Judge: Richard S. Whitney, Case: 37-2023-00017543-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2023-10-06 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 05, 2023

10/06/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-68 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S. Whitney

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Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Other Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00017543-CU-PO-CTL FORSTER VS UNIVERSITY CITY VILLAGE LP [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Defendant University City Village, L.P. ('Defendant') seeks to strike certain allegations, including the prayer for punitive damages, asserted by Plaintiff SUSAN FORSTER ('Plaintiff'). Pursuant to CCP section 436, the Court has discretion at any time to strike portions of pleadings, including irrelevant, immaterial, and improper allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) A claim for punitive damages must be specifically pled and show facts that, if proved, demonstrates the requisite degree of culpability necessary for imposing exemplary damages under Civil Code Section 3294. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166-167.) A plaintiff's allegations are sufficient if the complaint alleges despicable conduct carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 713.) Jury Instructions for punitive damages define 'Despicable conduct' as 'conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people.' (CACI 3940.) Despicable conduct 'has been described as '[having] the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.'' (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287 [citation omitted].) 'With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.' (Civ. Code, § 3294(b).) Part of Plaintiff's complaint is clearly grounded in breach of contract, but Plaintiff also alleges Defendant took Plaintiff's rent knowing that it was not providing what the contract required. Defendant does not challenge that the allegations are sufficient to state a claim for Financial Elder Abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act ('EADACPA'). The EADACPA provides a plaintiff may recover damages and punitive damages '[w]here it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is liable for physical abuse as defined in Section 15610.63, neglect as defined in Section 15610.57, or abandonment as defined in Section 15610.05, and that the defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse....' (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.) This case does not involve allegations of physical abuse, neglect, nor abandonment. Therefore, California Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657 subsection (c), which pertains to remedies for physical abuse, neglect, and abandonment, is inapplicable. However, the EADACPA also provides in the applicable section as to financial abuse that such section does not affect 'the award of punitive damages under Section 3294 of the Civil Code.' (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5(d).) Plaintiff does not address the fact that the lease agreement attached to the complaint does not state that Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2996713  62 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  FORSTER VS UNIVERSITY CITY VILLAGE LP [IMAGED]  37-2023-00017543-CU-PO-CTL Plaintiff was promised a dishwasher installation nor a guaranteed temperature of the pool or cleaning of the pool. In fact, the lease provides '[t]he pool will be heated at management's discretion' and '[t]he Landlord reserves the right to exclude any person from the use of the pool or spa at any time.' (Complaint, Exhibit A.) Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation ratified and/or participated in the conduct forming the basis of Plaintiff's claims. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges 'Plaintiff was told by Defendant's agent, the property manager, that it would simply 'shut the pool down' instead of dealing with complaints about maintenance, and that Plaintiff's option was to 'go somewhere else.'' (Complaint, ¶ 31.) There are no allegations that the property manager was an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant. The Court finds Plaintiff's allegations are not sufficient to support punitive damages.

The motion is granted. Plaintiff has the burden of proving a reasonable possibility of amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) However, '[u]nless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not.' (McDonald v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 297, 303–304.) The face of the complaint does not indicate amendment is impossible. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff ten (10) days leave to amend.

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