Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: 30-2019-01083346, Date: 2022-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Cross-Defendant KAYTE STERLING LONG will move the Court for an order determining that the settlement entered into between LONG and Plaintiff STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY was made in good faith.

History of this Motion

On 2/14/2022 Cross-Defendant Long filed the original Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, seeking an order determining that the settlement entered into between Long and Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was in good faith. The motion was set for hearing on 4/28/2022. On that date, the Court continued the motion to 7/21/2022 in order for the Motion and Notice of Continuance of the Motion to be served via email and mail upon all appearing parties. [ROAS 84, 100.] On 7/8/2022 Defendant Harkness filed an Opposition. On 7/21/2022, the Court denied the motion without prejudice.

The Court explained:

“Cross-Defendant Kayte Sterling Long is paying Plaintiff a total of $500 in exchange for a release of all claims. As stated in the motion, Plaintiff seeks subrogation damages of $31,227.91 consisting of $29,224.41 in property damage, $1,553.50 for towing and storage, and the $500.00 deductible, plus pre-judgment interest and costs. [Decl. of Evans¶2.] This subrogation case is based on a motor vehicle collision involving Plaintiff’s insured driver Krueger, Harkness, and Long. Long contends that Harkness made an unsafe lane change in front of her, causing her swerve to the right to avoid a collision, making her lose control of her vehicle and veer in front of Krueger, who rear ended her. Long denies liability and contends that Harkness caused the collision and resulting property damage to Krueger’s vehicle by making an unsafe lane change. Krueger’s vehicle was damaged, so she made a claim for the cost of repairs, which Plaintiff paid. [Id. ¶3.] As such, Long argues that Long and Plaintiff did nothing wrong in the incident and have 0% liability.

“Notably, Long fails to submit any evidence in support of the motion other than Attorney Matthew Evans’ declaration.

“Defendant Harkness objects to the settlement arguing that the dispute as to liability renders the $500 settlement severely disproportionate to Long’s liability. Harkness’ position is that although he attempted to make a lane change, he moved back into his lane after he heard a honk. He suggests that if Long’s reaction to Harkness’ potential lane change was found to be unreasonable, Long would be found to be 100% liable, or possibly 50% liable, for the collision between her vehicle and Krueger.

“Similarly to Moving Party, Harkness fails to submit any evidence in support of his position other than Attorney Ibrahim N. Muhtaseb’s declaration.”

Because the Court could not rule in a vacuum, the Court denied the motion without prejudice. [ROA 126.]

Thereafter, on 8/15/2022, Cross-Defendant Long filed the pending Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, which is essentially the same as the initial motion but now includes new evidence for the Court’s consideration. [ROA 134]

Law Generally:

Code Civ. Proc. §877.6 (a)(1) provides, in relevant part, “Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors…shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005.”

A settlement must be within the “reasonable range” (within the “ballpark”) of the settling tortfeasor's share of liability for the plaintiff's injuries—taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. [Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs. (1985) 38 C3d 488, 499]

Any party objecting to a proposed settlement has the burden to prove an absence of good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) The objecting party must prove that the settlement is “so far out of the ballpark” in comparison to the Tech-Bilt factors that it is inconsistent with the equitable objectives and purposes of section 877.6. [Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500.]

New Evidence:

The issue remains, whether a $500 settlement between Cros-Defendant Long and Plaintiff is within the reasonable range of Long’s share of liability for the plaintiff’s $31K+ in damages?

In deposition, Harkness appears to concede that about fifty percent of his vehicle was in Long’s lane before he switched back to his lane. [See Declaration of Castillo¶8, Ex. A, Deposition of Harkness, page 29:3-21.]

Correspondingly, at deposition Long testifies “about half of his truck’s length was in my lane.” [Decl. of Castillo ¶9, Ex. B, Deposition of Long, page 17:1-7.]

They both testify that Long’s vehicle was about a foot of so behind Harkness’ vehicle when Harkness switched back to his lane. [Id.]

As to whether Harkness “looked over his shoulder” prior to attempting his change, he testified, “As I stated prior, I looked in my side mirror, then I looked in my rearview mirror, then I looked in my side mirror again and I glanced to the side to clear my blind spot.” [Declaration of Castillo¶8, Ex. A, Deposition of Harkness, page 22:16-19.]

The main contested fact appears to be whether or not after Long honked, Harkness continued coming into her lane, or whether he moved back into his own lane. Harkness testified, “I took a glance off to the side to clear my blind spot and proceeded to do a slow intentional lane change and then I heard a honk. I looked in my side mirror and I saw a car about a foot off my bumper. I fully went back into the lane I was coming from….” [Id. page 20:11-17.] However, Long testified, “I noticed his truck was next to me slightly in front, so I was in his blind spot. I noticed that his truck started merging into my lane as I was still in his blind spot. I noticed after his truck was in my lane that his blinker was on. At that point, I honked my horn to try to get his attention to let him know I was right next to him and he should not be merging over. He still kept coming into my lane. That is when I took  evasive action, and I swerved my car to the right.” [Decl. of Castillo ¶9, Ex. B, Deposition of Long, page 15:16-25, page 16:1-3.]

Thereafter, Long moved her car onto the right hand shoulder, but lost control of the vehicle, and was impacted by Krueger who was getting onto the freeway. [Declaration of Castillo¶ 10, Ex. C., Deposition of Krueger, page 14:5-15.]

Arguments/Conclusion:

Harkness argues there is a dispute as to whether Harkness ever completed the lane change. However, it is unclear if completing the lane change, as opposed to ½ his vehicle being in the lane (as conceded), makes him more or less at fault for the accident.

Harkness also argues that Long’s reaction (or overreaction) to potential lane change is tantamount to evaluation of liability. If Long’s reaction to Harkness’ potential lane change was found to be unreasonable, Long would be found to be 100% liable, or at worst 50% liable, for the collision between her vehicle and Krueger’s. Markedly, however, there is no evidence before us that would suggest Long’s reaction was unreasonable. Harkness’s attempt to assign any percentages of fault is purely speculative.

Finally, Harkness argues that a critical consideration is that there was no contact between Krueger’s vehicle and Harkness’ vehicle---however, it is unclear how this fact makes Harkness less liable when it was his unsafe lane change that triggered the events.

As such, it does not appear Harkness has sustained his burden to prove an absence of good faith. [Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).]

For the aforementioned reasons, the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED.

Cross-Defendant Long to give notice.