Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: 2020-01140172, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling
Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
The motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is DENIED as to Issue Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, and GRANTED as to Issue Numbers 5 and 9, 10, 11, and 12 as to Defendant Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc.
The motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is GRANTED as on All Issues as to Defendant Nancy Schaefer-Jones.
Defendants Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. (“WDPR”) and Nancy Schaefer-Jones move for summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Maria Gillies. In the alternative, Defendants move for summary adjudication.
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show the plaintiff’s action has no merit. The defendant may do this by demonstrating the action has no merit, that plaintiff cannot prove an element of their claim, or that the defendant has a complete defense entitling the defendant to judgment as a matter of law. (Civil Proc. Code, § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851.) If a plaintiff has pleaded several theories, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 889.)
If a defendant fails to meet this initial burden, the plaintiff need not oppose the motion and the motion must be denied. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) If the defendant meets this initial burden, however, the burden shifts the plaintiff establish, by means of competent and admissible evidence that a triable issue of material fact still remains. (Civil Proc. Code, § 437c (p)(2); Binder, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 850–851.)
The moving party’s papers are to be strictly construed, while the opposing party’s papers are to be liberally construed. (Committee to Save Beverly Highland Homes Ass’n v. Beverly Highland (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1260.)
A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, and all evidentiary conflicts are to be resolved against the moving party. (McCabe v. American Honda Motor Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1119.)
First Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination
The first cause of action for disability discrimination alleges that on or about July 25, 2017, Plaintiff sustained an injury at work and developed a disability. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff pleads that she was put off work by her doctors, which forced her to continue extending her medical leave of absence. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff alleges that she requested accommodations, such as two-minute stretch or rest breaks every thirty minutes of prolonged sitting or standing, and permission to wear a lumbar corset at work. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff pleads that WDPR terminated Plaintiff after it was apparent she would need accommodation for her disability. (Compl. ¶ 42.)
To evaluate discrimination and retaliation claims, California uses the three-part burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792. (See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354; Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 708.) “Under that approach, the employee must establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 802.) Next, the employer bears the burden of articulating a legitimate reason for taking the challenged adverse employment action. (Id.) Finally, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered legitimate reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.” (Id. at 804; Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
“A defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment slightly modifies the order of these showings. If, as here, the motion for summary judgment relies in whole or in part on a showing of nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, the employer satisfies its burden as moving party if it presents evidence of such nondiscriminatory reasons that would permit a trier of fact to find, more likely than not, that they were the basis for the termination.” (Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097.)
Emile P. Wakim, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, conducted a Panel Qualified Medical Examiner Orthopedic Evaluation and Report in connection with Plaintiff’s injuries. (Freeze Decl., Exh. X. [MG000137-MG000153].) Dr. Wakim submitted a report to Jeffrey Lanier on June 19, 2018. (Id.) Dr. Wakim determined that Plaintiff “must be provided a 2 minutes [sic] stretch or rest break every 30 minutes of prolonged sitting or standing” and “must be allowed to wear a lumbar corset support at work.” (Id. at MG000150.)
WDPR engaged a consultant, Barbara Katzman, to review Plaintiff’s case in August 2018. (Katzman Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.) On September 5, 2018, Katzman provided an Accommodation Evaluation that listed as Permanent Restrictions: “Must stop and stretch for 2 minutes every 30 minutes of standing/sitting. Allow to wear back support.” (Id. at ¶ 3, Exh. 19.)
Nancy Schaefer-Jones, a former Case Advocate-Restrictions & Accommodation for WDPR, called Plaintiff on September 6, 2018. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 8.) Schaefer-Jones advised Plaintiff that Plaintiff was eligible to be scheduled for shifts as of September 6, 2018 and informed Plaintiff that it might take a week or two for Plaintiff to be scheduled for a shift. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 9.) Schaefer-Jones advised Plaintiff to call the Scheduling Department or Plaintiff’s supervisor to let them know Plaintiff was ready to be placed on the schedule if Plaintiff was not scheduled already in that time. (Id.)
