Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, Case Number: 19STCV31790, Date: 2024-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 19STCV31790, Date: 2024-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff DeeAnna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier

Plaintiff DeeAnna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier (“D. Linsmaier”) (collectively, “Plaintiff”) moves the court for an order (1) sealing documents filed in support of her request for default judgment, and (2) entering default judgment in her favor and against defendant Carl J. Linden, a/k/a Carl Linden (“Defendant”).

Plaintiff requests that the court seal the following documents: (1) Exhibits 1-10 attached to the filing entitled “Declaration of DeeAnna Linsmaier in Support of Application for Default Judgment Pursuant to CCP §585(d), and Request for Equitable Relief Under Probate Code §259(a),” filed on June 12, 2024 by Plaintiff; (2) pages 4:14-15, 4:17-25, 5:17-18, 5:21-24, 5:26-28, 6:1, 6:3-4, 6:7-15, 6:17, 6:19-21, 6:23-27, 7:1-4, 7:6-10, 7:12-14, 7:16-18, 7:20-28, 8:1, 8:7-14, and 8:18-20 of the “Declaration of Deeanna Linsmaier in Support of Application for Default Judgment Pursuant to CCP §585(d), and Request for Equitable Relief Under Probate Code §259(a),” filed on June 12, 2024 by Plaintiff; and (3) page 3, lines 9-20 of the filing entitled “Plaintiff’s Brief Summary of the Case in Support of Application for Default Judgment,” filed by Plaintiff on June 12, 2024.

Generally, court records are presumed to be open unless confidentiality is required by law.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (c).)¿ If the presumption of access applies, the court may order that a record be filed under seal “if it expressly finds facts that establish: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.”¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (d).)¿¿¿¿

First, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to exhibits 1-2 and 4-10 attached to her supporting declaration,[1] that (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the information in those exhibits since the documents include (i) death certificates of individuals that are not parties to this action, (ii) D. Linsmaier’s medical records, and (iii) sensitive financial information of the parties (i.e., their account numbers), (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the records, (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed, (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored, and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (d).)

The court acknowledges that Plaintiff has also moved to seal various emails that appear to describe D. Linsmaier’s condition. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 3.) However, Plaintiff did not present adequate argument to show that there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to these records.

Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to the identification of account numbers with various financial institutions described in the Plaintiff’s supporting declaration on pages 4:18, 4:23, 4:24, 6:4, 6:14, 6:15, 6:17, 7:2, 7:3, 7:7, 7:10, 7:13, 7:18, 7:22, 7:24, 7:26, 7:28, 8:7, 8:9, 8:11, and 8:13, that (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record since those portions of the declaration list the numbers associated with various financial accounts belonging to D. Linsmaier and Defendant, (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the record, (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed, (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored since the court will seal only the account numbers, and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 2.550, subd. (d).) The court denies Plaintiff’s request to seal the information describing the transfers made by Defendant, including the amount of the transfers, because Plaintiff has not established an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to that information.

Third, the court finds that Plaintiff has established, as to the account numbers listed on page 3, lines 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, and 19 of the case summary, that (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record since those portions of the Brief Summary list the numbers associated with various financial accounts belonging to D. Linsmaier, (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the record, (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed, (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored since the court will seal only the account numbers, and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 2.550, subd. (d).) The court denies Plaintiff’s request to seal the amount of compensatory damages sought as to the amounts transferred from each account and the names of the financial institutions. Thus, the court will seal only the account numbers.

Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended Complaint in this action on June 6, 2023, alleging five causes of action against Defendant for (1) elder abuse (financial), (2) elder abuse (physical), (3) elder abuse—fraud, (4) elder abuse—constructive fraud, and (5) elder abuse— undue influence. Defendant’s default was entered on March 14, 2024.

Plaintiff now requests that the court enter default judgment in her favor and against Defendant in the amount of $1,202,751.61, consisting of $834,510.19 in damages and $368,241.42 in interest.

