Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: 30-2022-01266638, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s Moves to Compel Arbitration

Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s Request for Judicial Notice of (1) Plaintiff’s complaint in the present case and (2) the Notice of Dismissal in Dina C. Felisilda, et al, v. FCA US LLC, et al. (34-2015-00183668), dated February 11, 2016 is GRANTED in its entirety pursuant to Code of Evidence section 452(d), which allows courts to take judicial notice of records of any court of this state.

“As a general rule, only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement.”  (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 495, review denied (Nov. 24, 2020).)  “However, there are several exceptions that allow a nonsignatory to invoke an agreement to arbitrate.”  (Ibid.; citing JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237].)  “The doctrine of equitable estoppel is one of the exceptions.”  (Ibid.)

“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied in both federal and California decisional authority, a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.”  (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 495, review denied (Nov. 24, 2020), citations omitted [citing Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 268; Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 534]; see also JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237.)

“Where the equitable estoppel doctrine applies, the nonsignatory has a right to enforce the arbitration agreement.”  (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237, fn. 18.)

Here, the court finds that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies as Plaintiff’s claims against Nissan are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying obligations contained in the “Retail Installment Sale Contract (‘Contract’)” relating to the condition of the purchased vehicle. 

For example, Plaintiff alleges that he “received written warranties and other express and implied warranties including . . . that the Vehicle would pass without objection in the trade under the Contract description.”  (Complaint, ¶ 7.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant provides “all Nissan customers with a New Vehicle Limited Warranty with the purchase or lease of a Nissan vehicle.”  (Complaint, ¶ 8.)  Importantly, Plaintiff further alleges that “Plaintiff has duly performed all the conditions on Plaintiff’s part under the Contract and under the express and implied warranties given to Plaintiff.”  (Complaint, ¶ 9.)  Plaintiff refers to the Retail Installment Sale Contract containing the arbitration provision when he alleges that “Plaintiff is entitled to rescission of the Contract and reimbursement of the purchase price paid for the vehicle.”  (Complaint, ¶ 24.)  Thus, as alleged the Plaintiff repeatedly includes the Retail Installment Sale Contract containing the arbitration provision as a basis for relief against Nissan. 

Plaintiff cites to Ngo v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 23 F.4th 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2022) and other federal authority for his contention that the arbitration provision is not enforceable by a non-signatory.  Decisions of the federal courts interpreting California law are not binding on this court and are merely persuasive.  (Finley v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1160, as modified on denial of reh’g (June 22, 2000).)

The court finds that the causes of action against the nonsignatory Defendant are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations such that doctrine of equitable estoppel applies and Defendant can invoke the arbitration clause as a nonsignatory.

Plaintiff alleges that the Retail Installment Sale Contract and related arbitration provision have not been properly authenticated.  However, when compelling arbitration and establishing evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’”  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 [citing Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218].)  In fact, the moving party can meet its burden of establishing “evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy” by (1) “attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature” or (2) “setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion.”  (Ibid.)  Here, Defendant has met its burden that a written arbitration agreement exists and Plaintiff has not established otherwise.

The arbitration agreement is not unconscionable such that is unenforceable.  (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 489, review denied (Nov. 24, 2020) [enforcing a form arbitration provision between a non-signatory manufacturer and a signatory purchaser of allegedly defective vehicle].)

Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.

This case is STAYED pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings.  (9 U.S.C. § 3; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

The Court sets an ADR Review hearing for April 20, 2023 at 1:30 p.m.

Moving party to give notice.