Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: 30-2021-01233806, Date: 2022-10-27 Tentative Ruling
Plaintiff, Kowen Lai, (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $220,937.50 to be payable by Defendants, Wayne Iwamoto, Susan Iwamoto, aka Susan-James Iwamoto (collectively “Defendants”) to “Law Offices of Roger E. Naghash – Client Trust,” pursuant to the parties’ lease agreement for real property located at 27851 Williams Canyon Road, Silverado, California, 92676 (the “Subject Property”), and as Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the action. Plaintiff also moves for an order for an award of costs in the amount of $8,509.45 as set forth in the memorandum of costs.
Supplemental Briefing
In light of new evidence submitted with the reply papers and the lack of clarity as to Plaintiff’s counsel’s calculation of hours, on July 28, 2022, the Court continued the hearing on the instant motion for attorney’s fees to October 27, 2022 and permitted supplemental briefs
The parties timely filed and served supplemental briefs in accordance with the Court’s Order.
Timeliness of Motion
Here, the Notice of Entry of Judgment was served by Plaintiff on 4/19/22. (Ex. B to Declaration of Roger E. Naghash.) (See ROA 303.) The instant motion was initially filed on 4/29/22. Thus, the motion is timely, i.e., it was filed 10 days after the service of notice of entry of judgment.
Merits
The Court first notes that that Plaintiff initially filed the moving papers for the instant motion on 4/29/22 seeking an order for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $161,990.25, and costs in the amount of $8,509.45. (ROA 250, 254, 256, 258.) Subsequently, on 5/3/22, Plaintiff filed an “Amended Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order for Award of Attorney’s Fee” only, requesting the same amounts in attorney’s fees and costs. (ROA 270.) Thereafter, on 6/27/22, Plaintiff filed a “Second Amended Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order for Award of Attorney’s Fee” as well as amended moving papers, requesting the same amount of costs, but requesting an increased amount of attorney’s fees in the amount of $220,937.50. (ROA 394, 396, 398, 340.) Based on the Plaintiff’s supplemental brief, Plaintiff now seeks an additional $8,113, for attorney’s fees in the amount of $229,050.50.
For the purposes of determining the motion, the Court will consider those papers filed on 6/27/22, opposing papers, reply papers, and the supplemental papers.
Plaintiff argues that they are entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to paragraph 39 parties’ lease agreement, as the prevailing party since the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on 4/1/22; and judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff by the court on 4/18/22 such that Plaintiff was the party with a net monetary recovery under CCP § 1032(a)(4). Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff has incurred the total sum of $220,937.50, including future time for appearance at the hearing, opposition and reply papers, and consisting of $195,225 for Roger E. Naghash, and $25,712.50 for Nicole B. Naghash; that fees should be based on the lodestar method; and that the fees requested are reasonable and necessary.
Defendants contend that the motion should be denied as Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to present evidence establishing entitlement to the fees requested and the reasonableness of the fees claimed. Defendants assert that the request is exorbitant and unreasonable on its face for a limited civil unlawful detainer matter that spanned the course of a few months; that Plaintiff fails to show that Plaintiff actually incurred or is legally liable for the fees requested; that the moving papers do not explain how or why the fees purportedly were incurred; and that Plaintiff’s counsels’ time records submitted in support of the motion are vague, incomplete, inadequate and do not provide sufficient information about the tasks performed or the reasonableness of the activities or hours incurred, depriving Defendants and the Court of the information to objectively assess what fees are reasonable to prove Plaintiff’s basic claim for non-payment of rent and to apply the lodestar method. Defendants additionally contend that Plaintiff’s fails to meet his burden to justify that Mr. Naghash’s hourly rate of $380 per hour is consistent with the legal market of residential unlawful detainers or reasonable for a residential unlawful detainer action like this one. Moreover, Defendants contend that time relating to the instant fee motion amounting to 27 hours is unreasonable, but that even if it took 27 hours, the request for fees relating to the motion is unreasonable given the inflated $220,000 in fees requested for an action of this nature.