The court finds that the Third Amended Complaint is well pleaded and therefore may support Plaintiff’s request for default judgment. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281 [“‘Substantively, “[t]he judgment by default is said to ‘confess’ the material facts alleged by the plaintiff, i.e., the defendant’s failure to answer has the same effect as an express admission of the matters well pleaded in the complaint”’”] [internal citations omitted] [emphasis in original].)

First, the court finds that the first and third through fifth causes of action state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action for financial elder abuse.[2]

As a threshold matter, the court finds that Plaintiff filed, on May 6, 2022, a declaration setting forth all information required by Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32, showing that Plaintiff (1) is the successor in interest to D. Linsmaier, and therefore (2) has standing to allege claims for elder abuse on behalf of D. Linsmaier under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the “Elder Abuse Act”). (Pl. May 6, 2022 Decl., ¶¶ 3-8; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.32, 377.11 [defining a decedent’s successor in interest]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)91) [“after the death of the elder . . . , the right to commence or maintain an action shall pass to the personal representative of the decedent” or, if there is no personal representative, to the decedent’s successor in interest, if the requirements of section 377.32 are met].)

“‘Financial abuse’ of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: [¶] (1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. . . . . [¶¶] (3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, ¶ 15610.30, subds. (a)(1), (a)(3); Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 174.) Undue influence is defined to mean “excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a).) In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence, courts shall consider several factors set forth in the Elder Abuse Act, including the vulnerability of the victim, the influencer’s apparent authority, the actions or tactics used by the influencer, and the equity of the result. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4).)

Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing the following. D. Linsmaier was, at all relevant times, an elder within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act. (TAC ¶ 45 [D. Linsmaier was over 65 years old at the time of all wrongful acts]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.27 [“‘Elder’ means any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older”].) D. Linsmaier was also diagnosed with dementia, which had advanced by the years 2005-2006. (TAC ¶ 27.) As a result of her impaired cognitive ability, D. Linsmaier became vulnerable to Defendant’s actions. (TAC ¶ 94.)

Defendant took control of D. Linsmaier’s property, including “hundreds of thousands of dollars” belonging to her and other financial accounts, which she accumulated “while living separate and apart from” Defendant such that it was D. Linsmaier’s sole property. (TAC ¶¶ 22, 29, 43-44.) Defendant used D. Linsmaier’s property “for his own benefit and not” for the benefit of D. Linsmaier, including by representing that “there were no funds or insurance to pay for [D. Linsmaier’s medical] care . . . .” (TAC ¶ 30.) Moreover, he fraudulently obtained power of attorney and “sign[ed] himself into [D. Linsmaier’s investment accounts] because [D. Linsmaier] lacked necessary capacity at the time.” (TAC ¶¶ 32, 50, subd. (b) [Defendant forced D. Linsmaier to “change her beneficiaries” and to change her power of attorney “despite her incapacity and inability to legally make such decisions”].)

The court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts showing that (1) D. Linsmaier was an elder within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act; (2) Defendant took, appropriated, and obtained D. Linsmaier’s property for a wrongful use, i.e., to use for his own benefit despite knowing that it would be harmful to D. Linsmaier (TAC ¶¶ 30, 113); and (3) Defendant took, appropriated, and obtained D. Linsmaier’s property by undue influence[3] because (i) he was acting as D. Linsmaier’s caregiver, friend, and, at certain times, significant other (TAC ¶¶ 21, 25, 111), such that he had apparent authority over her, (ii) he controlled D. Linsmaier’s medical care, medications, and interactions with her family members (TAC ¶¶ 29, 50, 96, 129), (iii) he, acting in this capacity, persuaded D. Linsmaier to allow him to obtain her power of attorney and to sign himself onto her investment accounts, despite the fact that she did not have the legal capacity to do so and was vulnerable due to her impaired cognitive ability (TAC ¶¶ 46, 50, 96, 129), which (iv) led to the inequitable results of Defendant obtaining her funds and assets and using them for his own benefit, rather than D. Linsmaier’s benefit (TAC ¶¶ 32, 50, subds. (e), (f)). (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.30, subds. (a)(1), (a)(3), (b), 15610.70, subd. (a).)