Plaintiff then informed Schaefer-Jones that she did not intend to return to work unless she received a back brace through the Workers Compensation Department. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 10.) Schaefer-Jones advised Plaintiff that permanent restrictions are written by a registered nurse at WDPR per Plaintiff’s doctor’s note and that a back brace was not listed as a restriction. (Id.) Schaefer-Jones informed Plaintiff that based on her restrictions, she was eligible to return to work immediately. (Id.)
In early November 2018, Schaefer-Jones went on a three-week leave of absence. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 13.) When Schaefer-Jones returned, she called Plaintiff and reminded Plaintiff that according to company records, Plaintiff was eligible to return to work immediately and was considered to be on an unauthorized leave. (Id.) In her declaration, Schaefer-Jones states that employees who remain on unauthorized leave, particularly for a long period of time, are subject to termination for job abandonment. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 18.) Indefinite leave is not permitted. (Lindquist Decl. ¶ 4.) WDPR typically sends at least one, if not multiple, warning letters to the employee. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 18.) But if an employee does not return to work and does not provide a new doctor’s note supporting additional leave within a reasonable amount of time, the employee’s supervisor will usually terminate employment. (Id.; Hada Decl. ¶ 3.)
On November 5, 2018, WDPR’s Global HR Operations Leave Administration sent Plaintiff a letter informing Plaintiff that she had exceeded the 12 months of consecutive leave or 15 months of intermittent leave provided by WDPR’s company policy. (Lindquist Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. 9.) The letter requested that Plaintiff contact the Global HR Operations Leave Administration Team to discuss her ability to return to work and the timeframe for returning. (Id.) WDPR provided evidence that Plaintiff did not call her manager to ask to return to work. (Heffner Decl. ¶ 4; Hada Decl. ¶ 2.)
In February 2019, the Senior Production Manager – Food & Beverage for Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., Stephanie Hada, was advised by the Company’s Employee Relations team that Plaintiff had been on unauthorized leave for approximately five months. (Hada Decl. ¶ 3.) Hada instructed the Blue Bayou manager to process Plaintiff’s termination because Plaintiff failed to return to work and remained on unauthorized leave for an extended period of time. (Id.)
Based on the above, WDPR has met its burden to present evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s discharge.
The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to adduce or point to evidence raising a triable issue, that would permit a trier of fact to find by a preponderance that intentional discrimination occurred.” (Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1097-1098; accord, Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 806, 821-822.) The employee must “produce ‘substantial evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.’ ” (Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.) “The plaintiff must do more than raise the inference that the employer’s asserted reason is false. ‘[A] reason cannot be proved to be “a pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’ [Citation.] If plaintiff produces no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that the employer’s true reason was discriminatory, the employer is entitled to summary judgment.” (Id.)
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff (see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843), Dr. Wakim’s Functional Capacity Assessment indicates that Plaintiff must be allowed to wear a lumbar corset support at work. (Freeze Decl., Exh. X [MG000150].) Senior Claims Examiner J.D. Lanier appears to agree with this interpretation, writing “Payments are ending because you have been declared MMI by Dr. Paul Wakim on 06/19/2018 with the restrictions 2 minutes of stretch or rest break every 30 minutes of prolonged sitting or standing and must wear lumbar corset support to work.” (Freeze Decl., Exh. Z [MG000166].)
Plaintiff has provided evidence that Schaefer-Jones understood, as of September 10, 2019, that Plaintiff would not be returning to work until she had a back brace. (Freeze Decl. Exh. B [Schaefer-Jones Depo. Tr. at 109:8-13].) Schaefer-Jones did not know whether an understanding that WDPR must allow Plaintiff to wear back support meant that WDPR was willing to wait until Plaintiff obtained her back support and came back to work with that accommodation. (Freeze Decl. Exh. B [Schaefer-Jones Depo. Tr. at 109:8-20-24].)