Defendants argue that, alternatively, the Court should significantly reduce the fee request to an amount that would be reasonable. Defendants contend that Plaintiff presents no evidence to connect tasks performed prior to filing this action to the litigation such that fees should not be awarded for any of the tasks performed prior to filing the complaint, and that a number of entries for Mr. Naghash and Ms. Naghash are unreasonable. Further, Defendants argue that additional equitable considerations weigh in favor of a much smaller fee award, if any, including that the lease agreement has a pre-lawsuit mediation requirement that is relevant because Plaintiff forced Defendants to raise their option to purchase claim/defense in this limited civil unlawful detain proceeding, notwithstanding that Defendants pleaded and sought to litigate said defense in the earlier-filed unlimited civil action, and Defendants spent in excess of $150,000 on improvements to the property with the understanding that they had exercised their option to purchase.
Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees
“[E]ach party to a lawsuit is responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees in the absence of an agreement between the parties for fees or a statute specifically authorizing fees. [Citations.]” (Pederson v. Kennedy (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 976, 979.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, attorney’s fees are recoverable as costs when authorized by contract. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)
Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) provides, “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civil Code § 1717(a).)
Here, a true and correct copy of the lease agreement for the Subject Property is attached as Exhibit A to the First Amended Declaration of Roger E. Naghash (“R. Naghash Decl.”). (R. Naghash Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. A.) Paragraph 39 states:
“39. ATTORNEY FEES: In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, except as provided in paragraph 38A.”
(Ex. A to R. Naghash Decl., Lease Agreement, ¶ 39.)
Paragraph 38A concerns mediation. (See Ex. A to R. Naghash Decl., Lease Agreement, ¶ 38.)
Defendants do not dispute the contention that Paragraph 39 of the lease agreement provides for the award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party in an action to arising out of the lease agreement, or that this provision applies in this case. Thus, Defendants concede these points. (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566 [“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue”].
There is also no dispute that this unlawful detainer action involved the failure to pay rent, that on 4/1/22, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, and that on 4/18/22, the Court entered judgment accordingly. (R. Naghash Decl., ¶¶ 13, 14; Ex. B.)
Based on the foregoing, as the party in whose favor judgment was entered and who obtained net monetary recovery, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. In turn, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Paragraph 39 of the parties’ lease agreement.
Reasonableness of Fees
A court has wide discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable attorney fees. The Court typically makes this determination based upon declarations without live testimony. The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the Court has its own expertise, and thus may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096; Padilla v. McClellan (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107; Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698 [“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court”].)
The determination ordinarily begins with ascertainment of the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; see Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271-282 [discussing general principles governing attorney fee awards].) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
“[T]he [party] . . . seeking fees and costs ‘ “bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” [Citation.] To that end, the court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide ‘ “a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.” ’ [Citation.] . . . .” [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]” ’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)
Although an attorney’s fee arrangement with his or her client may also have some bearing on the issue as well, it does not compel any particular award. (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1096; see Vella v. Hudgins (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 521.)
Reasonableness of Hourly Rate for Plaintiff’s Counsel
In determining a reasonable rate for the attorney's services, courts usually consider: (1) the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience for comparable legal services in the community; (2) the nature of the work performed; and (3) the attorney's customary billing rates. (See Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643.)
The court determines a reasonable rate by looking at the reasonable market value of the services rendered, and looks to see whether the requested rate is within the range of reasonable rates charged by comparable attorneys performing comparable work. (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)
Here, Mr. Naghash’s declaration states, in relevant part, “Roger E. Naghash was admitted to the State Bar of California on February 29, 1996. Since then Roger E. Naghash has been a sole practitioner, with offices in Irvine, California, County of Orange. Roger E. Naghash practice [sic] includes but not limited to Real Estate Law, Unlawful Detainers, fraud, and others . . . . Based on customs and practices of attorneys with similar experience and qualifications, consumer law attorneys’ hourly rate range is between $380.00 and $485.00 per hour.” (R. Naghash Decl., ¶ 16.) It also states that Mr. Naghash charges $380 for unlawful detainer matters, and that “[o]n or about October 1, 2021, [Plaintiff] retained legal services of Nicole B. Naghash and Roger E. Naghash of Law Offices of Roger E. Naghash to represent him in enforcing the terms and condition of the lease agreement,” and that Mr. Naghash’s legal services was retained on an “hourly fee basis, at the rate of $380 per hour.” (R. Naghash Decl., ¶¶ 17, 18.)