Second, the court finds that the second cause of action states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for physical elder abuse.

Physical abuse within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act means, inter alia, assault and battery, as defined in Penal Code sections 240 and 242, respectively, and the use of a physical or chemical restraint or psychotropic medication for any purpose not authorized by the physician or surgeon. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.63, subds. (b), (f)(3).) Plaintiff has alleged facts showing that (1) D. Linsmaier was an elder at all relevant times (TAC ¶ 45); (2) Defendant threatened D. Linsmaier and caused her physical harm by striking her on the face and shoulder, pushing her against a wall and into a couch, and pushing her until she fell (TAC ¶¶ 68, subd. (a), 69), and therefore has alleged facts establishing that Defendant battered D. Linsmaier within the meaning of Penal Code section 242; and (3) Defendant used physical and chemical restraints to control D. Linsmaier’s access to family, friends, and authorities, and for punishment (TAC ¶¶ 68, subd. (b), 70), and therefore has alleged facts establishing that Defendant used physical and chemical restraints for punishment and for purposes not authorized by D. Linsmaier’s physician. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.27, 15610.63, subds. (a), (f)(1), (f)(3); Pen. Code, § 242 [defining battery to be “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another”].) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for physical elder abuse against Defendant.

The court further finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that Defendant acted with malice and oppression in committing the physical and financial abuse of D. Linsmaier. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (c)(1), (c)(2).)

The court finds that Plaintiff has proven that she is entitled to recover from Defendant, as successor-in-interest to D. Linsmaier, damages in the amount of $824,660.19, consisting of $574,660.19 in economic compensatory damages and $250,000 in pain and suffering. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657.5, subd. (a) [plaintiff shall recover from a defendant found liable for financial abuse compensatory damages], 15657.5, subd. (b), 15657, subd (b).)

As a threshold matter, the court notes that, on November 4, 2022, the court issued an order denying Plaintiff’s request for default judgment because, inter alia, the evidence appeared to show that Defendant and D. Linsmaier were married, which could have triggered the community property laws and rendered the use and transfer of D. Linsmaier’s funds potentially lawful. However, Plaintiff has now (1) alleged that “no legal marriage existed between [D. Linsmaier] and [Defendant] in any other jurisdiction” (TAC ¶ 21), and (2) presented a copy of D. Linsmaier’s death certificate, which reflects that it has been amended (i) to state D. Linsmaier’s marital status to be divorced, and (ii) to state that Defendant (who is identified as the informant) is D. Linsmaier’s “friend,” not husband. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 1, D. Linsmaier Death Cert, p. 3.) Thus, Plaintiff has addressed the issue regarding the potential application of the community property laws.

First, Plaintiff has proven that Defendant took property belonging to D. Linsmaier in the amount of $307,245.55 in funds deposited on her behalf with Brighthouse Financial.

Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that (1) a total of $353,503.71 was deposited on behalf of D. Linsmaier by her financial advisor and from her 401k accounts; (2) at the end of June 2015, the account balance was $305,404.01; and (3) on January 16, 2016, a distribution in the amount of $307,245.55 was made from this account to Defendant. (Pl. Decl., ¶ 19; Pl. Decl., Ex. 5, pp. 5-03-5-09, 5-11, 5-12 [Acknowledgement from MetLife showing the lump sum distribution to the account with Pershing “FBO” Defendant].) Moreover, as set forth above, Plaintiff has alleged, and therefore Defendant has confessed, that Defendant unlawfully “sign[ed] himself into [D. Linsmaier’s] investment accounts” (TAC ¶ 32) and “took unauthorized control of [D. Linsmaier’s] investment, retirement, and financial accounts” (TAC ¶ 43). (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)

Thus, Plaintiff has shown that D. Linsmaier was damaged in the amount of $307,245.55 as a result of Defendant’s financially abusing her by taking control of, and receiving the disbursement from, her Brighthouse account.

