Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: 19STCV34676, Date: 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling
Tentative rulings are sometimes, but not always, posted. The purpose of posting a tentative ruling is to to help focus the argument. The posting of a tentative ruling is not an invitation for the filing of additional papers shortly before the hearing.
Case Number: 19STCV34676 Hearing Date: August 31, 2022 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
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vs. paul lauer |
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19STCV34676 |
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August
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[Tentative]
Order RE: motion to challenge and contest good faith
settlement |
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MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Bjork Plumbing, Inc.,
and Timothy Bjork
RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants Paul Lauer and Laura Lauer, individually
and as trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family Trust
Motion to Challenge and Contest Good Faith
Settlement
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in
connection with this motion.
Defendants Bjork Plumbing, Inc., and Timothy Bjork
(“Bjork Defendants”) move the court for an order, pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 877.6, determining that the Settlement and Release Agreement
(the “Settlement Agreement”) entered into by and between plaintiff Melissa
DeMarco (“Plaintiff”) on the one hand, and defendants Paul Lauer and Laura
Lauer, as individuals and trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family Trust
(“Lauer Defendants”) on the other hand, is not in good faith.
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section
877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure
for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered
into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint
tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when
good faith is shown.” (IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179
Cal.App.3d 94, 104.)
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d
488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive
factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith
under section 877.6: “a rough
approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate
liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds
among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in
settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the
financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as
well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure
the interests of nonsettling defendants.”
The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on
that issue. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 877.6, subd. (d).) The party
challenging the good faith settlement “should be permitted to demonstrate, if
he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to
these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the
statute. Such a demonstration would
establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’
within the terms of section 877.6.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at
pp. 499-500.)
The challenged Settlement Agreement provides
that Plaintiff will release all claims on behalf of herself and her children
against Lauer Defendants in exchange for the Lauer Defendants’ settlement payment
of $85,000. (Spaniac Decl., Ex. A,
Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4.) The
Settlement Agreement expressly excludes all claims against Bjork Defendants
from its terms. (Ibid.) Bjork Defendants contend that the Settlement
Agreement is not in good faith because (1) Plaintiff’s testimony establishes
that her damages were caused by defendant Paul Lauer’s conduct; (2) Bjork
Defendants’ work was approved by the County of Los Angeles Department of Public
Works Building and Safety Division; (3) the actions complained of were not
performed by Bjork Defendants; and (4) because the Lauer Defendants are
completely liable, the proposed settlement amount of $85,000 is unfair because
it represents only 28 percent of Plaintiff’s claimed damages and Plaintiff’s
global settlement demand of $295,000.
(See Spaniac Decl., ¶¶ 3-4 [Plaintiff’s initial settlement demand was
for $295,000, but Plaintiff’s final global settlement demand was $275,000].)
The court finds that Bjork Defendants have
not met their burden of establishing that the Settlement Agreement “is so far
‘out of the ballpark’” in relation to the Tech-Bilt factors as to
be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of section 877.6, and therefore denies Bjork Defendants’ motion to challenge the good faith
settlement. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 877.6, subd. (d); Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp.
499-500.)
First, the court finds that Bjork Defendants
have not met their burden of establishing that Lauer Defendants are 100 percent
responsible for Plaintiff’s claimed damages in support of their argument that
the Settlement Agreement does not appropriately account for Lauer Defendants’
proportionate liability. Bjork
Defendants attach portions of testimony from Plaintiff explaining that Paul
Lauer “tore up the stucco outside the house,” “tore up the wall inside the
garage,” and used bleach on the walls, which caused Plaintiff to become dizzy
and nauseous. (Daley Decl., Ex. A, Pl.
Dep., 86:4-14, 147:22-148:5.) In
opposition, Lauer Defendants attach portions of Plaintiff’s testimony
explaining that both Bjork Defendants and Paul Lauer contributed to cutting
walls open, including with Timothy
Bjork’s
electric saw. (Spaniac Decl., Ex. F, Pl.
Dep., 40:8-18, 41:24-42:24.) In light of
this evidence, the court finds that Bjork Defendants have not established that
Lauer Defendants were solely liable for Plaintiff’s claimed damages. Moreover, “‘[a] “good faith” settlement does
not call for perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability.’” (PacifiCare of California v. Bright
Medical Associates, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1465.) Lauer Defendants’ payment of $85,000 is not
“grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the
settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at
p. 499 [internal quotations omitted].)