Ms. Naghash’s declaration states that she was admitted to the State Bar of California on February 29, 2020, and that “[b]ased on customs and practices of attorneys with similar experience and qualifications, consumer law attorneys’ hourly rate range is between $275.00 and $320.00 per hour,” and that Ms. Naghash charges $275 per hour for unlawful detainer matters. (Declaration of Nicole Naghash (“N. Naghash Decl.”), ¶¶ 16, 17.)
Based on the foregoing, neither declaration provides any basis for a prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience for comparable legal services, i.e., legal services for unlawful detainer actions, within the community, i.e., Orange County. The Court does not consider the range of rates for consumer law attorneys to necessarily be indicative of the rates charged in unlawful detainer actions. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence supporting the hourly rates charged by Mr. and Ms. Naghash, the Court finds that $380 per hour for Mr. Naghash, and $275 per hour for Ms. Naghash are reasonable rates for attorneys handling unlawful detainer actions in Orange County.
The Opposition argues that the motion fails to justify Mr. Naghash’s hourly rate of $380, such that Plaintiff fails to meet his burden that the fees sought are reasonable, but does not otherwise provide any argument or evidence as to what a reasonable rate would be. (Opposition, 9:10-25.) The Opposition does not argue that $275 per hour is an unsupported or otherwise unreasonable rate for Ms. Naghash.
Reasonableness of Hours Expended
To incur a fee for the purposes of Civil Code section 1717, “is to ‘become liable’ for it [Citation], i.e., to become obligated to pay for it.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280.) “[T]he usual and ordinary meaning of the words ‘reasonable attorney’s fees’ is the consideration that a litigant pays or becomes liable to pay in exchange for legal representation.” (Id. at p. 282.)
The Court has discretion to reduce the fee award where fees were not reasonably incurred. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [“ ‘[P]adding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.”].)
“Attorney time spent on services which produce no tangible benefit for the client is not time ‘reasonably spent.’ ” (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 452.) “To enable the trial court to determine whether attorney fees should be awarded and in what amount, an attorney should present ‘(1) evidence, documentary and oral, of the services actually performed; and (2) expert opinion by [the applicant] and other lawyers, as to what would be a reasonable fee for such services.’ [Citations.] (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 558-559.) “In California, an attorney need not submit contemporaneous time records in order to recover attorney fees, . . . . [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff requests $229,050.50 in attorney’s fees. Initially, the Court notes that requested $229,050.50 in attorney’s fees for this limited unlawful detainer action includes fees from 10/4/21, before the Complaint was filed, through 8/6/22 and fees for the instant motion.
Mr. Naghash states that he has expended 513.75 hours (372.05 hours plus 171.70 hours in “post motion legal services”) totaling $195,225. (R. Naghash Decl., ¶¶ 24, 25.) However, 372.05 plus 171.70 totals 543.75 hours, not 513.75 hours. While 513.75 hours multiplied by a $380 hourly rate totals $195,225, the miscalculation of 30 hours raises questions as to whether there was an error in the calculation of 372.05 hours and 171.70 hours of “post motion legal services”, or whether there is a calculating error as to the total number of hours. Plaintiff’s errors undermines the legitimacy and accuracy, and thus, reasonableness, of his request.
The Court notes that while the “Time Activity Detail” provided in Exhibit C attached to R. Naghash’s declaration provides that the total hours is 513.75 hours, the “Account Statement” provided in reply does not set forth the total number of hours or the total amount for Mr. Naghash.