Second, Plaintiff has proven that Defendant took property belonging to D. Linsmaier in the amount of $81,760.44 in funds deposited on her behalf with Voya and therefore has proven damages in that amount.

Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that (1) D. Linsmaier held an account with Voya; (2) an account transfer form was completed, by which the funds held in D. Linsmaier’s Voya account were to be transferred to Defendant’s Pershing account; and (3) $81,760.44 was deposited into Defendant’s account from D. Linsmaier’s Voya account on February 8, 2016. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 6, pp. 6-01, 6-06 [Account Transfer Form], 6-11.) Plaintiff has also alleged, and therefore Defendant has confessed, that his acts in assigning himself as the beneficiary and taking control of this account before D. Linsmaier’s death was unlawful and constitutes financial abuse of an elder. (TAC ¶¶ 32, 43; Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)

Thus, Plaintiff has proven damages in the amount of $81,760.44 as a result of Defendant’s financially abusing D. Linsmaier by taking control of, and receiving the disbursement from, her Voya financial account.

Third, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant took property belonging to D. Linsmaier in the amount of $150,000 based on Defendant’s unauthorized receipt of D. Linsmaier’s life insurance funds.

Plaintiff has (1) alleged that Defendant took unauthorized control of D. Linsmaier’s life insurance policy (TAC ¶ 22), and (2) proven that Defendant received from D. Linsmaier’s life insurance policy $152,842.43 on June 16, 2016. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 7, p. 7-09). Although Plaintiff has proven that Defendant received $152,842.43 from D. Linsmaier’s life insurance policy, Plaintiff has requested only $150,000 in damages. (Brief Summary of Case, p. 3:13 [“Plaintiff seeks the return of the following funds stolen: [¶¶] $150,000” held in D. Linsmaier’s life insurance policy].)

Thus, Plaintiff has proven $150,000 in damages based on Defendant’s unauthorized receipt of D. Linsmaier’s life insurance funds.

Fourth, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant took $8,343.07 from D. Linsmaier’s Voya Financials account on January 26, 2016. Specifically, Plaintiff has (1) alleged that Defendant unlawfully took control of D. Linsmaier’s financial accounts (TAC ¶ 22), and (2) presented evidence showing that (i) D. Linsmaier transferred funds to an account with Voya Financials (at that time known as ING / Golden American Life Insurance Company), and (ii) Defendant received from this account $8,343.07 on January 26, 2016. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 8, pp. 8-05, 8-06-8-07 [check to Defendant for $8,343.07 for “DeathBenefit Payout for Contract [number associated with D. Linsmaier]]”].)

Thus, Plaintiff has proven $8,343.07 in damages based on Defendant’s unauthorized receipt of D. Linsmaier’s funds that were deposited with Voya Financials.

Fifth, the court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant withdrew a total amount of $9,850 from one of D. Linsmaier’s accounts with Voya Financials. Plaintiff has (1) alleged that Defendant took unauthorized control of D. Linsmaier’s financial accounts (TAC ¶ 22), and (2) presented evidence showing that (i) $5,212 was withdrawn from that account on August 20, 2012, and (ii) $4,638 was withdrawn from that account on January 17, 2013. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 9, pp. 9-01, 9-07.) However, Plaintiff did not submit evidence showing that those amounts were deposited in an account belonging to Defendant, and therefore has not shown that Defendant unlawfully took these funds from D. Linsmaier.

Thus, Plaintiff has not proven $9,850 in damages based on Defendant’s withdrawal of funds from D. Linsmaier’s account with Voya Financials in August 2012 and January 2013.

Sixth, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant unlawfully received $27,311.13 from D. Linsmaier’s ING / Golden American Life Insurance Company account.