Second, the court finds that the other Tech-Bilt
factors weigh in favor of finding that the settlement terms are in good
faith. The court finds the following
factors further establish that the Settlement Agreement was executed in good
faith: (1) Plaintiff made a settlement demand on Lauer Defendants for $90,000
before the parties subsequently reached their settlement of $85,000; (2) the
parties previously participated in a private mediation; (3) counsel continued
to discuss a global settlement and engaged in further settlement discussions; (4)
the $85,000 payment will be made to Plaintiff in exchange for the release of
her claims and the release of claims brought by her children; (5) Bjork
Defendants have introduced no evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious
conduct; and (6) the recognition that Lauer Defendants should pay less in
settlement than they would if they were found liable after a trial. (Spaniac Decl., ¶¶ 7, 4, 6, Ex. A, Settlement
Agreement, ¶ 4; Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)
For the reasons set forth above, the court
finds that Bjork Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing
that the Settlement Agreement “is so far ‘out of the ballpark’” as to be
inconsistent with the equitable objectives of section 877.6. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at
pp. 499-500.)
ORDER
The
court denies defendants Bjork Plumbing, Inc., and Timothy Bjork’s motion to
challenge and contest good faith settlement.
The court finds that the settlement entered
into by plaintiff Melissa DeMarco, on one hand, and defendants Paul Lauer and
Laura Lauer, as individuals and trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family
Trust, on the other hand, as set forth in the Settlement and Release Agreement,
is in good faith within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6,
subdivision (a).
Because the court has
determined that the settlement entered into by plaintiff Melissa DeMarco, on one hand, and defendants Paul Lauer and
Laura Lauer, as individuals and trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family
Trust, on the other hand, is in good faith, the court grants defendants Paul
Lauer and Laura Lauer’s, as individuals and trustees of the Paul and Laura
Lauer Family Trust, application for good faith settlement determination, filed
with the court on March 8, 2022. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 877.6.)
The court orders that all
other joint tortfeasors or co-obligors are barred from any further claims
against Lauer Defendants for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or
comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative
fault. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd.
(c).)
The court orders that the demurrer and motion to strike filed by Lauer
Defendants on April 27, 2020 are taken off calendar as moot.
The court orders defendants Paul Lauer and Laura Lauer, as
individuals and as trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family Trust, to give
notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 31, 2022
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – Central District
Department
53
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vs. |
Case
No.: |
19STCV34676 |
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Hearing
Date: |
August
31, 2022 |
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Time: |
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[Tentative]
Order RE: (1)
demurrer TO first amended COMPLAINT (2)
motion
to strikE PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM first amended COMPLAINT |
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MOVING PARTIES:
Defendants Paul Lauer and
Laura Lauer, as individuals and Trustees of the Laura Lauer Family Trust
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Melissa DeMarco
(1)
Demurrer
to First Amended Complaint
MOVING PARTIES:
Defendants Paul Lauer and
Laura Lauer, as individuals and Trustees of the Laura Lauer Family Trust
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Melissa DeMarco
(2)
Motion
to Strike Punitive Damages from First Amended Complaint
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in
connection with the demurrer and motion to strike.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Melissa DeMarco (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on September
30, 2019 against defendants Paul Lauer, Laura Lauer, Paul Andres Lauer and
Laura P. Lauer as Trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family Trust, Timothy
Bjork, and Bjork Plumbing, Inc. On March
16, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint, alleging six
causes of action for (1) negligent performance of work; (2) breach of contract;
(3) negligence and negligent hiring and supervision; (4) negligence per se; (5)
strict liability for ultrahazardous activities; and (6) intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
Defendants Paul Lauer and Laura Lauer, as individuals and Trustees of
the Laura Lauer Family Trust (“Defendants”), filed a demurrer and motion to
strike.
The court sustains Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of contract because it
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff
fails to identify which terms of the contract were breached by Defendants. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
The court sustains Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligence per se because
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege the violation of a specific statute and
instead incorporates exhibits which contain references to various regulatory
provisions. Thus, Plaintiff’s cause of
action fails to state facts sufficient to allege a cause of action and, is also
rendered uncertain by the vague reference to exhibits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.010, subd. (e), (f).)
The court sustains Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for strict liability for
ultrahazardous activities because it does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action since Plaintiff fails to allege facts to establish
that defendant Paul Lauer was engaged in ultrahazardous activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
The court sustains Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action since Plaintiff fails to allege facts to establish extreme and
outrageous behavior. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.10 subd. (e).)
The court overrules the
demurrer as to the alleged failure to join necessary parties.
MOTION TO STRIKE
The court denies as moot Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 69,
72, and 76 from the First Amended Complaint, because the court has sustained
the causes of action containing those allegations.
The court grants Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive
damages, because the court has sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the causes of
action on which Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is based.
ORDER
The court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the second, fourth, fifth,
and sixth causes of action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint with leave to
amend.
The court denies as moot Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 69,
72, and 76 from the FAC.
The court grants Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for
relief No. 3 on page 14 of the FAC (punitive damages) with leave to amend.
The court orders that Plaintiff has 20 days leave to file a second
amended complaint.
The court orders Defendants Paul Lauer and Laura Lauer, as individuals
and as Trustees of the Paul and Laura Lauer Family Trust to give notice of this
ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert
B. Broadbelt III
Judge
of the Superior Court