Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case 19STCV29421 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 19STCV29421, Date: 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

The court rules on defendant Ford Motor Company’s evidentiary objections as follows:

The court denies defendant Ford Motor Company’s requests to take judicial notice of the specified facts because they are not relevant to a material issue presented by this motion. (Malek Media Group LLC v. AXWG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 825.)

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”) moves the court for an order granting its motion for summary adjudication as to the third, seventh, and 10th causes of action, and the claim for punitive damages in the Second Amended Complaint filed by plaintiff Arin Yaghoubi (“Plaintiff”).

On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff dismissed the seventh cause of action for fraud against Defendant. The court therefore finds that the motion as to the seventh cause of action is moot, and rules on Defendant’s motion only as to the third and 10th causes of action and the claim for punitive damages.

1. Third Cause of Action for Sale of Defective Merchandise Without Disclosing Defects (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17531, 17535)

“It is unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation . . . to advertise, call attention to or give publicity to the sale of any merchandise, . . . which merchandise is defective in any manner, . . . unless there is conspicuously displayed directly in connection with the name and description of that merchandise and each specified article, unit, or part thereof, a direct and unequivocal statement, phrase, or word which will clearly indicate that the merchandise or each article, unit, or part thereof so advertised is . . . defective . . . .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17531.) Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered injury in fact as a result of Defendant’s violation of this statute and requests relief pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17535. (SAC ¶ 29; SAC Prayer, p. 28, ¶ 3.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the third cause of action for sale of defective merchandise without disclosing defects has no merit because Defendant has shown that elements of the cause of action (that (1) Defendant knew of the alleged defects with the subject vehicles and therefore was required to make the statement set forth in section 17531, and (2) Plaintiff was injured by the advertising and therefore has standing to bring this cause of action) cannot be established.

First, Defendant produces evidence showing that (1) it did not issue any recalls, customer satisfactory programs, or technical service bulletins for 2018 Ford Explorers related to exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion in the vehicle cabin; (2) although it issued customer satisfaction program 19N05 (“CSP 19N05”) in July of 2019, that program (i) applied only to 2011-2017 model years of Ford Explorers and allowed consumers who purchased those models to receive an updated climate control calibration and (ii) was not mandatory; (3) the updated climate control calibration and lift gate drain valves set forth in CSP 19N05 were implemented at the same time of production for 2018 Ford Explorers; and (4) technical service bulletins numbers 17-0044 and 14-0130 did not apply to 2018 Ford Explorers, and the primary services procedures outlined in those bulletins were incorporated into the design of 2018 Ford Explorers. (UMF Nos. 12-13; Eikey Decl., ¶¶ 6-11.)

Second, Defendant produces evidence showing that Plaintiff did not rely on any of the allegedly false or misleading advertisements when he leased the subject vehicle.

An action for injunction under section 17535 “may be prosecuted . . . by any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation of this chapter.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17535; People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 292, 318.) “Proposition 64 requires that a plaintiff’s economic injury come ‘as a result of’ the unfair competition or a violation of the false advertising law. ([Bus. & Prof. Code,] §§ 17204, 17535.) ‘The phrase “as a result of” in its plain and ordinary sense means “caused by” and requires a showing of a causal connection or reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.’” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 326 [superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 594, fn. 2].)

In deposition, Plaintiff testified that (1) he did not rely on any brochure in leasing the subject vehicle; (2) there was nothing specific that Plaintiff relied on when looking at Defendant’s website prior to leasing the vehicle that made Plaintiff want to lease the subject vehicle; (3) Plaintiff decided to lease the subject vehicle based on “the fact that it’s a bigger SUV, and it came with those options that [he] wanted[;]” and (4) there were no other websites, advertisements, or specific documents that Plaintiff relied on in leasing the subject vehicle. (Def. Material Fact No. 2; Def. Compendium of Evidence (“Def. COE”) Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 58:15-23, 59:12-60:1.) Further, Plaintiff testified that he could not recall the contents of the brochures sent to him by Defendant, which further supports Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff did not rely on any statements therein. (Def. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 57:25-58:2.)

