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to causation. (Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289, disapproved of by Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826.)

Here, it is undisputed that Rio Stones is a seller of natural and artificial stone products and began doing business in 2005. (Duarte Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) Thus, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff was exposed to stone products that were supplied by Rio Stones. In support of its Motion, Rio Stones argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence that he encountered any stone products for which Rio Stones was responsible. (Mot., at 1.) Rio Stones submits the declarations of Rio Stones’ Vice President, Diogo Duarte, and Rio Stones’ attorney, Vanessa Natividad. Natividad declares that although Plaintiff produced over 400 pages of documents in response to Rio Stones’ discovery requests, none of the documents reflected any purchases or deliveries were made by Rio Stones to Plaintiff or his worksites, or that Plaintiff used products supplied by Rio Stones. (Natividad Decl., ¶ 3.) Rather, Plaintiffs only provided two photographs of sample displays of Rio Stones’ products, which were purportedly taken at Reycost Granite and Sofia Marble. (Id., Exh. G [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 5], p. 495:16-20.) However, Rio Stones argues Plaintiffs cannot establish a connection between these sample displays and any actual sales to Plaintiff or use of Rio Stones’ products by Plaintiff. Even further, Duarte declares that despite a diligent search of Rio Stones’ sales records, Rio Stones found no records of any sales to Plaintiff, his worksites, or the sole contractor who Plaintiff could remember by name who supposedly purchased Rio Stones’ products for Plaintiff’s use. (Duarte Decl., ¶ 9.)

Despite this lack of documentation, Rio Stones also submits the deposition transcript of Plaintiff, which raises competing inferences as to Plaintiff’s exposure to Rio Stones’ products. For example, given that Plaintiff admitted that contractors were the ones who purchased the stone slabs he worked with, Rio Stones’ lack of sales records to Plaintiff and his employers do not necessarily negate a finding that Plaintiff worked with Rio Stones’ products. (Natividad Decl., Exh. G, p. 541:16-549:4, Exh. K [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 9], p. 1001:4-8.) Although Plaintiff could only identify one specific contractor by name, Plaintiff’s inability to recall such information goes to reliability and credibility of the witness testimony, which need not be evaluated by the Court at summary judgment. (Id., Exh. K, p. 997:19-998:12.) Even further, although Rio Stones frames Plaintiff’s testimony as an admission that he has no documentary evidence from Rio Stones, Plaintiff’s testimony that he received receipts from Rio Stones’ employees does suggest that Plaintiff was involved in picking up products from Rio Stones. (Id., Exh. K, p. 993:25-994:7.) Likewise, although Plaintiff’s interactions with Rio Stones’ employees were limited to discussing product samples, pricing, and catalogues, and confirming material orders, this testimony still supports an inference that Plaintiff obtained products from Rio Stones, even if he did not purchase those products himself. (Id., Exh. F [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 4], p. 445:23-446:4, Exh. L [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 11], p. 1248:7-11.) Plaintiff also testified that he saw stickers on the stone slabs he received from Rio Stones. (Id., Exh. L, p. 1248:7-11.) Taken together, the testimony suggesting that Plaintiff obtained stone products from Rio Stones reasonably contributes to an inference that he also worked with those products.

Most importantly, Plaintiff expressly stated under oath that he did, in fact, fabricate Rio Stones’ stone slabs at multiple points in his career. Plaintiff testified that he fabricated one to five natural stone slabs from Rio Stones per month between 2010 and 2013 while working at JO Marble. (Id., Exh. D [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 2], p. 155:9-12, 188:17-15; Exh. K, p. 992:7-19.) Plaintiff also testified that he picked up and fabricated five to ten stone slabs from Rio Stones’ brand per month between 2014 and 2021 while working at Reycost Granite. (Id., Exh. E [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 3], p. 306:5-20.) Finally, to the extent that Rio Stones repeatedly attempts to undermine the general reliability and credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony, such issues are not appropriate to resolve at the summary judgment stage. “The trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Accordingly, the Court finds Rio Stones’ own evidence precludes a prima facie showing that no triable disputes of material facts exist as to the issue of causation. Therefore, Rio Stones fail to overcome its moving burden with respect to the issue of Plaintiff’s exposure to Rio Stones’ products.