Moreover, while Mr. Naghash provides that Plaintiff retained his legal services on an hourly fee basis at the rate of $380 per hour, and expended more than 513.75 hours of legal services in representing Plaintiff to achieve the litigation goals and obtain relief under the lease agreement, this does not establish that Plaintiff was liable to pay the fees requested in exchange for legal representation. (R. Naghash Decl., ¶¶ 18, 24.) Nor does it appear that Plaintiff paid any attorney’s fees.
The Court notes that the supplemental declaration filed in reply states, “Plaintiff, Kowen Lai is liable to pay the legal fees incurred in connection with the legal services rendered by Roger E. Naghash and Law Offices of Roger E. Naghash . . . .” (Supplemental Declaration of Roger E. Naghash, ¶ 4.) However, this assertion is conclusory and there is no evidence to support this assertion, either in the moving papers or the reply papers. The Court notes that while the supplemental declaration in reply attaches as Exhibit R1, an “Account Statement”, which Mr. Naghash states represents fees that have been billed to Plaintiff, the “Account Statement” is a single statement which sets forth legal services expended from 10/4/21, before the Complaint was filed, through 7/28/22, the hearing date of this motion, for “expected time” spent on the instant motion. (Id., ¶ 3.) Hours that have yet to be expended certainly cannot be billed. The Second Supplemental Declaration of Mr. Naghash attaches an Account Statement purporting to cover a time period from 5/24/22, through 10/27/22, including credit for 7/28/22, and “expected time” spent on the instant motion. (Ex. C2 to Second Supplemental R. Naghash Decl.) Moreover, the “Account Statement” has a section for “Terms” which states “Due on receipt,” but it seems unlikely that a client for which an attorney is prosecuting an unlawful detainer action for failure to pay rent would be given a single statement covering a time period of over nine (9) months for a sum of $220,937.50 and be expected to pay it upon receipt.
Similarly, Ms. Naghash states she expended 93.5 hours (74.95 hours plus 18.55 hours for “post motion legal services”) totaling $27,712.50, in representing Plaintiff and achieving his litigation goals in obtaining past due rent pursuant to the lease agreement and restoring possession of the Subject Property. (N. Naghash Decl., ¶¶ 23, 24.) However, Ms. Naghash’s declaration does not provide any additional evidence as it relates to whether Plaintiff is liable to pay the legal fees.
It is apparent that Plaintiff did not pay any legal fees.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, even assuming that Plaintiff is legally liable to pay the legal fees requested, the 607.25 hours (513.75 hours for Mr. Naghash and 93.5 hours for Ms. Naghash), as well as additional hours subsequent to 7/28/22, Plaintiff does not provide evidence showing all of the hours expended were reasonably incurred.
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the “Time Activity Detail” attached as Exhibit C to Mr. Naghash’s First Amended Declaration (ROA 398); the list of hours expended for legal services attached as Exhibit D to Ms. Naghash’s First Amended Declaration (ROA 396); the “Account Statement” attached as Exhibit R1 to Mr. Naghash’s Supplemental Declaration (ROA 417); and the “Account Statement” attached as Exhibit C2 to Mr. Naghash’s Second Supplemental Declaration (ROA 434) is not consistent with the terms of the Legal Services agreement between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm. Mr. Naghash’s Second Supplemental Declaration attaches a redacted and truncated portion of the Legal Services Agreement between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm which states, in part, “Law Firm will charge in increments of one fourth (.25) of an hour, rounded off for each particular activity to the nearest one fourth (.25) of an hour. The minimum time charged for any particular activity will be one fourth (.25) of an hour.” (Ex. C1 to Second Supplemental R. Naghash Declaration.) However, all of the evidence of time billing entries submitted by Plaintiff indicates that the increments of time was not so billed. For example, the most recent “Account Statement” attached to Mr. Naghash’s Second Supplemental Declaration provides time billing for 0.95 hours, 0.55 hours, 0.35 hours, 0.15 hours, 1.1 hours, to name a few entries, and such entries of this kind are found throughout all of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff. This inconsistency undermines the credibility of Plaintiff’s counsel’s entries, and raises serious questions as to the reasonableness of time expended by Plaintiff’s counsel in this case.