The court finds that Defendant has presented evidence showing that (1) Defendant had no reason to believe that the 2018 Ford Explorers had defects regarding exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusions, and therefore has presented evidence showing that its advertisements regarding 2018 Ford Explorers and the subject vehicle were not required to comply with Business and Professions Code section 17531, and (2) Plaintiff did not rely on the advertisements that are the subject of the Second Amended Complaint and therefore finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff cannot establish that he has standing to assert this cause of action. (SAC ¶ 22 [alleging that Defendant advertised 2018 Ford Explorers for sale on its website and through sales brochures sent by mail to Plaintiff]; Kwikset Corp., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 887.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether (1) Defendant knew of the alleged exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusions defect and was therefore required to make the statement required by Business and Professions Code section 17531, and (2) he was injured by the alleged false advertising and therefore has standing to bring this cause of action.

First, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant had knowledge of exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion defects in 2018 Ford Explorers and, by extension, the subject vehicle. (UMF No. 1 [the subject vehicle is a 2018 Ford Explorer leased by Plaintiff on October 14, 2018].)

It is undisputed that Defendant has not issued any recalls, customer satisfaction programs, or technical service bulletins for 2018 Ford Explorers related to exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion in the vehicle cabin. (UMF No. 12.) Plaintiff has submitted evidence showing that (1) Defendant had knowledge of an issue with exhaust entering Ford Explorer cabins for 2011-2017 models and issued supplements regarding CSP 17N03 addressing this issue, and (2) Defendant installed on Plaintiff’s vehicle the parts listed in the second supplement to CSP 17N03. (Pl. COE Ex. 14 [January 9, 2019 CSP 17N03, stating that Defendant “is aware that some 2011-2017 Explorer owners have concerns about exhaust or carbon monoxide” but that the “vehicles are safe”], Ex. 7, Eikey Dep., p. 186:1-18 [testifying that portions of CSP 17N03 were applied to Plaintiff’s vehicle].) Plaintiff appears to argue that this evidence shows that Defendant knew of the exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion defect with 2018 Ford Explorers, including the subject vehicle, and that Defendant concealed that defect in its advertising. (Opp., p. 5:24-26.) However, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that (1) CSP 17N03 expressly applies only to 2011-2017 Ford Explorers and (2) Defendant’s person most qualified (i) confirmed that CSP 17N03 was “not applicable” to the subject vehicle, and (ii) stated that it was merely “a terminology that can be used that portions of [CSP] 17-N-03 were applied to the vehicle[,] [b]ut really, it’s just part replacements” that were chosen by the dealer to repair Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Pl. COE Ex. 14, p. 1, Ex. 7, Eikey Dep., p. 186:1-11.)

Thus, while Plaintiff’s evidence may show that Defendant had knowledge of the exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion defect as to 2011-2017 Ford Explorers, Plaintiff’s evidence does not show that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant knew of an exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion with 2018 Ford Explorers and therefore failed to include the statement required by Business and Professions Code section 17531 when advertising the sale of 2018 Ford Explorers, including Plaintiff’s vehicle. (UMF No. 1 [subject vehicle is 2018 Ford Explorer].)

Second, Plaintiff argues that he has submitted admissible evidence proving reliance on Defendant’s advertisements of the subject vehicle. Plaintiff points to his deposition testimony, in which he stated the following: (1) he spoke with a salesperson at a dealership, who stated that the subject vehicle was a safer option; (2) he received brochures to upgrade his vehicle, but Plaintiff “trashed them” and could not recall the contents of those documents; (3) he did not rely on any of the brochures in leasing the subject vehicle; (4) he relied on the Ford website, and specifically, “the fact that [the subject vehicle is] a bigger SUV,” and it had the options Plaintiff wanted; (5) he test-drove the vehicle with a salesperson at the Ford of Montebello, who stated the car was safe and that there were no known issues with the car; (6) the salespeople walked Plaintiff through brochures; and (7) Plaintiff relied on (i) what the salespeople said, and (ii) the information contained in the brochures. (Pl. Compendium of Evidence (“Pl. COE”) Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 45:17-23, 57:7-58:2, 58:15-59:20, 62:10-64:12, 276:16-278:24.) The court notes that Plaintiff testified that he did not have those brochures, did not produce those brochures, and also testified that he could not recall the contents of the brochures. (Pl. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 276:7-12, 58:15-23.)

