Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: 30-2020-01164482, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling
Plaintiffs Robert Louthan and Tanya Louthan (“Plaintiffs”) move for attorney’s fees and costs as prevailing parties under Civil Code section 1794(d). Plaintiffs request $35,211.93 in attorney’s fees and costs, with the award adjusted by a 1.5 multiplier to reflect the contingent nature of the case, for a total of $52,817.90.
Attorney’s fees are authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(10)(A), (B) & (C).) Civil Code section 1794(d) states: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”
It is Plaintiffs’ burden of proof to show the fees they incurred and that those fees are reasonable. (Christian Research Institute v. Alno (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320; Maughan v. Google Tech., Inc. (2007) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1254.)
In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal.Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id.)
In determining the amount of fees to award, the Court has broad authority to determine what is reasonable. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) It is within the Court’s discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation. (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 449; see also Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34.)
To determine the appropriate fee award under Civil Code section 1794, the Court applies the loadstar method. Under the lodestar method, the base amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) When considering a request for a multiplier, trial courts may consider “the contingent nature of the fee award, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) The “trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.)
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for purposes of this Motion. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in this matter wherein Defendant FCA US LCC (“Defendant”) and Plaintiffs agree that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties for purposes of a fee motion under Civil Code section 1794(d). (Declaration of Thomas K. Ledbetter (“Ledbetter Decl.”), Ex. 1.)
Plaintiffs present evidence that two attorneys billed time on this matter: Thomas K. Ledbetter at a rate of $350 an hour and Amie Jacoby at a rate of $250 an hour. (Ledbetter Decl., ¶ 12.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that the hourly rates charged by these attorneys is reasonable based upon their level of experience. (See id., ¶¶ 8-9.)
Plaintiffs also submit evidence that they incurred a total of $35,211.93 in attorney’s fees and costs in this matter. (Ledbetter Decl., Ex. 3.) The last three entries under the Fee Detail are for future expenses relating to this instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees, which total to $2,252.50. (Id., at pp. 16-17.) The Fee Detail shows a total of 92.70 hours of attorney time billed to this matter, for a fee total of $34,105.00, and $1,106.93 in costs. (Id. at pp. 17-18.) Defendant disputes the specific items discussed below.
6.8 Hours for Motion to Compel Deposition
Defendant contends 6.8 hours billed for a straightforward motion to compel deposition is excessive and the hours should be reduced by half. Defendant points out that the filed motion was eight pages long. However, Defendant ignores the fact that the motion required a separate statement, declaration, and supporting exhibits. The Court finds 6.8 hours billed for preparation of the motion to compel to be reasonable.
1.9 Hours for Drafting Discovery
Defendant contends the February 8, 2021 time entry for 1.9 hours for preparing special interrogatories, form interrogatories, and requests for production is excessive because this is simple discovery that has been recycled in numerous lemon law cases. The time entry shows that 0.3 hours were spent on the form interrogatories and 0.8 hours were spent drafting each of the special interrogatories and requests for production. Though Plaintiffs’ counsel perhaps had the benefit of using templates from prior discovery requests, counsel would still have had to spend time updating the requests to conform to the facts of this case. The Court finds the time billed to be reasonable.
4.6 Hours Reviewing Discovery Responses and 1.1 Hours Reviewing Protective Order
Defendant also argues that the billing entries of 6.5 hours to review Defendant’s straightforward discovery responses and 1.1 hours to review a form LASC protective order are excessive. However, the invoice shows that counsel billed 4.6 hours, not 6.5 hours, to review Defendant’s discovery responses. Given that most of this time was spent reviewing Defendant’s document production and responses to special interrogatories, the Court finds the time to be reasonable.
The Court agrees that 1.1 hours spent reviewing a form protective order is excessive and finds that this time should be reduced to 0.5 hours, for a reduction of $210.00.
1.2 Hours to Analyze Discovery and Protective Order
Defendant argues that the 1.2 hours billed for reviewing Defendant’s verifications, discovery responses, and protective order is excessive, given that counsel had already billed 4.6 hours to review the discovery responses and 1.1 hours to review the form protective order. The Court agrees that 1.2 hours to re-review the listed documents is excessive and finds that this time should be reduced to 0.6 hours, for a reduction of $210.00.
2.6 Hours for Reviewing the Bill and 5.3 Hours for Future Fees
Defendant contends the 2.6 hours billed for auditing Plaintiffs’ pre-bill to make a fee demand is excessive. Defendant further contends Plaintiffs should not be awarded 5.3 hours for reviewing the opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing, because these hours are entirely speculative and yet to be earned. These tasks should be reduced entirely for a reduction of $1,105.00 and $2,252.50, respectively.
The April 26, 2022 entry for 2.6 hours states “Audit pre-bill for purposes of meet and confer of plaintiffs’ fee demand.” The entire bill consists of 18 pages. The Court finds 2.6 hours to review 18 pages to be excessive and this time should be reduced to 1.3 hours, for a reduction of $552.50.
As to the 5.3 hours Plaintiffs guess their counsel will expend in reviewing Defendant’s opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing, the Court finds a claim for fees over this time to be inappropriate. Fees awarded under Civil Code section 1794(d) must be based on actual time expended. Because that time had not yet been expended, the Court finds this time, and the related $2,252.50 claimed fee, to be improper and thus excluded from the award.
Multiplier
Plaintiffs argue a multiplier of 1.5 should be applied in light of the contingent nature of this case.
Here, the Court finds there is no basis to justify any multiplier. This action is a straightforward lemon law case, with no unusual facts and no novel legal issues. This action is not complex and did not require exceptional skill. The attorney’s fees being awarded appropriately compensates Plaintiffs’ attorneys at a reasonable hourly rate for the number of hours reasonably spent on this case. Thus, no multiplier will be applied to Plaintiffs’ award of attorney’s fees.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED in the sum of $31,986.93.
Plaintiffs to give notice.