Judge Richard L. Fruin, Case Number: 24STCV12359, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

[A] defendant is not entitled to even an in camera review of police personnel files without first “establish[ing] a plausible factual foundation” for the defense asserted. [Id. at p. 1025.] The defendant “must present ... a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.” (Ibid.) In doing so, the defendant need not point to any corroboration for the defendant's account, and is also not required to “present a credible or believable factual account of, or a motive for, police misconduct.” [Id. at p. 1026.] Rather, all that is required is the presentation of a scenario “that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges.” (Ibid.)

(Uybungco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048–1049, citing Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1025-1026.) “A defendant must also show how the information sought could lead to or be evidence potentially admissible at trial. Such a showing ‘put[s] the court on notice’ that the specified officer misconduct ‘will likely be an issue at trial.’ [Citation.] Once that burden is met, the defendant has shown materiality under section 1043.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1026.) In other words, to determine whether the moving party has established the requisite materiality of the information sought, courts consider the following factors:

Has the defense shown a logical connection between the charges and the proposed defense? Is the defense request for Pitchess discovery factually specific and tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct? Will the requested Pitchess discovery support the proposed defense, or is it likely to lead to information that would support the proposed defense? Under what theory would the requested information be admissible at trial?

(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1026–1027.)

PLAINTIFFS’ SPECIFIC REQUESTS

Plaintiff’s specific requests are extensive. The Court has prepared the following summaries for the categories of documents that are sought. (The bracketed numbers refer to the requests specified in the notice.]

With respect to Chief Grisafe, Plaintiffs seek all writings (1) related to PPD’s investigations into Grisafe’s “headlock” interaction with Shelby on 8/23/2023 [No. 1], and (2) contained in Grisafe’s personnel file identifying complaints initiated against Grisafe in the past 5 years [No. 2]. Plaintiffs also seek all IA Pro and Blue Teams computer entries for Grisafe within the past 5 years [Nos. 3-4].

The City filed objections to each category. The Court does not know what IA Pro and Blue Teams computer entries are, nor how such information is obtained. As to materiality, there is an insufficient showing as to Request Nos. 2-4. Plaintiffs offer no criteria as to what are the types of complaints or entries related to Grisafe, such that the information sought is not sufficiently limited in scope to facts relevant to the instant litigation.

With respect to Officer Palacios, plaintiffs seek: (1) all writings and body/dash camera footage related to PPD’s investigations into Palacios’ conduct during the 2/20/2023 Incident involving the Towns family [No. 5], (2) all writings contained in Palacios’ personnel file identifying complaints initiated against Palacios in the past 5 years [No. 6], and (3) all writings related to PPD’s investigations into the following incidents with respect to Palacios: (a) discharge of firearm, (b) use of force resulting in death or great bodily injury, (c) complaints alleging unreasonable or excessive force, and/or (d) failure to intervene against another officer using unreasonable or excessive force [No. 7]. Plaintiffs also seek all IA Pro and Blue Teams entries for Palacios within the past 5 years involving claims of excessive force or conduct unbecoming [Nos. 8-9]. There is a lack of materiality for these categories as they do not relate to the conduct the plaintiffs complain of in the complaint. The requests are not limited to facts relevant to the litigation.

Third, with respect to Sgt. Blanchard, plaintiffs seek all writings (1) related to PPD’s investigations into Crutchfield’s complaint against Blanchard on 2/25/2023 alleging disparate treatment including the complaint and all witness statements (audios, videos, transcriptions and summary notes) [No. 10], and (2) related to PPD’s investigation into Blanchard’s complaint against Crutchfield on or about 2/27/2023 in connection with the 2/20/2023 Incident [No. 11].

The Court needs to be educated on the processes used within the PPD in making investigations, for instance, whether every investigation is given an identifying number, has a defined scope, and has a record for procedures taken and documents reviewed and identified.