Rio Stones fail to overcome their burden of establishing their sophisticated user defense. [3] “California's sophisticated user defense applies to both strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims.” (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 182.) “The sophisticated user defense does not require a user's actual awareness of potential hazards. Rather, a product manufacturer or supplier is not liable for failing to warn a sophisticated user if the user knew or should have known of the product's risk in light of his training or skill.” (Ibid.) “The focus of the defense ... is whether the danger in question was so generally known within the trade or profession that a manufacturer should not have been expected to provide a warning specific to the group to which plaintiff belonged.” (Ibid., quoting Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 72-74.) To establish this defense, a defendant “must demonstrate that sophisticated users of the product know what the risks are, including the degree of danger involved (i.e., the severity of the potential injury), and how to use the product to reduce or avoid the risks, to the extent that information is known to the manufacturer.” (Buckner v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 522, 536.)

Here, Rio Stones argues, assuming Plaintiff can establish causation, that Plaintiff and his employers were “sophisticated users” of Rio Stones’ products. The crux of Rio Stones’ argument is that Plaintiff should have known the hazards of fabricating stone countertop products given his extensive experience as a fabricator. (Mot., at 10.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff has a 20-year work history in the stone fabrication industry as an employee, supervisor, and business owner. (Natividad Decl., Exh. C [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 1], p. 57:6-20.) Plaintiff stated under oath that he was taught how to cut and polish stones and operating fabricating machinery, and he was responsible for cutting and grinding countertop designs. (Id., Exh. C, p. 60:10-15, 61:1-2, 62:5-19, 63:10-17, 80:7-23.) Plaintiff admitted his work generated significant amounts of airborne which adhered to his skin, eyes, and face, especially from artificial stone. (Id., Exh. C, p. 64:7-21, 81:2-5; Exh. D, p. 149:11-25.) Plaintiff also testified that he used masks, goggles, earplugs, boots, and aprons while cutting with water, and back braces and vacuums while cutting dry stone to minimize dust. (Id., Exh. C, p. 80:7-23.) Plaintiff’s employers provided him with 3M paper masks and later rubber masks with dual filters for the dust. (Id., Exh. G, p. 513:23-514:7-18, 576:5-10.) Plaintiff also gave his own workers masks to avoid the dust. (Id., Exh. I [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 7], p. 688:21-689:4.) Further, Plaintiff testified that he understood that the masks he was provided with were intended to protect against the dust he encountered. (Id., Exh. C, p. 80:24-81:1, 85:12-17; Exh. D, p. 149:6-10, 150:1-19.) Finally, it is undisputed that Plaintiff saw stickers on the stone slabs he fabricated, but failed to take steps to understand the stickers’ contents. For example, he never sought assistance from co-workers to translate or explain the English-language stickers and admitted he paid no attention to the warnings prior to his silicosis diagnosis. (Id., Exh. J [Plaintiff’s Depo. Vol. 8], p. 820:4-16; Exh. G, p. 517:23-518:15, 527:16-528:4, 551:12-14.) Based on the above testimony, Rio Stones argues that it can reasonably be inferred that Plaintiff: (1) had an awareness of the materials and tools used in the fabrication trade and (2) should have known of the occupational hazards of dust exposure. The Court disagrees.

At most, the above testimony demonstrates that Plaintiff worked as a stone fabricator, was aware that his work produced significant dust, wore protective materials to avoid the dust, and failed to take additional steps to read warning labels on the stone products. By itself, these facts do not support an inference that Plaintiff “should have known” of the unique health and safety hazards associated with the dust. For example, Plaintiff would have had reason to avoid extensive dust in his face even if he was unaware of the dust’s toxicity. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had received training on how to fabricate stone products, such evidence does not demonstrate that Plaintiff either had or should have had specialized training or knowledge with respect to the health and safety hazards of the RCS released with the dust or how to protect himself from such hazards. Critically, Rio Stones submits no evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff knew of the specific health hazards affiliated with the dust, or that he could have become fully informed of such hazards by reading the Rio Stones’ warning stickers. Moreover, Rio Stones submits no evidence indicating whether the safety hazards of RCS dust were generally known within the fabrication profession. (Webb, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 182.) Likewise, Rio Stones submits no evidence that either Plaintiff, his employers, or fabricators in general knew the degree of danger involved in the products or how to effectively mitigate those risks. (Buckner, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at 536-537.) Such evidence is necessary to establish the sophisticated user defense. Accordingly, the Court finds Rio Stones has not submitted sufficient evidence to overcome its moving burden with respect to this affirmative defense.

