Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: 30-2022-01286871, Date: 2023-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff, Robert Campbell (“Plaintiff” or “Campbell”), moves for an order consolidating the instant unlimited civil case, Campbell v. Brooks, case no. 30-2022-01286871-CU-BC-WJC (the “Unlimited Action”) and an unlawful detainer case, Brooks v. Campbell, case no. 30-2023-01312405-CL-UD-CJC (the “UD Action”).

The instant motion to consolidate initially came on for hearing on July 20, 2023. The Court continued the hearing due to the late-filed opposition. The Court considers the late-filed opposition, and reply filed in response thereto.

Plaintiff contends that both actions involve complex issues of title and fraud, that adjudicating those complex issues in the summary proceedings of the UD Action infringes on Campbell’s due process rights, and that because Brooks’ right to possession of the property depends on the outcome of Campbell’s Unlimited Action, Campbell seeks to consolidate Brooks’ second unlawful detainer action against Campbell with this Unlimited Action. Plaintiff also contends that the Court should consolidate both actions and stay the UD Action pending the outcome of this Unlimited Action since the Court assumed jurisdiction over the case first and the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction obligates the Court to stay the UD Action. Plaintiff further contends that even if due process and jurisdictional concerns do not predominate, the UD Action and Unlimited Action concern common questions of law and fact, and adjudicating them separately carries the risk of inconsistent judgments, as well as avoid repetitive trial and unnecessary costs and delays to the parties. Plaintiff asserts that the UD Action against Campbell involves the same property, the same contract, the same parties, and the same underlying facts, and that in the Unlimited Action, Campbell seeks to determine title to the property at issue, which affects the outcome of the unlawful detainer case.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff had more than 6 months to move for consolidation and request a stay but did not so move, and that the cases do not involve common issues as the sole issue in the UD Action is Defendant’s possession of the property based on a breach of the lease provision where Plaintiff was the only tenant allowed, but moved other parties and a dog into the property and after service of a 3-day notice to quit, Plaintiff refused to vacate them from the property. Defendant asserts that a Residential Purchase Agreement (“RPA”) is at issue in the Unlimited Action, and concerns Plaintiff’s ability to purchase the property which was contingent on Plaintiff’s ability to secure financing from a credible financial institution. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is in breach of that contract as Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with a lender approval letter by March 3, 2023, for purchase of the property; that close of escrow is scheduled for July 10, 2023; that the expiration of the contract is on July 11, 2023; and that the matter will be moot because Plaintiff has been unable to perform under the RPA. Defendant thus contends that the issues are not complex and no fraud is involved, and that the allegations raised in the Unlimited Action are separate and apart from the one issue raised in the UD Action; that there is no crossover in the presentation of evidence; that the two cases only share parties; and that Plaintiff has never been denied the opportunity to take title to the property.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the motion is procedurally deficient as there is no showing that Plaintiff has filed the notice of motion to consolidate in the UD Action as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a)(1)(C).

As to the merits, Code of Civil Procedure § 1048(a) provides: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue in the actions, it may order all the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”

“[T]he trial court has the power to consolidate an unlawful detainer proceeding with a simultaneously pending action in which title to the property is in issue. That is because a successful claim of title by the tenant would defeat the landlord’s right to possession. [Citation.] When an unlawful detainer proceeding and an unlimited action concerning title to the property are simultaneously pending, the trial court in which the unlimited action is pending may stay the unlawful detainer action until the issue of title is resolved in the unlimited action, or it may consolidate the actions. [Citation.] If it does neither and instead tries the issue of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer proceedings, the parties’ right to a full trial of the issue of title may be unfairly expedited and limited. If complex issues of title are tried in the unlawful detainer proceeding, the proceeding loses its summary character; defects in the plaintiff’s title ‘are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment. [Citations.]” (Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385.)

The court in Martin-Bragg specifically noted that it “[did] not hold that trial courts must in all cases grant applications for consolidation of an unlawful detainer proceeding with a pending quiet title action, no matter how straightforward the issues, and no matter what the circumstances. With or without consolidation of the cases, trial courts have available options to address plaintiffs’ legitimate rights and need for protection from unjustified delay of the unlawful detainer proceeding, while still affording reasonable opportunities for discovery and to prepare for trial of complex issues relating to the property’s title. The trial court has discretion, for example, to sever and separately try the issue of title to the property, while assuring the availability of fair compensation to the plaintiff for any delay in acquiring possession. [Citation.].” (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 393.)

“It is generally recognized the summary unlawful detainer action is not a suitable vehicle to try complicated ownership issues involving assertions of fraud and deceptive practices.” (Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 144.)