The court finds that this evidence is insufficient to establish actual reliance on the allegedly misleading advertisements. Plaintiff expressly testified that (1) although he received brochures, he did not rely on them in leasing the subject vehicle; (2) although he visited Defendant’s website, he did not rely on anything stated on the website; (3) he did not rely on any specific advertisements or documents when leasing the subject vehicle; and (4) he tends to rely only on the internet and talking to sales representatives, and he leased the subject vehicle based on the fact that it was a bigger SUV and came with certain options. (Pl. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 58:15-23; Def. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 59:12-60:1.) The court finds that Plaintiff’s later testimony that he relied on information given to him by the sales representatives[1] and the brochures does not constitute “substantial responsive evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact” as to the element of reliance since Plaintiff expressly stated that he did not rely on any advertisements in deciding to lease the subject vehicle. (Pl. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 276:16-277:5; Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

Third, Plaintiff argues he may establish standing by showing either a causal connection or reliance on the misrepresentation, and that Plaintiff has submitted evidence establishing that, because Plaintiff lost money as a result of Defendant’s conduct, he has sufficiently established standing, irrespective of the element of reliance. (Kwikset Corp., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 326 [stating that “as a result of” requires a plaintiff to show “‘a causal connection or reliance on the alleged misrepresentation’”] [emphasis added].)

The court disagrees. Here, Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for false advertising based on alleged misrepresentations concerning the safety of 2018 Ford Motor Vehicles, and, specifically, that Defendant failed to indicate that the subject vehicle was defective as required by Business and Professions Code section 17531. (SAC ¶¶ 24-25 [the advertisements did not include any information about known safety issues about carbon monoxide leaks], 28.) Thus, Plaintiff is required to plead and prove the element of reliance. (Kwikset Corp., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 888 [cases based on a fraud theory involving false advertising to consumers requires a showing of actual reliance].) As set forth above, Plaintiff has not met his burden to produce evidence sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact as to the element of reliance on the subject advertisements.

However, even if Plaintiff could show a triable issue of material fact exists by establishing a causal connection, the court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to show a triable issue of material fact as to the element of causation.

Plaintiff cites to (1) the allegation in his Second Amended Complaint “that had he been told of the defects in the vehicle and the history of similar complaints in Explorers he ‘would have never leased the subject vehicle[,]’” and (2) his deposition testimony, in which he stated that the information regarding the safety of the vehicle was “important” to him and that, had that information been disclosed to him, he “would definitely [have] change[d his] mind.” (Opp., p. 7:6-8 [citing SAC ¶¶ 27, 29]; Def. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 276:16-278:24.)

On a motion for summary adjudication, a plaintiff “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation in the Second Amended Complaint is not sufficient to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether he has standing based on the existence of a causal connection between Defendant’s conduct and Plaintiff’s injury. The court further finds that Plaintiff has not produced “substantial responsive evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact” regarding the element of causation based solely on his own deposition testimony. (Sangster, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163.)

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action for sale of defective merchandise without disclosing defects.

“‘The [Consumer Legal Remedies Act] makes unlawful, in Civil Code section 1770, subdivision (a) . . . various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.”’” (Rubenstein v. The Gap, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 870, 880-881.) The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction that results in the sale or lease of goods to any consumer are unlawful: (1) representing that goods have characteristics that they do not have; (2) representing that goods are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another; (3) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised; (4) representing that a transaction involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve; and (5) representing that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subds. (a)(5), (a)(7), (a)(9), (a)(14), (a)(16); SAC ¶ 108 [alleging violations of these subdivisions].)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant (1) represented to the public and Plaintiff that 2018 Ford Explorers had numerous safety packages to protect consumers but did not inform consumers of the exhaust leak condition existing in Explorer vehicles; (2) did not inform consumers that 2018 Ford Explorers had exhaust leak defects; (3) represented to Plaintiff that he was secured by Defendant’s warranty. (SAC ¶¶ 109-110, 112.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the 10th cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act has no merit because Defendant has shown that elements of the cause of action (that (1) Defendant made unlawful misrepresentations about the subject vehicle, and (2) Plaintiff relied on the misrepresentations about Defendant’s responsibilities under the warranty) cannot be established.

