Judge: Richard L. Fruin, Case: 24STCV23615, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULINGS:
The Court prepares written tentative rulings for contested motions other than Discovery Motions. Usually the Court will not be able to e-mail tentative rulings until 8:30 a.m. on the morning of the motion hearing. If the tentative rulings are available on the day before the scheduled hearing, the Court will e-mail the tentative rulings to counsel. The Court does not read its tentative rulings to attorneys appearing by LACourtConnect. Tentative rulings that are made final at the hearing will be entered in the computer as a separate document filed.

Email will be sent to those counsel remotely appearing on LACourtConnect if signed-in at the time email is sent and/or alternatively will be sent to attorney(s) of record.

Counsel receiving the tentative email are requested to please forward the attached tentative ruling to any party/counsel entitled that is not included in the email.

All recipients are to appear at the hearing for any comments or arguments; parties are not to respond to the email with any comments or argument.

Case Number: 24STCV23615    Hearing Date: April 24, 2025    Dept: 15

# 11   TENTATIVE RULING                9:15 a.m., Thursday, April 24, 2025

SANAZ SAHA v. KOUROSH NETTY, et al. [24STCV23615]

Defendants Ghadoushi and Netty were partially successful in their special motion to strike (CCP 425.16) and seek in their present motion attorneys’ fees in prosecuting the special motion to strike in the amount of $36,310. Defendants make their claim under CCP 425.16(c)(2).

Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, although granted in part, will have minimal effect on this litigation. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 24 causes of action. The Court granted defendants’ motion to strike certain allegations in the 15^th and 17^th causes of action for, respectively, intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. Specifically, the Court struck from para. 47 allegations about attending court hearings; from para. 247(b) and (c) allegations about court attendance and testimony; from para. 248(a) and (b) allegations about court attendance and behavior; and from para. 267 allegations about court attendance and testimony.

Even with these allegations stricken, the causes of action survive. The Court made this clear from footnote 5 from its February 24, 2025 ruling. That footnote reads:

Simultaneously, the 15^th and 17^th causes of action also contain allegations of unprotected activity. For example, that Brittney’s alleged prevention of Mother retrieving her personal property happened to occur during a court-ordered property retrieval period does not make the conduct itself a protected activity. (FAC, ¶¶ 247, 267.) Rather, this allegation is merely incidental to Mother’s judicial proceedings. (See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395.) Additionally, although Mother alleges Niloofar participated in “spreading false information” about Mother with the purpose of discrediting Mother in her legal proceedings, it is not clear how such communications or conduct trigger the anti-SLAPP statute. (FAC, ¶¶ 248.) The FAC does not allege facts to suggest that Niloofar’s alleged false communications occurred before a court or in the course of litigation-related activity, or that these false communications involve an issue of public concern. Statements about court proceedings or parties are not necessarily protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. That Family Defendants allegedly spoke falsely about topics involved in Mother’s pending court proceedings does not demonstrate that such communications were made in connection with an issue under judicial consideration or an issue of public interest. (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264 (even if “conduct might have been ‘in connection with’ a proceeding, it was not… ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review’ in that proceeding.”))

Defendants’ anti—SLAPP motion, even though granted, will not have any significant effect on this litigation. The results achieved by defendants’ motion fall within the ambit of Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.  (2006) 139 Cal.App. 4^th 328, wherein the appellate court declared that a party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is generally considered a prevailing party “unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that they provide no practical benefit.” Id at 340.

Defendants filed its special motion to strike together with their demurrer and regular motion to strike. Defendants worked up both motions at the same time, and both motions were ruled on at the same hearing. Defendants’ demurrers were overruled, and their motion to strike was denied. Defendants’ coupling of its demurrer with its anti-SLAPP motion together, and the results achieved, emphasizes that defendants’ challenges to the complaint were largely unavailing.

The motion for sanctions under CCP 425.16(c)(2) is DENIED.

Plaintiff is to serve notice of ruling. This TR shall be the order of the Court, unless changed at the hearing, and by this reference shall be incorporated into the minute order. TR emailed to counsel at 4:25 p.m. on 4/23/25.