USE OF PITCHESS PROCEDURES IN CASES ALLEGING INTERNAL FEHA VIOLATIONS

“Traditionally, Pitchess motions seek information about past complaints by third parties of excessive force, violence, dishonesty, or the filing of false police reports contained in the officer's personnel file.” (Rezek v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 633, 640.) However, a Pitchess motion has previously been partially successful in the civil whistleblower retaliation context in at least one case. In Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, a retired LAPD sued the City of Los Angeles alleging LAPD had retaliated against him for protected whistleblower activity by failing to promote him over less-qualified candidates. The Court of Appeal partially reversed the denial the plaintiff’s Pitchess motion, which sought to obtain certain records of the officers selected for the positions to which the plaintiff had applied. (Id., at 652.) The plaintiff argued these records were necessary to show Los Angeles’s stated business reason for the promotion decisions were pretext for retaliation against plaintiff. (Id., at 651.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal found the plaintiff had established good cause to obtain an in camera review of the officers’ TEAMS reports and last two performance evaluations. (Id., at 664.) Notably, the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court’s denial of the Pitchess motion with respect to “personnel records pertaining to investigations into [plaintiff’s] retaliation claim and documents pertaining to retaliation against [another officer].” (Id., at 664.)

In Riske, the Court of Appeal reasoned that “nothing in [the Pitchess] statutes explicitly restricts discovery to personnel records of peace officers who participated in or witnessed the wrongdoing at issue in the litigation.” (Id., at 658-59 (“the dispositive factor in these cases was not the presence or absence of the officer during the episode of misconduct at issue; it was the materiality of the officer's records to the issue before the court.)) The court further explained that the plaintiff had sufficiently demonstrated good cause for the records at issue “by articulating his whistleblower activity, a history of being maligned by other officers for that activity and his substantial qualifications for each of the 14 positions for which he applied. He also alleged he was more qualified than each of the candidates selected. Further particularity is not required.” (Id., at 663-664.)

In the criminal context, the California Supreme Court has reversed the denial of a Pitchess motion, but ostensibly limited the discovery requested in the motion to exclude requests that were “completely untethered either to the factual scenario or to the proposed defenses.” (Warrick, supra, (2005) 35 Cal.4th at 1022.) In Warrick, supra, (2005) 35 Cal.4th at 1017, a defendant charged with cocaine possession filed a Pitchess motion for “disclosure of any previous citizen complaints against the three arresting officers for making false arrests, falsifying police reports, or planting evidence. Defendant also sought discovery of a long list of other misconduct by the officers,” including complaints of racial bias.1 The defendant argued the information related to the officer’s past incidents of dishonesty were relevant to the defense’s position that “the officers had falsely arrested defendant and fabricated the facts in the arrest report.” (Id., at 1017.) “[T]he Court of Appeal characterized defendant's discovery request as overbroad” and “concluded that only information about prior complaints that any of the three officers ‘had made false statements in police reports’ would have relevance to petitioner's claims of officer misconduct.” (Id., at 1022.) “The Court of Appeal also concluded that defendant had not shown good cause for discovery of prior complaints of false statements in police reports written by the three arresting officers, because he had not established a ‘plausible’ factual scenario.” (Ibid.)

Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court reversed, finding the defendant had “established good cause for Pitchess discovery, entitling him to the trial court's in-chambers review of the arresting officers' personnel records relating to making false arrests, planting evidence, fabricating police reports or probable cause, and committing perjury.” (Id., at 1027–1028, emphasis added.) The Supreme Court reasoned that “defendant has outlined a defense raising the issue of the practice of the arresting officers to make false arrests, plant evidence, commit perjury, and falsify police reports or probable cause.” (Id., at 1027.) While the Warrick Court does not explicitly state that the defendant’s broad request for discovery of complaints related to officer bias in general, including racial bias, was properly denied, the Court’s limited holding does reflect a narrowing of the defendant’s Pitchess requests (citing People v. Jackson¿(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 for the position that “overbroad discovery request is properly narrowed by the trial court to misconduct similar to that alleged.” (Id., at 1220.) This conclusion is consistent with the Pitchess Court’s requirement for the personnel record request to be made with “adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is engaging in a ‘fishing expedition.’” (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 538.)

