Judge: Richard S. Whitney, Case: 37-2021-00047031-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-03-22 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - March 20, 2024

03/22/2024  10:30:00 AM  C-68 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S. Whitney

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Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Other Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) 37-2021-00047031-CU-PO-CTL LYNCH VS 24 HOUR ELEVATOR INC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING: DEFENDANT SHARP HEALTHCARE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is GRANTED.

Defendant SHARP HEALTHCARE ('Defendant') seeks summary judgment against Plaintiff MARY LYNCH ('Plaintiff') based on Defendant's affirmative defense that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the exclusive remedy rule pertaining to California workers' compensation. In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court must first identify the issues framed by the pleadings, since the pleadings set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved, and the materiality of disputed facts. (Conroy v. Regents of University of Cal. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250; Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 289-90; Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 858.) The Court then determines whether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor, and if the moving party has carried its initial burden, decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Serri, supra, at p. 858.) The Court must 'liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.' (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The issue before this Court is whether Defendant was Plaintiff's employer at relevant times. Plaintiff asserts there are issues of fact because 'Specialty Medical Groups' was her employer according to her paychecks. It is undisputed that Plaintiff worked for physicians Adamson & Dembitsky, who sold their staff to Defendant in 2014. (Defendant's Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [SSUMF] Nos. 3.) It is also undisputed that Plaintiff, as part of the re-hiring process, Plaintiff attended orientation for Defendant new hires at Defendant's Corporate Headquarters and spoke with a member of Defendant's human resources department. (SSUMF Nos. 4.) Plaintiff also does not dispute that she completes various online learning modules each year through Defendant's learning center. (SSUMF Nos. 6.) 'The question of whether a worker is an employee within the meaning of the Compensation Act [], is referred to as a question of mixed law and fact to be proved like any other question.' (Schaller v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1938) 11 Cal.2d 46, 50.) '[A]n employee of a wholly owned subsidiary who has obtained workers' compensation benefits from the subsidiary may maintain an action in tort against the parent corporation and this is so even though the parent and subsidiary are covered by the same workmen's compensation policy.' (Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 591, 601.) A 'subsidiary' is a corporation whose voting shares of more than a specified percentage are owned Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3082988  71 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LYNCH VS 24 HOUR ELEVATOR INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00047031-CU-PO-CTL directly or indirectly by the parent corporations. (Corp. Code, § 189, subd. (a).) Generally speaking a percentage ownership of more than 50 percent creates the corporation as a 'subsidiary' whether it is owned directly or indirectly through one or more subsidiaries. (Ibid.) The term 'division,' however, is not defined with equal clarity in the law. It is a generic term. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) page 664 defines a division as 'a major administrative unit of an industrial enterprise comprising at least several departments or constituting a complete integrated unit for a specific purpose.' (Id. 601–602.) 'The degree of separation between the parent and the subsidiary entity, whether true subsidiary or simply a subdivision of a larger integrated whole, is again a factual matter.' (Id. at 602.) In Gigax a trial court's granting of summary judgment based on the defendant's characterization that the California corporation was merely a division of a Missouri corporation was reversed because 'the evidence before the trial court do not demonstrate that Van Camp is merely a smaller part of an integrated whole.' (Gigax, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at 602.) '[C]ertain facts would indicate that Van Camp acts and operates as a separate business entity. It is a proper factual inference from the record below that Van Camp is a corporation totally separate and distinct, in location, function and identity from its corporate parent, Ralston.' (Id.) Defendant provides evidence that the Federal Employer Identification Number for Specialty Medical Group is the same as Defendant. (SSUMF Nos. 4 and 10.) Defendant classifies employees of this purported subdivision as employees of Defendant. (SSUMF No. 10.) The form, for relevant periods, Defendant submits to the IRS to report wage tax liability shows that employees such as Plaintiff, who work for a sub-division of Defendant are Defendant employees. (SSUMF No. 11.) Plaintiff disputes that 'Specialty Medical Groups' is a subdivision of Defendant. Plaintiff cites the deposition of herself. Plaintiff testified that her employer was 'Specialty Medical Groups.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 3.) Plaintiff's conclusion that she was employed by 'Specialty Medical Groups' appears to be based solely on her paystubs, which reflects that 'Specialty Medical Groups' is her employer.

(Bruno Declaration Ex. 2.) Plaintiff does not cite any authority to support the conclusion that a subdivision of a corporation may not be the identified employer on paystubs. The Court finds Plaintiff's legal conclusions are not sufficient to raise triable issues of fact. As the case cited by Plaintiff, Gigax, indicates, Plaintiff must provide facts to support that 'Specialty Medical Groups' acts and operates as a separate business entity, such as having a distinct location, function, and identify from Defendant.

Plaintiff also attempts to raises issues of fact based on the deposition testimony of Defendant's payroll manager Carlos Castellanos, and Sharp Rees-Staley's CEO Stacey Hrountas. Plaintiff asserts Carlos Castellanos struggled to answer certain questions. Carlos Castellanos testified 'Specialty Medical Groups' is 'a subset or a subdivision from Sharp HealthCare where certain physicians and nurse practitioners, they provide health care services to the community. And even though they have kind of like their own name, the Sharp Medical Group, but they're all part of the Sharp HealthCare organization.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 5, pg. 21.) When asked how many employees receive paychecks from 'Specialty Medical Groups,' Carlos Castellanos testified paychecks come from Defendant. (Bruno Declaration Ex. 5, pg. 22.) This contradicts the evidence of Plaintiff's paychecks. (Bruno Declaration Ex. 2.) However, Carlos Castellanos later testified that 'approximately less than 15' people receive paychecks from 'Specialty Medical Groups.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 5, pg. 26.) It appears Carlos Castellanos was merely identifying that Defendant was the ultimate employer, not what name appeared on the paystubs.

Carlos Castellanos could not answer what the job titles were of people paid by 'Specialty Medical Groups' 'in five minutes,' but Carlos Castellanos also described 'Specialty Medical Groups' as being composes of 'some physicians, nurse practitioners, and also support staff that -- that provide services to the community.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 5, pgs. 21 and 26.) However, Carlos Castellanos testified he does not know where people paid by 'Specialty Medical Groups' physically worked. (Bruno Declaration Ex. 5, pgs. 26-27.) However, importantly Carlos Castellanos testified 'nowadays, with COVID and everything, some people work remote. But that's something, me in payroll, I don't know.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 5, pg. 27.) Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3082988  71 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LYNCH VS 24 HOUR ELEVATOR INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00047031-CU-PO-CTL Stacey Hrountas testified that she is not aware of an 'entity' known as 'Specialty Medical Groups.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 7, pgs. 14-15.) Stacey Hrountas testified 'Specialty Medical Groups is kind of a catch-all phrase for the non-Sharp Rees-Stealy foundation pods. I think it's on their paychecks. But we don't refer to Sharp Cardio Thoracic Center as Specialty Medical Groups. It's just a grouping of the non-Sharp Rees-Stealy medical foundation pods together.' (Bruno Declaration Ex. 7, pg. 20.) The Court finds Plaintiff has not raises triable issues of material fact. Plaintiff does not point to any admissible evidence that indicates Specialty Medical Groups' was a separate entity or a subsidiary of Defendant. At best, Plaintiff cites her own legal conclusion which is based on paystubs. As discussed above, Defendant provides evidence that the fact 'Specialty Medical Groups' appears on her paychecks does not alter the fact Defendant was Plaintiff's employer at relevant times, given that 'Specialty Medical Groups' is not a separate entity, but a subdivision of Defendant. The motion is granted.

Defendant's Objections to Evidence: Objection 1-3: Overruled Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

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