Plaintiff also provided evidence that she told Katzman, Heffner, and Schaefer-Jones that she wanted to return to work. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 104:20-24].) Plaintiff spoke with Katzman and Heffner on a conference call in September 2018. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 106:1-8].) It was resolved for Plaintiff to go back to work. Katzman told Plaintiff that Plaintiff would be hearing from “Nancy Jones,” who would set up Plaintiff and get her back. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 105:15-19].)
Plaintiff testified in deposition that Schaefer-Jones called Plaintiff later that same day. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 106:20-23].) Schaefer-Jones asked if Plaintiff was ready to come back. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 106:20-23].) Plaintiff responded that she was ready, but was going to “be fitted for a lumbar.” (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 107:1-5, 111:15-20].) Schaefer-Jones told Plaintiff that WDPR could get her back, but it would take scheduling a couple weeks to get Plaintiff back, that Schaefer-Jones would be calling her, and that Plaintiff would have her brace by then. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 107:6-14, 111:21-112:2].)
Plaintiff testified that she followed up with scheduling and called Schaefer-Jones when scheduling told Plaintiff that they hadn’t heard from Schaefer-Jones. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 107:24-108:16, 112:3-5].) Plaintiff left also multiple phone messages for Schaefer-Jones that were not returned. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 112:8-9, 112:18-21].) There is evidence that Plaintiff called WDPR in November and left a voicemail. (Freeze Decl., Exh. C [Lanier Depo. Tr. at 71:9-23].) Although WDPR’s Workers’ Compensation Department received updates regarding the status of Plaintiff’s back brace and doctor’s appointments, there were no communications between the Workers’ Compensation Department and the Leave Administration or Accommodation or Restriction Department regarding Plaintiff. (Freeze Decl., Exh. C [Lanier Depo. Tr. at 72:9-22, 73:22-74:11, 78:17-79:23, 106:23-107:23].)
Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff followed up with WDPR to inform the company that she was ready to return and whether WDPR failed to return Plaintiff’s calls. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that WDPR’s stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff were factually baseless. (Reeves v. MV Transportation, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 666, 677 [“A triable issue as to an employer’s veracity ‘may arise where the employer has given shifting, contradictory, implausible, uniformed, or factually baseless justifications for its actions.’”].) A reasonable inference could arise that WDPR acted with discriminatory animus in terminating Plaintiff when she remained out on leave after “exceeded[ing] the 12 months of consecutive leave or 15 months of intermittent leave.” (Lindquist Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. 9.)
Second Cause of Action for Failure to Accommodate
The second cause of action for failure to reasonably accommodate disability in violation of FEHA alleges WDPR knew that Plaintiff had a medical disability and that Plaintiff needed and requested accommodations for said medical condition and/or disability. (Compl. ¶ 58.) The Complaint further alleges Plaintiff’s disability required accommodations for Plaintiff to take leaves of absence. (Compl. ¶ 59.) Plaintiff plead that once she was released to return to work, Plaintiff required the accommodations of two-minute stretch or rest breaks every thirty minutes of prolonged sitting or standing and being allowed to wear a lumbar corset. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that WDPR failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s disability. (Compl. ¶ 60.)
The elements of a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability under the FEHA are (1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA or was regarded as having a disability, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1009–1010.)
“‘Two principles underlie a cause of action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. First, the employee must request an accommodation. [Citation.] Second, the parties must engage in an interactive process regarding the requested accommodation and, if the process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party who failed to participate in good faith.” (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1252.) “Generally, ‘[t]he employee bears the burden of giving the employer notice of the disability. This notice then triggers the employer’s burden to take ‘positive steps’ to accommodate the employee’s limitations. . . . The employee, of course, retains a duty to cooperate with the employer’s efforts by explaining [his or] her disability and qualifications. Reasonable accommodation thus envisions an exchange between employer and employee where each seeks and shares information to achieve the best match between the [employee’s] capabilities and available positions.’” (Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1222, citations omitted.)