First, Defendant contends that it had no reason to believe that the 2018 Ford Explorers had exhaust nonconformities before or at the time that Plaintiff leased the subject vehicle, and therefore could not make misrepresentations to Plaintiff about its condition. As set forth above, Defendant produces evidence showing that it did not issue any recalls, customer satisfactory programs, or technical service bulletins for 2018 Ford Explorers related to exhaust odor or carbon monoxide intrusion in the vehicle cabin, and although it issued CSP 19N05, it applied only to 2011-2017 model years of Ford Explorers. (UMF Nos. 12-13; Eikey Decl., ¶¶ 6-11.) Further, Defendant submits evidence showing that Plaintiff spoke to salespeople at the Ford of Montebello only and did not speak to Defendant directly. (Def. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., p. 50:19-23 [Plaintiff spoke to salespeople at the Ford of Montebello], Ex. 6, Pl. Responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories, pp. 4:15-17 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2; Plaintiff communicated with sales personnel at Ford of Montebello], 6:7-9 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 3: “Plaintiff believes Sales personnel presented the vehicle as free from any defects which may affect the use, value and safety of the vehicle”], 6:25-7:2 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 4: “Plaintiff is unable to recall specific communications or statements made at the time of the lease” but “believes Sales personnel as free from any defects which may affect the use, value and safety of the vehicle”], 10:6-11 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 11: Defendant presented the vehicle as being free from defects by omitting information regarding carbon monoxide leaks in its sales brochures, window stickers, and advertisements], 12:1-4 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 12: Defendant, through sales documents and sales facility, presented vehicle as being free from defects in sales brochures, window stickers, and advertisements], 13:21-24 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 13: Defendant, through sales documents and sales facility, presented vehicle as being free from defects in sales brochures, window stickers, and advertisements].)

Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is required to establish reliance on the alleged misrepresentations or omissions to bring a cause of action for violation of the CLRA. “Under the CLRA, plaintiffs must show actual reliance on the misrepresentation and harm.” (Nelson v. Pearson Ford Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 983, 1022 [disapproved of on another ground in Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 180]; Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 201, 221-222 [actual reliance must be established for award of damages under CLRA].) Thus, “[t]he CLRA allows recovery when a consumer ‘suffers any damage as a result of’ the unlawful practice. (Civ. Code, § 1780, subd. (a), italics added.) This provision ‘requires that plaintiffs in a CLRA action show not only that a defendant’s conduct was deceptive but that the deception caused them harm. [Citation.]’” (Tucker, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 222; Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 915-916 [explaining “that the standing requirements of the CLRA are essentially identical to those of the” unfair competition law and false advertising law and therefore includes damage and causation].)

Defendant argues, for the same reasons set forth above, Plaintiff did not rely on any alleged misrepresentation or omission in leasing the subject vehicle. (Def. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 57:7-58:2, 58:15-23, 59:12-17, 59:21-60:1.) As to the allegation that Defendant represented that the subject vehicle was accompanied by an obligation that it did not have (i.e., that Defendant was obligated to repair the vehicle to conform to the applicable specifications in the warranty), Defendant asserts that it could not have mispresented the terms of the warranty “because [Plaintiff] could not remember any terms of the warranty other than the length….” (Mot., p. 22:13-16.) Defendant submits the deposition testimony of Plaintiff, in which he stated that he (1) did not ask about the warranty because he knew, from experience, that Defendant’s leases were accompanied by a warranty; (2) was aware of the length of the warranty; and (3) was not given any other information about the warranty. (Def. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 77:1-78:1.)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that (1) it did not misrepresent the condition, quality, or grade of 2018 Ford Explorers and the subject vehicle as it relates to the alleged exhaust and carbon monoxide leak defects (SAC ¶¶ 109-111) because (i) it had no knowledge that the 2018 Ford Explorers had such a defect, and (ii) Defendant did not make any statements to Plaintiff directly, as Plaintiff spoke only to salespeople at the Ford of Montebello, and (2) Plaintiff did not rely on any misrepresentation that Defendant would secure the benefit of a warranty in leasing the subject vehicle because Plaintiff did not ask about the warranty and did not remember any specific terms of the warranty, other than its length and Defendant’s general responsibility to fix certain issues with the car during the covered period of time.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the elements that (1) Defendant made unlawful misrepresentations about the subject vehicle and (2) Plaintiff relied on those misrepresentations.

First, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence showing that Defendant made unlawful misrepresentations about the subject vehicle. As set forth above, although Plaintiff submits evidence showing that 2011-2017 Ford Explorers suffered from exhaust and carbon monoxide intrusion defects, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence showing that all 2018 Ford Explorers had this defect, or that Defendant knew of and concealed any such defect. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether any statements made by Defendant or through its legal agents about the safety and condition of the subject vehicle were misrepresentations because Defendant knew of the alleged exhaust and carbon monoxide intrusion defect and concealed those defects from Plaintiff and the public.