In addition, both the “Time Activity Detail” attached as Exhibit C to Mr. Naghash’s First Amended Declaration and the “Account Statement” attached as Exhibit R1 to Mr. Naghash’s Supplemental Declaration, as well as the list of hours expended for legal services for Ms. Naghash that are attached as Exhibit D to her First Amended Declaration and the “Account Statement” attached as Exhibit C2 to the Second Supplemental Declaration of Mr. Naghash do not provide adequate information about the tasks performed and consist of vague entries. For example, there are multiple entries concerning communications with Plaintiff, but the subject matter of those communications is not included, i.e., Mr. Naghash’s entries dated 11/16/21, 11/22/21, 11/23/21, 12/15/21, 12/28/21, 1/4/22, 1/5/22, 1/23/22, 1/27/22, 1/28/22, 2/5/22, 2/6/22, 2/9/22, 2/11/22, 2/16/22, 3/10/22, 3/17/22, 3/18/22, 3/21/22, 3/22/22, 3/29/22, 3/30/22, 4/19/22, 4/22/22, 4/25/22, 4/26/22, 5/26/22, 5/27/22, 5/29/22, 5/30/22, 5/31/22, 6/10/22, 6/13/22, 6/14/22, 6/21/22, 6/22/22, 6/23/22, 6/27/22, and 6/28/22; and Ms. Naghash’s entries dated 11/2/21, 1/8/22, 1/20/22, 3/7/22. In addition, there are multiple entries where there is insufficient information about how the task performed was related to or reasonably necessary to the litigation, including, but not limited to, Mr. Naghash’s entries dated 10/4/21, 12/28/21, 2/3/22, 3/4/22, 4/6/22, and 6/29/22, and Ms. Naghash’s entries dated 10/29/21, 1/18/22, 3/31/22, 4/11/22, 5/23/22, 5/26/22.
Moreover, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees for fees incurred prior to the filing of the Complaint on 11/30/21. (See ROA 2.) Compensation for fees incurred prior to filing the complaint are allowed where the fees are reasonably and necessarily incurred at that time by the prevailing party. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 655.) Plaintiff does not show that entries dated prior to filing the Complaint on 11/30/21 were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
Further, the Opposition argues that the time expended relating to the Defendants’ default, the time expended relating to Defendants’ Petition for Writ of Mandate to Stay Eviction, the time expended for secretarial or other non-lawyer tasks, and Ms. Naghash’s time at trial are all unreasonable. The Court agrees, as well.
Time for Defendants’ Default
Defendants provide evidence which tend to support that the time expended relating Defendants’ default and the application to set aside default, including time entries on 12/13/21, 12/14/21, 12/15/21, 12/19/21, 1/11/21, 1/14/22, ,1/18/22, 1/19/22, 1/27/22, and 2/3/22, were unreasonable because it was unnecessary and produced no tangible benefit for Plaintiff. In particular, Defendants show that Plaintiff’s counsel had been communicating with Defendants’ counsel, Larry Rothman, concerning three other lawsuits between the same parties and concerning the same property and contracts, knew that Mr. Rothman was Defendants’ counsel, but that Plaintiff’s counsel did not reach out to Mr. Rothman or contact Mr. Rothman about accepting service of summons and the complaint in the instant unlawful detainer action, rushed to enter default, refused to set aside the default opting to oppose the application to set aside the default, and unsuccessfully opposed the motion to set aside default. (Declaration of Larry Rothman, ¶¶ 5-7.) As a result, time spent concerning the default and subsequent application to set aside appears unnecessary and unreasonable. The fee request is excessive.
Time for Secretarial or Other Non-Lawyer Tasks
It appears to the Court that there are numerous entries that did not require attorney time, and could have been performed by non-attorneys. For example, the billing entries reflect activities such as making calls to the Orange County Sheriff from 6/2/22 through 6/23/22, from both Mr. and Ms. Naghash, and “coordination” and “walk through” of property with the Orange County Sheriff by Mr. Naghash on 6/27/22 and 6/29/22, as well as filing documents on 12/13/21, 1/21/22, and 2/7/22 by Ms. Naghash.