Plaintiff has (1) alleged that Defendant took unauthorized control of D. Linsmaier’s life insurance policy and financial accounts (TAC ¶ 22), and (2) presented evidence showing that (i) D. Linsmaier’s account with ING / Golden American Life Insurance Company had a death benefit value of $27,311.13, and (ii) Defendant transferred that amount to himself by submitting a Claimant Statement with the account holder. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 10, pp. 10-05, 10-06.)

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff, as successor in interest to D. Linsmaier, is entitled to an award of compensatory damages in the amount of $574,660.19.

Finally, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that D. Linsmaier suffered pain and suffering damages in the amount of $250,000 before her death as a result of the physical abuse of Defendant. (Pl. Supp. Decl. re Pain & Suffering, ¶¶ 1-5, 7-13; Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220, 226-227 [Elder Abuse Act permits “pain and suffering damages even after the abused elder dies”]; Welf. & Inst. Code, §15657, subd. (b).)

Although Plaintiff requests $368,241.42 in interest, Plaintiff did not (1) submit interest computations as required, or (2) identify a statute authorizing the court to award interest on the economic damages proven. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(3).) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not proven that she is entitled to prejudgment interest and therefore denies the request for prejudgment interest in the amount of $368,241.42.

Plaintiff requests that the court (1) deem Defendant to have predeceased D. Linsmaier for the purpose of entitlement pursuant to Probate Code section 259, and (2) determine that Defendant is to take nothing from D. Linsmaier’s estate. (TAC p. 26, ¶ 10.)

“Any person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent . . . where all of the following apply: [¶] (1) It is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the person is liable for physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult. [¶] (2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith. [¶] (3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious in the commission of any of those acts upon the decedent. [¶] (4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter until the time of his or her death, has been found to have been substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence.” (Prob. Code, § 259, subd. (a).)

The court has found, as set forth above, that Plaintiff alleged facts establishing that Defendant, while acting in bad faith and engaging in conduct that was malicious and oppressive, is liable for the physical abuse and financial abuse of D. Linsmaier. (Prob. Code, § 259, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3).) The court has also found that D. Linsmaier, at the time that the acts occurred, was unable to substantially manage her finances or to resist the undue influence of Defendant as a result of her diagnosis of advanced dementia and her impaired cognitive ability. (Prob. Code, § 259, subd. (a)(4).)

Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that she is entitled to an order deeming Defendant to have predeceased D. Linsmaier to the extent provided by Probate Code section 259, subdivision (c).

The court denies Plaintiff’s request for an order that “any such property the Defendant came into possession, transferred the title to his name or become entitled to shall revert back to Decedent’s estate” because (1) Probate Code section 259 does not appear to authorize such an order, and (2) Plaintiff did not request that relief in the Third Amended Complaint.

The court finds that Plaintiff has dismissed all parties against whom judgment is not sought as required. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(7); June 6, 2024 Req. for Dismissal.)

For the reasons set forth above, the court grants Plaintiff’s request for court judgment by default against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff, as the successor in interest to D. Linsmaier, in the total amount of $824,660.19.

The court notes, however, that Plaintiff appears to be requesting default judgment be entered in favor of herself, as an individual. However, Plaintiff only has standing to assert causes of action under the Elder Abuse Act as successor in interest to D. Linsmaier, and does not have standing to assert individual claims against Defendant under this statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)(1) [successor in interest of a decedent elder may commence an action under the Elder Abuse Act].) Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff requests default judgment in her favor as an individual, the court denies that request.

The court grants in part plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier’s motion to seal as follows.

The court orders that the unredacted versions of the following documents, lodged with the court by plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier on or around June 12, 2024, shall be filed under seal: (1) “Declaration of DeeAnna Linsmaier in Support of Application for Default Judgment Pursuant to CCP §585(d), and Request for Equitable Relief Under Probate Code §259(a),” and (2) “Plaintiff’s Brief Summary of the Case in Support of Application for Default Judgment.”