Based on the foregoing review of the more relevant case law, the Court will be required to address individually the objections made by the PPD to determine whether plaintiffs have shown materiality of their requests given the allegations in their complaint. The Court has other questions that it may raise at the hearing. The Court provides in the appendix its chronology and summary of the complaint for reference at the hearing.

This TR shall be included in the Court’s ruling on the motion. This TR is emailed to counsel on 1/29/25 at 4 p.m.

TIMELINE ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT:

Plaintiff Officer Taisyn Crutchfield (“Crutchfield”) is a black, female peace officer employed by Pasadena Police Department (“PPD”). Plaintiff Officer Jarvis Shelby (“Shelby”) is a black, male peace officer employed by PPD. Plaintiff Sergeant Milton White (“White”) is a black, male peace officer employed by PPD.

Alleged Facts Relevant to Plaintiff Taisyn Crutchfield (“Crutchfield”):

10/2022: Crutchfield applies to attend an all-female combat training and is denied, while four other non-black, female PPD officers were allowed to attend. (Compl., ¶ 25.)

1/22/2023: Charles Towns (“Mr. Towns”) is shot and killed by a deputy sheriff employed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”). PPD responds to the scene, including PPD Officer Ralph Palacios. The family of Mr. Towns arrives at the scene and realizes Mr. Towns was killed in the incident. Officer Palacios has a negative interaction with Mr. Towns’ family and is ordered away from the family by LASD. (Id., ¶ 30, fn. 1.)

2/20/2023: PPD officers arrive at the home of Mr. Town’s surviving family. Officer Bledsoe makes contact with the family outside the home. Officer Palacios aggressively takes hold of Carlos Towns and pushes Carlos into the ground. Crutchfield and her partner, Officer Duran, arrive at the scene after Officer Bledsoe fails to respond to dispatch. Crutchfield sees two black males, including Carlos, handcuffed and placed in the back of two PPD patrol vehicles. Crutchfield also hears a handcuffed black female yelling that Officer Palacios “was the aggressive one.” While Crutchfield is trying to deescalate the situation by guiding Officer Palacios away from the scene, Palacios pushes Crutchfield’s arm and instructs her, “No don’t do that.” Officer Palacios places an arm on Crutchfield’s vest and says, “Get out of my face.” Palacios allegedly has several prior allegations of excessive force made against him. (Id., Exh. 1, at p. 4.) Sergeant Blanchard orders Crutchfield to leave the scene and return to the PPD station.

At the station, Crutchfield asks Sergeant Blanchard if she needed a union representative. Blanchard yells at Crutchfield to get out. As Crutchfield is leaving, Blanchard begins interrogating Crutchfield about the prior event. Blanchard orders Crutchfield to dock her body camera.

2/25/2023: Crutchfield files a complaint against Sergeant Blanchard for disparate treatment during the 2/20/2023 Incident. Crutchfield alleges PPD never responds to the complaint.

2/27/2023: Lt. Gordon, a black female lieutenant formerly in charge of internal affairs, is transferred out of internal affairs (“IA”).

Thereafter, Sergeant Blanchard files a complaint against Crutchfield regarding the 2/20/2023 Incident with a falsified submission date.

4/2023: PPD opens an internal investigation into Officer Negrete for holding a party at her home where alcohol was served to on-duty PPD officers. Neither Negrete nor the officers were placed on administrative leave due to this incident.

4/13/2023: Lt. Kirby and Sergeant Dubois come to Crutchfield’s home and serve Crutchfield with notice she is on administrative leave. Crutchfield is allegedly the only officer placed on leave due to the 2/20/2023 Incident.

5/8/2023: On the date Crutchfield’s probation is supposed to end, Crutchfield’s administrative leave is extended.

6/8/2023: The civilian family involved in the 2/20/2023 Incident files a civil rights lawsuit.

6/26/2023: Crutchfield is interviewed by IA and reveals evidence in confidence. Yet, around 9/2023, Crutchfield learns the confidential evidence was leaked to PPD members.

8/28/2023: Crutchfield files a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) and receives a right to sue letter. (Id., ¶ 16, Exh. 3.)