Based on the foregoing, it appears to the Court that the fee request is “padded” and/or excessive, and thus, unreasoable. The credibility of the billing entries is undermined by increments of time stated therein as they are not consistent with the terms of the Legal Services Agreement, and numerous billing entries refer only to vague descriptions.
The Court “may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320, internal quotations omitted.) “A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)
“When confronted with hundreds of pages of legal bills, trial courts are not required to identify each charge they find to be reasonable or unreasonable, necessary or unnecessary.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.) “A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.” (Ibid.)
All of which are true here. The Court’s observations are that the case has been overlitigated by Plaintiff; that Plaintiff has submitted padded bills’ and that many of the opposing party’s objections are valid. This case involves numerous entries from Mr. Naghash and Ms. Naghash which are not categorized or broken down in any fashion to support that the hours expended were reasonably necessary. In light of the fundamental inconsistency concerning how increments for billing was to apply in this case, the Court cannot simply deduct items that are unreasonable or unnecessary. The time entries and “Account Statements” submitted indicate that discovery was not extensive, but also indicate that there were various pre-trial motion(s) and/or ex parte(s), as well as post-trial motions and a writ of mandamus, in addition to pre-trial documents, trial preparation and trial.
In reviewing the time entries and “Account Statements”, the Court finds the following constitutes reasonably compensable attorney hours.
For Mr. Naghash, 2 hours to draft the Complaint; 25 hours to conduct discovery; 30 hours relating to pre-trial motions and/or oppositions to motions and/or ex partes; 40 hours for pre-trial documents and trial preparation; 60 hours for jury trial; 30 hours for post-trial motions; and 20 hours relating to the writ of mandamus for a total of 207 hours at $380 per hour amounting to $78,660.
For Ms. Naghash: 5 hours to conduct discovery; 10 hours for pre-trial and trial preparation; and 25 hours to appear for jury trial for a total of 40 hours at $275 per hour amounting to $11,000.
As a result, the Court GRANTS the Plaitniff’s motion for attorney’s fees and AWARDS a total of $89,660 in attorney fees against Defendants, Wayne Iwamoto, Susan Iwamoto, aka Susan-James Iwamoto.
Fees for the Motion
Defendants contend that Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees for more than 27 hours of time in connection with the instant motion. The moving papers do not separately specify the total number of hours as it relates to the instant motion.
Fees may be awarded for bringing a motion for an award of attorney fees. (Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1423.) “ ‘Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstances permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. [Citation.]” (Meister v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 455.)
Here, Defendants do not identify the entries for either Mr. Naghash or Ms. Naghash upon which they rely to get to 27 hours. Mr. Naghash has entries dated 4/26/22 for 4.6 hours, dated 4/29/22 for 6.8 hours, dated 6/25/22 for 3.9 hours, dated 6/27/22 for 3.4 hours, and 7/28/22 for 7.5 hours. The “Account Statement” submitted with the Second Supplemental Declaration of Mr. Naghash provides a credit for 7.25 hours, instead of the 7.5 initially claimed for the entry dated 7/28/22, and instead seeks 5.9 hours on 10/27/22.
Thus, Mr. Naghash seeks in excess of 24 hours as it relates to the instant motion.
In addition, Ms. Naghash has entries dated 4/29/22 totaling 1.5 hours, and dated 5/3/22 for 0.25 hours, for a total of 1.75 hours.
The Court notes that Plaintiff filed an original motion, a First Amended notice, and then the instant Second Amended notice. Thus, it appears to the Court that the time expended is excessive. The Court finds 10 hours for Mr. Naghash at $380 per hour for a total of $3,800, and the 1.75 hours for Ms. Naghash at $275 per hour for a total of $481.25 reasonable.
The Court further AWARDS a total of $4,281.25 against Defendants for fees in bringing the instant motion.
Costs
The Court ruled on Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Tax Costs on 8/4/22, and thus, finds Plaintiff’s request MOOT. (See ROA 441.)
Plaintiff to give notice.