The court orders plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier, no later than September 13, 2024, to file a revised redacted version of the “Declaration of DeeAnna Linsmaier in Support of Application for Default Judgment Pursuant to CCP §585(d), and Request for Equitable Relief Under Probate Code §259(a)” that (1) identifies it as “Public-Redacts materials from sealed record,” and (2) redacts the following portions of the declaration: (i) exhibits 1-2 and 4-10, and (ii) the account numbers identified on pages 4:18, 4:23, 4:24, 6:4, 6:14, 6:15, 6:17, 7:2, 7:3, 7:7, 7:10, 7:13, 7:18, 7:22, 7:24, 7:26, 7:28, 8:7, 8:9, 8:11, and 8:13.

The court orders plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier, no later than September 13, 2024, to file a revised redacted version of the “Plaintiff’s Brief Summary of the Case in Support of Application for Default Judgment” that (1) identifies it as “Public-Redacts materials from sealed record,” and (2) redacts the account numbers set forth on page 3, lines 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, and 19.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.551, subdivision (e), the court directs the clerk to file this order, maintain the records ordered sealed in a secure manner, and clearly identify the records as sealed by this order.

The court grants in part plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier’s request for default judgment as follows.

The court orders that plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier as her successor in interest, is entitled to a court judgment by default against defendant Carl J. Linden, a/k/a Carl Linden (1) in the total amount of $824,660.19, consisting of $574,660.19 in compensatory damages, which is awarded based on a claim for financial abuse of an elder adult as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, and $250,000 in pain and suffering damages, which is awarded based on the claim for physical abuse of an elder adult, and (2) ordering that Carl J. Linden, a/k/a Carl Linden is deemed to have predeceased Donna Marie Linsmaier, a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier pursuant to Probate Code section 259, subdivision (a).

The court denies all other relief requested in plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier’s request for default judgment.

The court will modify, sign, and file the proposed Judgment (made on Judicial Council form JUD-100) consistent with this order.

The court directs the clerk to give notice of this order and entry of judgment to plaintiff Deeanna Linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier.

[1] The court notes that Plaintiff has previously filed some of these documents, without redactions, with the court. (TAC Ex. A [D. Linsmaier’s Death Certificate]; Pl. Decl. filed December 16, 2020 Ex. J [Kaiser records].) Because Plaintiff did not move to seal those documents, the court does not include those documents in this order.

[2] The court notes that Plaintiff has entitled her third through fifth causes of action to be “Elder Abuse – Fraud,” “Elder Abuse – Constructive Fraud,” and “Elder Abuse – Undue Influence,” respectively. However, abuse of an elder is defined to mean (1) physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering, (2) the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering, and (3) financial abuse as defined in section 15610.30. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.07, subd. (a).) Elder abuse, therefore, does not encompass claims for fraud. However, it appears that Plaintiff has alleged causes of action for financial abuse of an elder under these theories (i.e., that Defendant obtained D. Linsmaier’s property (1) “with intent to defraud” as defined in section 15610.30 and (2) “by undue influence” as defined in sections 15610.30 and 15610.70). (TAC ¶¶ 91, 95-96, 113-14, 128-129.) Thus, the court has discussed these causes of action with the first cause of action for financial elder abuse.

[3] It appears that Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant obtained D. Linsmaier’s property as a result of his undue influence over her in support of all of her financial elder abuse causes of action. (TAC ¶¶ 50, 96, 114, 129.) Thus, while Plaintiff does not appear to have alleged facts establishing that Defendant took D. Linsmaier’s property with the intent to defraud her, the allegations of undue influence are sufficient to support each financial elder abuse cause of action.

deeanna linsmaier, as an individual and on behalf of Donna Marie Linsmaier, a/k/a Dawn D. Linsmaier ; Plaintiff, vs. carl j. linden, a/k/a CARL LINDEN , et al.; Defendants.	Case No.:	19STCV31790

	Hearing Date:	August 16, 2024

	Time:	10:00 a.m.

	[tentative] Order RE: (1) Plaintiff’s motion to seal (2) plaintiff’s request for court judgment by default