10/18/2023: PPD advises Crutchfield she will be allowed to return to work on the condition she is “partnered” with another officer for three months. Typically, officers returning from extended leave are only required to be “partnered” for 1-2 weeks.

10/25/2023: Crutchfield returns to work. PPD informs her that her probation will end on 11/19/2023.

11/3 & 11/8/2023: Sergeant Blanchard is Crutchfield’s immediate supervisor.

11/29/2023: Crutchfield is signed off probation. Thereafter, PPD places her on a 90-Day Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). The PIP cites confidential information from Crutchfield’s hiring background investigation.

11/30/2023: Crutchfield files a government claim, which is rejected on 1/8/2024. (Id., ¶ 15, Exhs. 1-2.)

12/1/2023: Crutchfield is dispatched to a scene involving a gun but does not initially receive back up (contrary to PPD policy).

1/11/2024: During a Police Oversight Meeting, the PPD Chief of Police allegedly falsely claims Crutchfield’s probation had not been extended.

1/23/2024: Crutchfield interviews for a special assignment with Community Relations, which is denied on 1/30/2024.

5/2024: Crutchfield returns to PPD after a medical leave. Upon her return, Crutchfield is required to repeat her PIP.

Alleged Facts Relevant to Plaintiff Jarvis Shelby (“Shelby”):

Circa 2020: Shelby is assigned to the Community Relations Section at PPD. Thereafter, white PPD officers repeatedly falsely claim Shelby received the position because he was Black. Shelby complains.

Circa 2021: PPD tells Shelby is told he will receive a position with PPD’s Enforcement Unit. During a meeting, a PPD Corporal states “I don’t think people should get spots because they’re Black,” referring to Shelby. Thereafter, similar comments continued. Shelby complains. Shelby is ultimately denied a position on the Unit.

12/14/2022: Shelby sustains a work-related injury to his neck, for which he receives worker’s compensation.

5/17/2023: Shelby sustains another work-related injury to his neck, for which he receives worker’s compensation.

6/6/2023: Shelby applies for a Corporal position.

6/27/2023: Shelby receives his scores for the Corporal position, just missing the eligibility list.

8/16/2023: Shelby files a grievance over the Corporal position.

8/23/2023: When Shelby attempts to shake the hand of Commander Grisafe (who oversees Shelby’s unit), Grisafe places Shelby in a headlock, causing neck injuries. Plaintiff White (Shelby’s supervisor) was present for this Incident and submits a memo to IA. However, White is prevented from documenting the injuries (contrary to PPD policy). Instead, PPD has a white supervisor document Shelby’s injury.

Thereafter, IA investigates the Incident and Grisafe is disciplined for “engaging in horseplay resulting in injury.” (Grisafe Depo., Exh. 2 to Pitchess Motion, at p. 201.)

9/3/2023: Shelby files a complaint with the Chief of Police and Pasadena City manager. The Chief of Police cancels meetings regarding the complaint without notifying Shelby.

12/12/2023: Shelby files a government claim, which is rejected on 1/24/2024. (Compl., ¶ 17, Exhs. 4-5.)

2/5/2024: Shelby files a complaint with the California CRD and receives a right to sue letter. (Id., ¶ 18, Exh. 6.)

Alleged Facts Relevant to Plaintiff Milton White (“White”):

6/21/2023: White is selected as the Community Relations Sergeant, a 3-year assignment.

6/26/2023: A local Black-owned business, Brick City Boxing (“BCB”), is burglarized. Officer Palacios is dispatched to BCB and falsely clears the scene as a false alarm. As a result of Palacios’ clearance (described as an alleged lie), the business remains accessible for three hours overnight until the owner arrives. White discovers Palacios’ lie and reports the violation to IA. On 7/5/2023, Commander Grisafe blocks PPD’s yearly purchase order with BCB.

9/5/2023: White informs the Chief of Police that he believes Commander Grisafe was discriminating against BCB.

9/25/2023: The mother of White’s children passes away. In response, White requests Family Medical Leave (“FMLA”). On 9/26/2023, Commander Grisafe informs White that White will be replaced as Community Relations Section Sergeant (which should have been a 3-year position). White was not informed why he was being removed from the position.