Second, even if Plaintiff had met its burden to show that Defendant concealed the exhaust and carbon monoxide intrusion defect, Plaintiff has not submitted competent, substantial evidence showing that he relied on those misrepresentations since he expressly testified that he did not rely on any brochures, advertisements, or documents, or any information on Defendant’s website. (Pl. COE Ex. 4, Pl. Dep., pp. 58:21-23, 59:12-23.)

Finally, the court notes that Plaintiff contends that Defendant has not met its initial burden on summary adjudication by failing to challenge each unlawful act alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff specifically argues that Defendant did not address Plaintiff’s allegations that (1) Defendant’s “misrepresentations also apply to the fact that [Defendant] made representations to Plaintiff about this one subject vehicle that were not true[,]” and (2) Defendant’s “2018 Model Year Ford Warranty Guide” promised Plaintiff that the dealership would “meet[] [his] every service need” and remedy manufacturing defects. (Opp., pp. 13:11-12, 13:25-14:2.) The court disagrees. Fairly interpreted, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant misrepresented the standard, quality, grade, and condition of all 2018 Ford Explorers, which necessarily included the subject vehicle, and not that Defendant made any specific affirmative misrepresentations as to the subject vehicle. (SAC ¶¶ 109-111.) Further, the court acknowledges that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant represented that Plaintiff would be “securing the benefit of a warranty” to maintain the utility and performance of the subject vehicle. (SAC ¶ 112.) However, Defendant’s motion has addressed this allegation by arguing and producing evidence showing that Plaintiff cannot establish the element of reliance on this alleged misrepresentation.

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to (1) whether Defendant knew, at the time of making the alleged representations, that its 2018 Ford Explorers, including the subject vehicle, suffered from an exhaust and carbon monoxide intrusion defect, and therefore made misrepresentations about the quality, grade, or standard of the subject vehicle, and (2) whether Plaintiff relied on alleged misrepresentations made in the warranty when deciding to lease the subject vehicle.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the 10th cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages has no merit because Defendant has shown that the causes of action on which Plaintiff bases his request for punitive damages have no merit, and therefore there is no remaining cause of action on which Plaintiff can base his request punitive damages.

The court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the sufficiency of the causes of action on which Plaintiff bases his request for an award of punitive damages. Here, Plaintiff appears to request an award of punitive damages in his seventh cause of action for fraud and 10th cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. (SAC ¶¶ 83, 117; SAC Prayer, ¶¶ 8, 10.)

First, Plaintiff has dismissed the seventh cause of action for fraud, and therefore is not entitled to an award of punitive damages on that claim.

Second, for the reasons set forth above, the court has granted Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the 10th cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of punitive damages on that cause of action.

Finally, even if the court had not granted summary adjudication on the 10th cause of action, the court notes that Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that he was entitled to punitive damages in connection with this cause of action. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he “has not complied with the notice provisions of Civil Code § 1782, and therefore does not seek damages on this claim at the time this Complaint is filed.” (SAC ¶ 122.) The court acknowledges that a consumer may amend his or her complaint without leave of court to include a request for damages after compliance with Civil Code section 1782. (Civ. Code, § 1782, subd. (d).) However, Plaintiff did not amend his Second Amended Complaint to include such a request for damages. Thus, even if the court did not grant summary adjudication as to the 10th cause of action, Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a request for punitive damages in connection with this cause of action.

The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

The court denies defendant Ford Motor Company’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff Arin Yaghoubi’s seventh cause of action for fraud as moot.

The court grants defendant Ford Motor Company’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff Arin Yaghoubi’s third cause of action for sale of defective merchandise without disclosing defects, 10th cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and claim for punitive damages.

[1] Further, the court notes that any oral statements made by the sales representative would not appear to fall within the purview of section 17531, which governs advertisements made “in any newspaper, magazine, circular, form letter or any open publication, published, distributed, or circulated in this state, including over the Internet, or on any billboard, card, label, or other advertising medium, or by means of any other advertising device . . . .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17531.)

arin yaghoubi ; Plaintiff, vs. ford motor company , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	19STCV29421

	Hearing Date:	April 10, 2023

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: defendant’s motion for summary adjudication