As to the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “[t]he established rule of ‘exclusive concurrent jurisdiction’ provides that where two (or more) courts possess concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over a cause, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of all others, thus rendering ‘concurrent’ jurisdiction ‘exclusive’ with the first court. [Citations.] The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one. As Witkin has it, ‘Justification for the rule [of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction] rests on practical considerations. If the identical cause of action is asserted by the same plaintiff in two suits, there is no doubt that the first court has priority, but this can rarely happen. What does happen is that parties to the same controversy or transaction ... file separate suits on their individual causes of action, usually against each other. Although their claimed rights and therefore their alleged causes of action are distinct, the issues are substantially the same, and individual suits might result in conflicting judgments. The rule of priority is designed to avoid the unfortunate result[s] of these conflicts by requiring, in effect, a consolidation of the separate actions in the court in which jurisdiction of the parties first attached. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] (Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175.)

Here, both actions involve the same real property located at 7312 Spruce Circle, La Palma, CA 90623 (the “Property”). The Complaint in the Unlimited Action alleges that Plaintiff resides at the Property, and that “[a]t all relevant times,” Defendant Brooks “has owned the Property.” (See Complaint in Unlimited Action, ¶¶ 1-2.) Said Complaint seeks resolution as to Plaintiff’s “right to purchase the Property at the agreed-upon price.” (Id., ¶¶ 34, 43, 45, 53, 64, 68.) Thus, the Unlimited Action concerns an issue of title arising from whether Plaintiff is entitled to purchase the Property.

The UD Action appears to be based upon a breach of a provision under a lease agreement concerning the number of tenants allowed at the Property. (Declaration of Lawrence Brooks, 7:16-23.)

It appears that the parties entered into two contracts:  (1) a Residential Lease/Rental Agreement with a term from January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2024, and executed on July 10, 2021 (Ex. B to Complaint in Unlimited Action); and (2) a Residential Real Estate Purchase Agreement made on July 10, 2021, and signed by Brooks and Campbell on that same date, with certain conditions to be completed in 2023 (Ex. C to Complaint in Unlimited Action).

In considering the issues in both actions, a determination of whether Plaintiff has the right to purchase the Property pursuant to the RPA in the instant Unlimited Civil Action and thereby is entitled to obtain title to the Property will affect the UD Action. In turn, a successful claim of title by Plaintiff would defeat the Defendant’s right to possession.

While the UD Action appears to be premised upon a provision in the lease agreement, the lease agreement is not the only agreement at issue. As noted above, the parties appear to have entered into the two agreements concerning the Property at the same time, one to lease the Property and the other to purchase the Property, such that resolution of the UD Action appears to depend on the resolution of the Unlimited Action. Defendant’s assertions that Plaintiff has been unable to perform on the RPA goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and is not salient to determine whether the actions should be consolidated. Additionally, it appears that Defendant argues that the motion is untimely or late, but Defendant cites to no authority showing that this is the case, cites to no other authority in support of any of his contentions, and does not address the arguments raised in the moving papers.

Based on the foregoing, it appears to the Court that the Unlimited Action and UD Action have issues of law and fact in common as who is entitled to possession and ownership of the Property, and that a stay is proper to avoid the risk of conflicting rulings, to serve judicial efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary costs. Due process concerns in adjudicating issues of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer proceedings also support consolidation of the two actions. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion to stay the unlawful detainer action but DENIES the motion to consolidate.

The Court STAYS the UD Action pending the outcome of this Unlimited Action.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the docket report for Brooks’ first unlawful detainer case, including the Court’s Order entering summary judgment in favor of Campbell; and (2) the docket report for Brooks’ current unlawful detainer case that Plaintiff seeks to consolidate.

California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1306(c) provides as follows: 

“Any party requesting judicial notice of material under Evidence Code sections 452 or 453 must provide the court and each party with a copy of the material. If the material is part of a file in the court in which the matter is being heard, the party must: 

“(1)    Specify in writing the part of the court file sought to be judicially noticed; and

“(2)    Either make arrangements with the clerk to have the file in the courtroom at the time of the hearing or confirm with the clerk that the file is electronically accessible to the court.”

While the Court may take judicial notice of court records, copies of the docket reports are not attached or submitted, and does not present evidence showing compliance with the CRC, rule 3.1306(c)(2).

It also does not appear to the Court that a copy of the entire docket report is particularly relevant to the determination of the issues. Plaintiff does not specify which particular document of which it seeks judicial notice. A court may deny a request for judicial notice on the ground that the material is not relevant to the determination of the issues. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 422, 442-443.) Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice.

Plaintiff to give notice.