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff did use Rio Stones’ products, Rio Stones argues that Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim must fail because Plaintiff made no effort to read or rely on any warnings associated with Rio Stones’ products. “To be liable in California, even under a strict liability theory, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's failure to warn was a substantial factor in causing his or her injury.” (Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1604, citing CACI No. 1205.) “The natural corollary to this requirement is that a defendant is not liable to a plaintiff if the injury would have occurred even if the defendant had issued adequate warnings. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) There can be no proximate cause where the allegedly inadequate warnings promulgated by a defendant about a product were neither read nor relied upon. (Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 89, 112.)

Here, Rio Stones submits Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, in which Plaintiff admits to having seen warning stickers on Rio Stones’ Copa Quartz stone slabs. (Natividad Decl., Exh. L, p. 1248:7-11.) As discussed above, it is undisputed that Plaintiff never sought assistance to understand any warning labels on the stone products, such as asking a co-worker to read, translate, or explain the stickers’ contents. (Id., Exh. J, p. 820:4-16; Exh. G, p. 517:23-518:15, 527:16-528:4, 551:12-14.) Plaintiff also admitted that he only began paying attention to the warning labels after his silicosis diagnosis. (Ibid.) This affirmative evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff had access to the warning information provided along with Rio Stones’ products, but that he failed to make efforts to read or understand them. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff did not rely on Rio Stones’ warning materials. Thus, the Court finds Rio Stones has overcome its moving burden with respect to Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs fail to include an argument section addressing this issue. Plaintiffs briefly address the failure to warn claim in their Introduction section, arguing that Rio Stones fails to establish what type of information was on the stone product’s stickers and whether they served as an adequate warning to Plaintiff. As stated above, however, it is immaterial whether Rio Stones’ warning labels were adequate if Plaintiff made no attempt to read or rely on them. (Conte, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at 112.) In other words, even if such warnings were inadequate, Plaintiff cannot establish that those inadequate warning labels proximately caused his injuries because he never even attempted to consider them. Plaintiffs submit no additional evidence disputing this admission. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to raise a triable issue as to their failure to warn claim against Rio Stones. Therefore, Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s 2^nd cause of action as to Rio Stones is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs cannot establish their fraudulent concealment claim as a matter of law.[4] ¿Rio Stones argues Plaintiffs cannot establish the first and second elements of this claim with respect to Rio Stones. The Court focuses its analysis on the “duty to disclose” element. The California Supreme Court “has described the necessary relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose as a ‘transaction’ between the plaintiff and defendant.” (BiglerEngler¿v.¿Breg, Inc.¿(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311.) “Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.” (Id., at 312.) “In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2)¿the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff.” (Id., at 311, citation omitted.) While it is true that the “duty to warn” in products liability actions “applies to all entities in a product's chain of distribution,” (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181), the Bigler-Engler Court expressly rejected the contention that the broader “duty to warn” in strict products liability action is the applicable standard for imposing a duty to disclose in fraud actions. The Court of Appeal explained:

Bigler-Engler argues that this duty [to warn] applies here as well and the violation of that duty gives rise to a cause of action for fraud under a theory of concealment. The authorities Bigler-Engler cites, however, involve strict products liability, not fraud. Bigler-Engler has not provided any reason to apply this duty to the fraud cause of action here, and we are aware of none. Products liability law involves a set of circumstances, elements, and doctrines that are independent from, and not directly applicable to, fraud. The duties underlying each cannot simply be applied to the other. (Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 89, 108, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 [“[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law.”].)

Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff admitted that contractors were the ones who purchased stone products from Rio Stones and supplied those products to Plaintiffs’ worksites. (Natividad Decl., Exh. G, p. 541:16-549:4; Exh. K, p. 1001:4-8.) This suggests that Plaintiff, Reycost Granite, and his other employers did not purchase stone products directly from Rio Stones, but instead received the products from third party contractors. The non-existence of a buyer-seller relationship between Plaintiff and Rio Stones is further confirmed by the declaration of Rio Stones’ Vice President, who declares that Rio Stones found no records of any sales to Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s employers. (Duarte Decl., ¶ 9.) Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to produce any documents evidencing purchases or deliveries from Rio Stones directly to Plaintiff, Reycost Granite, or his other employers. (Natividad Decl., ¶ 3.) At most, Plaintiff’s deposition transcript suggests that Plaintiff picked up products from Rio Stones. (Id., Exh. K, p. 993:25-994:7.) To the limited extent that Plaintiff interacted with Rio Stones’ employees, such interactions were confined to discussing product samples, pricing, catalogues, and confirming orders, but Plaintiff did not identify any specific sales, inquiries regarding warnings, hazards, or safety measures, or other substantive communications. (Id., Exh. F, p. 445:23-446:4; Exh. L, p. 1248:7-11.) Taken together, this affirmative evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff, Reycost Granite, and his other employers never directly engaged in any “transactional relationship” with Rio Stones. Thus, Rio Stones has overcome its burden with respect to the duty to disclose.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs rely on Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 1187 and LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326 to argue that a duty to disclose may exist even without a fiduciary relationship. Indeed, “[a]lthough, typically, a duty to disclose arises when a defendant owes a fiduciary duty to a plaintiff [Citation], a duty to disclose may also arise when a defendant possesses or exerts control over material facts not readily available to the plaintiff.” (Jones, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1199.) However, “[w]here material facts are known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless there is some relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty to disclose such known facts.” (LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 337, citing BAJI No. 12.36 (8th ed.1994), emphasis added.) “[S]uch a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties.” (Id., at 337.) For example, “a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement. [Citation.] All of these relationships are created by transactions between parties from which a duty to disclose facts material to the transaction arises under certain circumstances.” (Ibid., emphasis added.) In other words, while Plaintiffs are correct that a duty to disclose may exist absent a fiduciary relationship, this rule does not dispose of the requirement for a transactional relationship between the parties.

To address this element, Plaintiffs argue that a “transactional relationship” may exist between a worker who uses a hazardous product at his worksite and the manufacturer or distributor from whom his hirer purchased that product. (Opp., at p. 16.) However, Plaintiffs submit no evidence to raise a dispute as to whether he, his employers, or his business (Reycost Granite) ever purchased products from Rio Stones. In fact, Plaintiff does not dispute that he admitted that Rio Stones’ products were purchased by contractors. Plaintiffs also fail to submit any legal authority supporting a conclusion that working with products obtained through transactions between Rio Stones and third parties is enough to impose a duty to disclose for purposes of a fraud action. While Plaintiff’s Opposition primarily attempts to raise evidence of Rio Stones’ role in concealing facts, a transactional relationship is also necessary to support Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim. (BiglerEngler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at 311.) Accordingly, as Plaintiffs fail to establish the duty to disclose element, Plaintiffs cannot establish their fraudulent concealment claim with respect to Rio Stones as a matter of law. Therefore, Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s 4^th cause of action as to Rio Stones is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages from Rio Stones fails as a matter of law. The punitive damage statute requires proof of malice, fraud, or oppression among corporate leaders (i.e. the “officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s]”). (Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167, citing Cal. Civ. Code, § 3294(b).) In other words, corporate defendants may be liable for punitive damages “only if the knowledge, authorization, ratification or act was on the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b).) “Under the [punitive damages] statute, ‘malice does not require actual intent to harm. Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.’” (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299, internal citations omitted.)

Here, Rio Stones argues Plaintiffs cannot establish either: (1) that Rio Stones was aware of the hazards of the products it supplied or (2) that Rio Stones’ corporate leaders acted with the requisite malice, oppression, or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages. With respect to the first argument, Rio Stones’ Vice President declares that Rio Stones does not design, manufacture, fabricate, or install stone countertops, but simply stocks and sells products made by third-party manufacturers. (Duarte Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) As a supplier, Rio Stones argues it should have been able to rely on product warning information from the manufacturer. Rio Stones contends that Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence that Rio Stones ever received manufacturers’ warnings related to the hazards of silica-containing products. (Mot., at 14.) However, Rio Stones contradicts its own argument by admitting that Plaintiff saw warning stickers affixed to what Plaintiff believed were Rio Stones’ products. (Natividad Decl., Exh. L, p. 1248:7-11.) Rio Stones states in its Reply that it “did not alter, remove, or suppress any labels or hazard information,” received from the manufacturers, suggesting that if Plaintiff saw warning stickers on Rio Stones’ products, those stickers were provided to Rio Stones by the manufacturers. (Rep., at 8.) Even so, as neither party has submitted evidence indicating what the stone products warning stickers said, the Court cannot determine whether such stickers were sufficient to give Rio Stones actual notice of the products’ hazards. Moreover, Rio Stones also argues that the only documents produced by Plaintiffs with respect to Rio Stones’ potential knowledge of its products hazards were studies linking RCS exposure to silicosis. (Mot., at 14.) However, Rio Stones argues that Plaintiffs lack evidence demonstrating that such studies were actually known to Rio Stones or its corporate leaders.

