Judge: Richard S. Whitney, Case: 37-2022-00012509-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2023-10-13 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 11, 2023

10/13/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-68 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S. Whitney

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Civil - Unlimited  Breach of Contract/Warranty Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) 37-2022-00012509-CU-BC-CTL ANDERS VS WS LIM FAMILY HOLDINGS LLC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING: DEFENDANT W.S. LIM FAMILY HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

Defendant W.S. LIM FAMILY HOLDINGS, LLC ('Defendant') challenges each cause of action by Plaintiff JOE JOHN GOMEZ ('Plaintiff') based mainly on the assertion that Plaintiff was not a resident of Iris Mobile Manor mobilehome park ('Park'). In ruling on a summary judgment/adjudication motion, the trial court must first identify the issues framed by the pleadings, since the pleadings set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved, and the materiality of disputed facts. (Conroy v. Regents of University of Cal. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250; Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 289-90; Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 858.) The Court then determines whether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor, and if the moving party has carried its initial burden, decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Serri, supra, at p. 858.) The Court must 'liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.' (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) As to Defendant's main argument, the Court finds there are issues of fact. In Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004 the court considered whether a former terminated employee qualified as a tenant or a licensee (the same argument Defendant makes here).

One key characteristic that distinguishes a tenancy from a mere license is the right to exclusive possession as against the whole world, including the landowner. (San Jose Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1328, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 505; Von Goerlitz v. Turner, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d at p. 429, 150 P.2d 278.) Here, plaintiff made the factual assertion that the 'lease agreement did not place any restrictions upon Plaintiff's occupancy at the Subject property.' Defendants responded that the proffered fact was irrelevant, but they did not dispute it. In any event, there is no evidence in the record indicating that any person besides plaintiff had the right to occupy the apartment during the lease term. To the contrary, the housing agreement provides for plaintiff to 'be housed individually' in the apartment. Thus, so far as this record suggests, plaintiff enjoyed exclusive possession of the premises during the term of the lease. (Cf. San Jose Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court, at p. 1328, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 505 [no exclusive possession where the contracting party was required to 'provide reasonable access for pedestrian customers of the adjacent property owners'].) Another 'fundamental attribute of a lease' that distinguishes it from a license is payment 'for the use of the premises' in the form of 'the legal equivalent of rent.' (San Jose Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 505.) In this case, there is evidence that plaintiff was housed at the apartment as part of her compensation. (Tappe v. Lieberman, supra, 193 Cal.Rptr. 514, Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2999590 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  ANDERS VS WS LIM FAMILY HOLDINGS LLC [IMAGED]  37-2022-00012509-CU-BC-CTL 145 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 24; cf. Eichhorn v. De La Cantera, supra, 117 Cal.App.2d at p. 54, 255 P.2d 70.) That is sufficient to raise a triable issue on the question of payment of rent or its legal equivalent.

(Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1040–1041.) Similar to Spinks, Plaintiff raises issues of fact as to whether he was a resident of the Park by providing evidence that Plaintiff had exclusive use and possession of the mobilehome, he paid rent and utilities, maintained and repaired the mobilehome at his own expense, and was obligated to follow the same Park rules and regulations as other Park residents. (Decl. Gomez, ¶¶ 3, 5-10, Gomez Depo. 11:1-5; 68:17-69:3; 91:13-25; 147:6-22; 148:4-6; 139:21-140:3; 210:5-211:18; 230:13-25; 233:4-234:2.) Further, the Court notes that the mobilehome residency law ('MRL') provides '[a] civil action pursuant to this section may be brought by a park resident....' (Civ. Code, § 798.87(c).) ''Resident' is a homeowner or other person who lawfully occupies a mobilehome.' (Civ. Code, § 798.11 [Emphasis added].) It is undisputed that Plaintiff occupied a mobilehome in the Park. Further, ''Rental agreement' is an agreement between the management and the homeowner establishing the terms and conditions of a park tenancy. A lease is a rental agreement.' (Civ. Code, § 798.8.) Plaintiff provides evidence of his employment agreement, which establishes terms and conditions of his tenancy at Park, as well as conduct that could support a tenancy implied by law. (Decl. Gomez, ¶ ¶¶ 3, 5-10, Exhibit 1; Gomez Depo. 11:1-5; 68:17-69:3; 91:13-25; 139:21-140:3; 147:6-22; 148:4-6; 210:5-211:18; 230:13-25; 233:4-234:2.) There are issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff was a resident with standing to assert the claims in this action (aside from the declaratory relief claim).

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's argument as to Plaintiff not being a resident fails as to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. Plaintiff does not dispute that he does not have standing as to the declaratory relief cause of action. Therefore, the motion is granted as to the ninth cause of action for declaratory relief.

As to the second and third causes of action for breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff has raised issues of fact as to whether he had a 'rental agreement' with Defendant that was incorporated into the employment contract or was implied by law and whether Plaintiff paid Defendant rent via deduction from his paycheck. (Decl. Gomez, ¶ 5, Exhibit 1.) While Plaintiff did not own the mobilehome, there are issues of fact as to whether Defendant failed to maintain the common areas and facilities in accordance with the tenancy whether or not Plaintiff owned the mobilehome. Plaintiff has raised issues of fact as to whether he suffered harm which did not require that he owned the mobilehome.

As to negligence, Defendant also asserts Plaintiff did not suffer damages because he did not own the mobilehome. The employee contract states 'Employee is to maintain both the exterior and the interior of said quarter in a clean and orderly condition. All necessary repairs are to be performed by the Employee at his/her own expense. This includes the maintenance of the carpet and the drapes, painting, and all necessary plumbing and electrical repairs.' (Decl. Gomez, Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff alleges damages occurred in the mobilehome as a result of sewage backups and overflow. While the employee contract indicates that Plaintiff was responsible for maintenance of plumbing, it does not state that Plaintiff would be responsible for damages that occur from sewage issues that arise out of issues outside the mobilehome.

Plaintiff has raised issues of fact as to damages. (Gomez Depo. 91:13-25; 139:21-140:3; 147:6-22; 148:4-6.) As to the breach of warranty of habitability (sixth cause of action) and breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (seventh cause of action), Defendant again asserts there was no lease agreement. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has raised issues of fact as to whether he had a 'rental agreement' with Defendant that was incorporated into the employment contract or was implied by law.

Finally, as to breach of unfair competition law (eighth cause of action), Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not suffer any loss of money or property. Plaintiff fails to directly address the issue. However, as discussed above, there are issues of fact as to damages from sewage backups and overflow that may have been Defendant's responsibility. (Gomez Depo. 91:13-25; 139:21-140:3; 147:6-22; 148:4-6.) Plaintiff was not reimbursed for the repairs he made. (Decl. Gomez, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has raised issues of fact as to loss of money.

For the reasons discussed above, the motion is granted as to the declaratory relief cause of action. The motion is denied as to the remaining causes of action.

Defendant's Objections to Evidence: Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2999590 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  ANDERS VS WS LIM FAMILY HOLDINGS LLC [IMAGED]  37-2022-00012509-CU-BC-CTL Objections 1-9: overruled. As to objection 3-5, the Court understands the discovery admissions appear to, on their face, contradict Plaintiff's declaration. However, it appears Plaintiff could have understood 'live rent free' as being required to pay out of pocket when the arrangement was for 'rent' to come directly out of Plaintiff's paycheck. Without a precise definition of the term 'rent' the Court declines to conclude the discovery admissions are directly contradictory of Plaintiff's declaration.

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