Plaintiff has submitted evidence demonstrating that she requested a back brace. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends WDPR failed to accommodate Plaintiff by failing to make an exception to its medical leave policy or to allow Plaintiff to return to work after her request for finite time off to receive her back brace. Plaintiff has demonstrated a triable issue of fact.
Although WDPR argues that it made an exception to its neutral 12-month medical leave policy to appropriately accommodate Plaintiff, there is evidence that belies this claim. WDPR sent Plaintiff a letter, dated November 5, 2018, warning Plaintiff that she was on unauthorized leave. (Lindquist Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. 9.)
Third Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process
The third cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA alleges that Plaintiff was willing to participate in an interactive process to determine whether reasonable accommodation could be made so that she would be able to perform the essential job requirements. (Compl. ¶ 72.) The Complaint further alleges WDPR failed to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with Plaintiff to determine effective reasonable accommodations. (Compl. ¶ 73.)
“While a claim of failure to accommodate [under section 12940, subdivision (m)] is independent of a cause of action for failure to engage in an interactive dialogue [under section 12940, subdivision (n)], each necessarily implicates the other.” (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54.) “Although it is the employee’s burden to initiate the process, no magic words are necessary, and the obligation arises once the employer becomes aware of the need to consider an accommodation. Each party must participate in good faith, undertake reasonable efforts to communicate its concerns, and make available to the other information which is available, or more accessible, to one party. Liability hinges on the objective circumstances surrounding the parties’ breakdown in communication, and responsibility for the breakdown lies with the party who fails to participate in good faith.” (Id. at p. 62, fn. 22.)
As discussed above, Plaintiff provided evidence that her phone messages to Schaefer-Jones were not returned. (Freeze Decl., Exh. A [Gillies Depo. Tr. at 112:8-9, 112:18-21].) Plaintiff has shown a triable issue of fact regarding whether the responsibility for the breakdown in communications and failure to engage in the interactive process lies with WDPR.
Fourth Cause of Action for Retaliation
The fourth cause of action for retaliation alleges Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodation was a substantial motivating reason for WDPR’s decision to terminate Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 86.)
A prima face case of retaliation under FEHA requires the plaintiff-employee to produce evidence showing that “(1) he ... engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1123, 1042.)
WDPR bore the initial burden of proving a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for recommending Plaintiff’s termination. As discussed above, WDRP carried this initial burden.
The burden then shifted to Plaintiff to produce evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for her requests for accommodations or for taking leave. As explained above, Plaintiff has produced evidence to meet that burden.
Fifth Cause of Action for Age Discrimination, Ninth Cause of Action for Slander, and Tenth Cause of Action for Libel
Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of action for age discrimination, the ninth cause of action for slander, and the tenth cause of action for libel. The motion shall be granted as to those causes of action.
Sixth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation, Seventh Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination, and Eighth Cause of Action for Unfair Competition
It is undisputed that the sixth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, seventh cause of action for wrongful termination, and eighth cause of action for unfair competition are derivative claims that are dependent on the underlying causes of action for discrimination or retaliation. Because the motion is denied as to the first cause of action for disability discrimination and the fourth cause of action for retaliation, the motion must also be denied as to the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action.
Defendant Nancy Schaeffer-Jones
Defendants also argue that, even if the Court finds that there are triable issues of fact regarding Plaintiff’s claims against WDPR, summary judgment or summary adjudication should be granted as to Defendant Nancy Schaeffer-Jones on all causes of action.
Defendants assert that FEHA applies to employers and not employees. (See Gov’t Code, § 12940, subd. (a); Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 643-645 [nonemployer individuals may not be sued for discrimination under FEHA]; Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1173-1174 [nonemployer individuals not personally liable for retaliation under FEHA].) Because the first through sixth causes of action rely upon FEHA, they cannot be maintained against Defendant Schaeffer-Smith, who is not an employer under FEHA.