10/16/2023: White returns early from FMLA due to fear of further adverse employment action.

11/20/2023: Although White returned to work, Deputy Chief Chute sends an email posting White’s position for other Sergeants to apply.

12/5/2023: White sends an email to Deputy Chief Chute and Commander Grisafe asking why he was removed from the Community Relation Section. White does not receive a response.

Later that evening, White approaches Chute at a PPD event to request an answer to his email. Chute asks White to meet him in Chute’s office after the event, which White does. Chute apologizes but informs White the transfer to Community Relations had been temporary (despite the documentation stating the assignment was three years minimum).

2/29/2024: White files a government claim, which is rejected on 4/12/2024. (Compl., ¶ 19, Exhs 7-8.)

5/3/2024: White files a complaint with the California CRD and receives a right to sue letter. (Id., ¶ 20, Exh. 9.)

Facts Relevant to All Plaintiffs:

5/16/2024: Plaintiffs Crutchfield, Shelby, and White (collectively “Plaintiffs”) file the instant Complaint against the City of Pasadena (“City”), alleging causes of action for:

FEHA Harassment

FEHA Discrimination

FEHA Retaliation

Whistleblower Retaliation

Failure to Take Corrective Action

6/6/2024: During a news conference, Corporal David Llanes (“Llanes”) allegedly claims to the media that Plaintiffs’ claims are false. Thereafter, Llanes’ allegations are published in at least three print media outlets. (Gage Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.) Notably, the only reference to Llanes himself within Plaintiffs’ allegations is included in Shelby’s Government Claim (attached to the Complaint), which alleges that “several years ago,” Llanes discriminated against and harassed Officer Robinson, who is Black. (Compl., Exh. 4, at p. 4.)

6/7/2024: According to City, Llanes sent communications to the media stating that he was misquoted in the news reports and clarifying that neither the PPOA nor Lllanes called Plaintiffs’ allegations false. (Llanes Decl., ¶¶ 13-15, Exhs. C-D.) Plaintiffs’ counsel alleges these communications have not been produced to Plaintiffs. (Gage Decl., ¶ 2.) However, the email communications between counsel in December 2024 state that these communications were sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel by email attachment. (Applen Decl., ¶ 7, Exhs. J.)

6/10/2024: Plaintiffs serve a Notice of Deposition of Llanes for 7/15/2024. (Gage Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 1.)

6/12/2024: Plaintiffs serve City with a Request for Admission (RFA), Set One and Form Interrogatories – General Set One. (Applen Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. F.) RFAs No. 1-4 seek admissions regarding to Llanes’ alleged statements on June 6, 2024. (Ibid.) Additionally, Form Interrogatory General No. 17.1 asked for facts, witnesses, and documents related to these RFAs. (Id., ¶ 4, Exh. F.)

6/18/2024: City files an Answer.

7/10/2024: City objects to the deposition notice. (Gage Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 2.)

7/11/2024: Plaintiffs’ counsel informs City’s counsel that the refusal to produce Llanes for deposition was improper. (Id., ¶ 5, Exh. 3.)

9/12/2024: City serves verified responses to Plaintiffs’ RFA, Set One and Form Interrogatories – General, Set One. (Applen Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. G.) In these responses, City denied that on June 6, 2024, Llanes claims that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were false. (Ibid.) In response to Form Interrogatory General No. 17.1, City responded, in relevant part, as follows: “Officer Llanes did not speak about Plaintiffs’ lawsuit with the media on June 6, 2024, or ever… Officer Llanes made clear that the Pasadena Police Officer Association did not comment on the claims and allegations raised by Plaintiffs nor did he call the claims and allegations raised by Plaintiffs false.” (Ibid.) Even further, City identified the existence of “[e]mails and texts from Officer Llanes to various media outlets stating that he was misquoted.” (Ibid.)

9/23/2024: City’s counsel responds to Plaintiffs’ counsel, explaining why Llanes should not be deposed. (Gage Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. 4.)