With respect to the second argument, Rio Stones argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify who concealed material information from Plaintiff and what information was known to those individuals, or any of Rio Stones’ corporate leaders who acted with fraud, malice, or oppression. Rio Stones submits an excerpt of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, in which Plaintiff stated that he spoke to an individual at Rio Stones but admitted that he could not recall his name. (Natividad Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. K, p. 993:12-25.) Further, although Plaintiff was asked about the representatives or employees of Rio Stones who purportedly lied to Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not identify any such individuals by name, position, or description. (Id., Exh. K, p. 995:24-996:23.) In the Court’s view, Rio Stones has sufficiently identified how Plaintiffs’ discovery responses and document production was insufficient to demonstrate Rio Stones’ actual knowledge of its product’s hazards, while also presenting affirmative evidence reflecting that Plaintiff cannot identify any corporate leaders who knowingly participated in the concealment of such hazards. Accordingly, the Court finds Rio Stones has overcome its moving burden with respect to punitive damages.

In support of their Opposition, Plaintiffs submit the deposition transcript of Rio Stones’ Person Most Knowledgeable, Diogo Duarte, who affirmed that “Rio Stones is aware that exposure to [RCS] causes lung diseases, including silicosis.” (Barrow Decl., Exh. 1 [Duarte Depo.], p. 91:21-24.) However, even if Rio Stones’ currently knows such information, Plaintiff improperly extends this testimony to suggest that Rio Stones previously knew such information at the time Plaintiff was exposed to Rio Stones’ products. Duarte neither admits that Rio Stones knew of this information at the time of Plaintiff’s injuries nor identifies when Rio Stones learned such information. Additionally, while Duarte admits that Rio Stones knew their stone products would be fabricated and currently knows that fabrication generates RCS, neither of these facts are sufficient to impute knowledge of the specific hazards of its products at the time of Plaintiff’s exposure. (Id., p. 70:17-71:5, 94:1-17.) Even further, Plaintiff still fails to identify any specific corporate leaders who were supposedly aware of their products’ hazards, or who acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. As Plaintiffs have not set forth evidence to establish the “awareness” aspect of conscious disregard among Rio Stones’ corporate leaders, Plaintiffs cannot establish they are entitled to punitive damages. Therefore, Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim as to Rio Stones is GRANTED.

Rio Stones objects to the Deposition of Diogo Duarte (Nos. 1-15) submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion of Rio Stones. The following objections are SUSTAINED: 5, 11, 13, 14 and 15 (relevance), and 12 (subsequent remedial measures). The following objections are OVERRULED: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Defendant Rio Stones, Inc. to serve notice of ruling. This tentative ruling (“TR”) shall be the order of the Court unless changed at the hearing and shall by this reference be incorporated into the Minute Order. TR emailed to counsel for the moving parties on 4/11/25 at 11:45 a.m.

[1] It is undisputed that Plaintiff was employed at Sofia Marble and Granite (from 2001-2004), Malibu Granite (from 2004-2010), JO Marble & Granite (from 2010-2013), and Reycost Granite (2014-2021).

[2] Natividad Decl., ¶¶ 7, 9, 12-13; Exh. D, p. 212:9-214:23; Exh. F, p. 437:5-8; Exh. I, p. 676:2-14; Exh. J, p. 881:21-882:8.

[3] Rio Stones’ Answer only asserts the sophisticated user defense, which applies to end users. (Natividad Decl., Exh. M [Rio Stones’ Answer], p. 7:22-25.) To the extent that Rio Stones conflates this defense with the sophisticated intermediary defense, which applies to purchasers, the Court disregards such arguments and legal authority.

[4] “[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Blickman¿Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC¿(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 868, internal citation omitted.)