Judge: Richard S. Whitney, Case: 37-2023-00037808-CU-WT-CTL, Date: 2024-03-01 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPT.:

EVENT DATE:

EVENT TIME:

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - February 07, 2024

02/09/2024  10:30:00 AM  C-68 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S. Whitney

CASE NO.:

CASE CATEGORY:

EVENT TYPE:

CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:

Civil - Unlimited  Wrongful Termination Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00037808-CU-WT-CTL LEE VS BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

TENTATIVE RULING: DEFENDANTS BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY, CAREFUSION RESOURCES, LLC, RICHARD WEBER, AND BIBI KNOETZE'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ('FAC') is SUSTAINED, in part, and OVERRULED, in part.

Defendants BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY, CAREFUSION RESOURCES, LLC, RICHARD WEBER, and BIBI KNOETZE ('Defendants') demur to Plaintiff WILLIAM LEE's ('Plaintiff' or 'MR. LEE') FAC. When considering a demurrer, '[t]he pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary.' (Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 39, 47.) '[W]e give the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context.' (Mead v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 564.) 'A complaint must contain '[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.' (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) This fact-pleading requirement obligates the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that 'as a whole apprise[ ] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]' (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 886 [Citation omitted].) Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted.

Plaintiff agrees to dismiss his intentional infliction of emotional distress without prejudice. The demurrer is sustained as to the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants first assert the first cause of action for discrimination under the FEHA fails because Plaintiff's allegations as to being in a protected class are insufficient. Plaintiff alleges he 'was subjected to harassing conduct due to, without limitation, his age and/or his use of medical leave.' (FAC, ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that after 'two (2) new managers came aboard in August 2021, Richard Weber ('WEBER') and Bibi Knoetze ('KNOETZE'),' his stress increased. (FAC, ¶¶ 17, 33.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 'the attitude and verbal outburst of WEBER were so severe and/or pervasive that MR. LEE felt he needed to go out on stress leave twice in 2022 to attempt to emotionally cope.' (FAC, ¶ 33.) While Plaintiff does not specifically allege he suffered from anxiety or some other specific disability, Plaintiff alleges he suffered 'anxiety, stress, worry, and sadness.' (FAC, ¶ 33.) Further, Plaintiff alleges, in October 2022, he 'communicated to DEFENDANTS the details of this medical leave, including the anticipated duration as per his doctor.' (FAC, ¶ 22.) Further, contrary to Defendants' assertions that Plaintiff alleges the conduct was not directed at older employees, Plaintiff alleges 'MR. LEE's age was another reason WEBER and KNOETZE picked on him.

In fact, it was not at all uncommon that other older employees were targeted by WEBER and KNOETZE by being given extra work, stricter expectations, and treated as if they did not matter as much as the Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3060909 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LEE VS BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY [IMAGED]  37-2023-00037808-CU-WT-CTL younger employees.' (FAC, ¶ 27.) The allegations are sufficient to put Defendants on notice. The demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action.

Next, Defendants allege Plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing that he was subjected to any alleged unlawful harassment because of his inclusion in any of the FEHA's protected classifications. As to claims relating to discrimination, 'plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.' (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) The Court agrees that much of Plaintiff's description of purported harassment largely falls into the category of personnel management decisions that were inherently necessary to performance of a supervisor's job. (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 63.) However, some of the purportedly discriminatory conduct does not fit in this category. For example, Plaintiff alleges 'WEBER in particular ... would never take accountability for his mistakes – instead, WEBER would blame mistakes on subordinates,' and 'WEBER would verbally mistreat employees in a belligerent and bullying manner.' (FAC, ¶ 18.) While these allegations are not specific to Plaintiff, the allegations indicate that Plaintiff was part of the group who was being bullied. (See FAC, ¶¶ 18-19, 27.) Plaintiff alleges 'WEBER and KNOETZE continued to mismanage and bully employees, largely in an effort to get the older ones who complained to resign it seemed.' (FAC, ¶ 20.) Again, these allegations, when read in context of the whole complaint, indicate Plaintiff was part of the group being bullied. Further, Plaintiff alleges 'MR. LEE's age was another reason WEBER and KNOETZE picked on him. In fact, it was not at all uncommon that other older employees were targeted by WEBER and KNOETZE by being given extra work, stricter expectations, and treated as if they did not matter as much as the younger employees.' (FAC, ¶ 27.) While Plaintiff is vague as to the bullying to determine if it was 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment,' the Court believes the allegations as a whole are enough to put Defendants on notice to allow the allegations to pass the demurrer stage. (Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397, 409 [Citations and quotes omitted].) '[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a 'protected activity,' (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action.' (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1042.) The discrimination must be 'a substantial factor motivating' in the particular employment decision.' (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232.) 'The causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer's knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.' (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615 [Citation and quotes omitted].) Defendants assert Plaintiff does not allege facts to support they retaliated against him because of a protected activity. In response, Plaintiff fails to point to any allegations that support Plaintiff complained to any of the Defendants about discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff alleges he 'and three (3) other employees drafted an extensive letter to DEFENDANTS' human resources department ('HR') on or about October 18, 2021.' (FAC, ¶ 17.) While Plaintiff does not state what exactly was included in the letter, the complaint read as a whole indicates it included some of the conduct above that did not qualify as supervisory duties, such as not taking responsibility, blaming others, and targeting older employees with extra work and stricter expectations to get rid of them. Plaintiff alleges retaliatory conduct after the letter, including 'a negative performance review and corresponding bonus that contained several false statements and inaccurate metrics,' and a lack of response from HR. (FAC, ¶ 19.) The demurrer is overruled as to the third cause of action.

Defendants assert that because the other causes of action above fail so too does the fourth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation under the FEHA. As Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3060909 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LEE VS BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY [IMAGED]  37-2023-00037808-CU-WT-CTL Defendants' argument as to the other causes of action fail, this argument fails. The demurrer is overruled as to the fourth cause of action.

'The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.' (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154.) Defendants rely upon the same arguments above as to the other causes of action to assert this claim fails. As Defendants' arguments as to the other causes of action fail, this argument fails. The demurrer is overruled as to the fifth cause of action.

In sum, the demurrer is sustained as to the sixth cause of action but overruled as to the first through fifth causes of action.

Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3060909