Plaintiff does not appear to have addressed this argument and the evidence presented reveals that there is no triable issue of fact that Defendant Schaeffer-Jones was Plaintiff’s co-worker and not employer. In fact, even if Defendant Schaeffer-Jones was Plaintiff’s supervisor, that would not have been sufficient to create FEHA liability as the Jones Court held that an individual supervisor, who was not an employer, could not be held liable under FEHA. (See Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1160.)
Further, because the seventh and eight causes of action are derivative of the discrimination and retaliation claims, if the discrimination and retaliation claims cannot be maintained against Defendant Schaeffer-Jones, then neither can the seventh and eight causes of action.
Plaintiff did not oppose granting summary judgment or summary adjudication as to either Defendant with respect to the ninth and tenth causes of action. Therefore, the court will grant the motion as to Defendant Schaeffer-Jones on all causes of action.
Punitive Damages
A plaintiff may not recover punitive damages unless “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civil Code, § 3294(a) [addressing punitive damages “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract”].) In addition, a corporation will only be liable for punitive damages based on acts ratified, authorized, or committed by a corporate officer, director, or managing agent. (Civil Code, § 3294(b); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1151.) Thus, to prevail on this motion on the issue of punitive damages, WDPR must establish that, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the undisputed facts prevent Plaintiff from establishing at least one of these two elements. (See Civil Proc. Code, § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)
To prove an employee is a managing agent, “a plaintiff seeking punitive damages . . . [must] show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation’s business.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.) Managing agents are “only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decision[-]making so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” (Id. at 566–567.)
The evidence on record demonstrates that J.D. Lanier’s duties included “communicat[ing] openly with team manager,” and “advocate[ing] on behalf of injured cast member.” (Freeze Decl., Exh. C [Lanier Depo. Tr. at 28:3-13].) Lanier makes sure that injured cast members understand workers’ compensation and taking the time to help them. (Freeze Decl., Exh. C [Lanier Depo. Tr. at 29:3-4].)
Stephanie Hada declares that as a Senior Production Manager – Food & Beverage for WDPR, she supervises employees at the Blue Bayou Restaurant in Disneyland Park. (Hada Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Hada further declares that it is WDPR’s policy that employees who remain on unauthorized leave can be terminated for job abandonment. (Id., ¶ 3.) Thus, when Hada is advised by Employee Relations that an employee has been on unauthorized leave for an extended period of time and has no information indicating that their continued absence may be excused, it is Hada’s usual practice to terminate employment for job abandonment. (Ibid.)
Nancy Schaefer-Jones declares that she is a former Case Advocate-Restrictions & Accommodations for WDPR. (Schaefer-Jones Decl. ¶ 1.) Schaefer-Jones declares that she was not a manager or supervisor of employees and had no authority to set corporate policy for the Company. (Id., ¶ 3.) Her role was to coordinate the accommodations process for Disneyland Resort employees who had medical restrictions and were returning to regular work after medical leave. (Ibid.)
Based on the evidence, a trier of fact could not reasonably conclude that Lanier, Hada, or Schaefer-Jones meets the definition “managing agent” set forth in the case law. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th at 563, 566.) None of the job duties reflected in the evidence suggests that Lanier, Hada, or Schaefer-Jones made decisions that shaped corporate policies—that is, “formal policies that affect a substantial portion of the company and that are [of] the type likely to come to the attention of corporate leadership.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 715.)
The fact that an employee has a supervisory position with the power to terminate employees under his or her control—even one in which she supervises a large number of employees—does not, by itself, support such a conclusion. (See White v. Ultramar, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 566 & 576–577.) Neither Lanier, Hada, nor Schaefer-Jones had “ultimate supervisory and decisional authority” to the extent necessary to establish managing agent status. (See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 823.) Thus, the court must grant summary adjudication as to the issue of punitive damages.
Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of Stephanie Hada, the Declaration of Glenn A. Williamson, Nancy Schaefer-Jones, Lynn Lindquist, and Barbara Katzman are overruled. The court declines to rule on the remaining objections as they are not material to the disposition of this motion. (Civil Proc. Code, § 437c (q).) Defendants’ objections are overruled.
Defendants shall give notice of this ruling.