Judge Richard Y. Lee, Case Doe7030vs.1 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Richard Y. Lee, Case: Doe7030vs.1, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Demurrer

Defendant Newport-Mesa Unified School District’s Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with fifteen (15) days leave to amend.

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff Jane Doe 7030’s fourth cause of action for sexual harassment. Plaintiff filed no opposition to the demurrer.

Civil Code section 51.9(a) provides that “[a] person is liable in a cause of action for sexual harassment” when certain elements are met. (Civil Code, § 51.9, subd. (a).) A “person” may include a teacher, but not a school district, but Section 51.9 does not define a “person” to include a school district. (Civil Code, § 51.9, subd. (a)(1).)

Civil Code section 51.9 may be compared to Civil Procedure Code section 340.1, which extends the statute of limitations for sexual abuse to a “person or entities.” (Civil Procedure Code, § 340.1, subds. (a) (2) & (3), (c) & (d).) The fact that Civil Code section 51.9 did not include liability for an entity indicates that liability cannot attach to a school district.

Section 51.9 also requires that there be “a business, service, or professional relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.” (Civil Code, § 51.9, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiff does not plead that she had such a relationship with the Defendant Newport-Mesa Unified School District (“School District”), nor could she as “California's public school districts are not business establishments under the [Unruh] Act.” (Brennon B. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 367, 389.)

Motion to Strike

Defendant Newport-Mesa Unified School District’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to 1) the allegation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship and 3) the prayer for attorney fees under Civil Code section 51.9, with fifteen (15) days leave to amend.

The Motion to Strike is DENIED as to 2) the prayer for attorney fees under Civil Procedure Code section 1012.5.

The School District moves to strike three portions of the Complaint: 1) the allegation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship (Complaint, 13:3.); 2) the prayer for attorney fees under Civil Procedure Code section 1012.5; and 3) the prayer for attorney fees under Civil Code section 51.9.

Confidential or Fiduciary Relationship

The School District seeks to strike the allegation in the Complaint that “The duty to disclose this information arose from the special, trusting, confidential, fiduciary, and in loco parentis relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff.”

Plaintiff has not shown that there is or was a confidential or fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and the School District. “Technically, a fiduciary relationship is a recognized legal relationship such as guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary, principal and agent, or attorney and client [citation], whereas a ‘confidential relationship’ may be founded on a moral, social, domestic, or merely personal relationship as well as on a legal relationship.” (Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640, 663.”

While a school district does have a special relationship with its students, (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 870), Plaintiff does not point to and the Court could not find any case or statute which holds that a fiduciary relationship or confidential relationship exists between a school district and an individual student. (See Strong v. State (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448 [liability can only be imposed against a public entity if authorized by statute]; Gov’t Code, § 815, et seq.)

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Section 1021.5

Civil Procedure Code section 1021.5 provides that “[u]pon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.

The School District’s motion to strike is premature, as it seeks to argue what the results of this litigation will be even well before the conclusion of the litigation. At this early stage, the Court cannot determine whether a significant benefit will be conferred on the general public or large class of persons. Similarly, the Court is unable to determine what the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement will be, even before the necessity and burden have been undertaken.

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to Civil Code Section 51.9

Plaintiff did not oppose the demurrer to the fourth cause of action or the motion to strike the request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 51.9. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action was sustained and so there is no legal basis to request attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 51.9 so the motion must be granted.

Defendant shall give notice of the Court’s ruling.